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Abbreviations and symbols 
no data available 
nil 
0 figure less than half the unit used 
kg oe kilogram of oil equivalent 
(41 860 kjoules NCV/kg) 
M million (10«) 
t tonne (metric ton) 
t = t tonne for tonne 
toe tonne of oil equivalent 
(41 860 kjoules NCV/kg) 
fob free on board 
cif cost-insurance-freight 
MW megawatt = 103 kWh 
kWh kilowatt hour 
GWh gigawatthour = 10« kWh 
J joule 
kJ kilojoule 
TJ terajoule = 10'kJ 
NCV net calorific value 
GCV gross calorific value 
ECU European currency unit. The ECU is a composite monetary unit consisting of a basket of the following 
amounts of each Community currency: 
BFR 3.71 HFL 0.256 
DKR 0.219 IRL 0.00871 
DM 0.719 LIT 140 
DR 1.15 LFR 0.14 
FF 1.31 UKL 0.0878 
USD US dollar 
EUR 10 Total of member countries of the EC before accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 
EUR 12 Total of member countries of the EC 
I or — discontinuity in series 
of which the words 'of which' indicate the presence of all the subdivisions of the total 
which *ke w o r c k 'among which' indicate the presence of certain subdivisions only 
Introduction 
At a time when the eyes of the world turn once more to the Gulf, it is opportune to reflect on the 
changing role of oil in our energy supplies and to look at some of the ways of reducing our de-
pendence on this region. 
The first article in this issue traces the evolution of oil consumption since the second oil shock in 
1979 — brought about mainly by political instability in the Gulf — to the present day and puts for-
ward some thoughts on its possible development until 1995. For the future, two price scenarios 
(USD 18/barrel and USD 25-30/barrel) are used which result in a range of possible levels of 
consumption (from 485 to 560 million tonnes of oil/year). While this review does not predict major 
disruptions to supply, these are always possible and the European Community is prepared for such 
events. The second article describes the emergency measures which the Community could take in the 
event of a future oil crisis. 
The major increases in oil prices brought about by the 1979 oil shock resulted in large decreases in 
the consumption of oil by the Member States. Consumption fell by 7.5% in 1980 and by 1985 was 
22% lower than in 1979. However, in 1986 the price of crude oil fell by 60% while oil demand in the 
European Community only rose by 3%! This might be taken to indicate that energy prices are less 
important than we used to think. The article 'Do oil and energy prices matter?' examines — and 
disagrees with — this view. 
The article 'So forecasting is easy!' is a personal view on possible energy futures and the uncertain-
ties surrounding these, by the Head of DG XVII's 'Analyses and forecasts' division. While this 
paper is centred around reflections upon the past and likely future role of 'king or citizen oil' it also 
briefly discusses some of the new technologies and improvements in energy efficiency that are hav-
ing an impact on energy demand. 
Third-party financing or, as it is called in our fifth article 'performance contracting' is more than 
just a new method of financing increasing efficiency of energy use. It usually includes a package of 
services such as the design, financing and installation of energy efficiency measures and the regular 
maintenance and service of the equipment. It was the subject of a seminar sponsored by the Com-
mission and held in Luxembourg in October 1987 at which this paper was presented. 
The development and exploitation of renewable forms of energy is likely to play an increasingly 
important role in the longer term. This was the subject of a recent Communication from the Com-
mission to the Council which is described in a short article. 
Greater use of nuclear power has been advocated by many to reduce dependence on imported fuels. 
However, to reduce the level of the uranium imports required to fuel the nuclear reactors it will be 
necessary to further develop the fast breeder reactor (FBR). The article here reports on the results of 
a Commission-sponsored study which examined how the gap between the costs of constructing a 
current technology reactor and those of constructing the recently completed FBR, Superphenix 1, 
could be narrowed by building a series (or batch) of the more advanced reactor type. 
The next article casts a backward glance at the amount of financial support from the Community to 
the energy sector in 1986 and analyses the distribution of the funds concerned. This support totalled 
4 321 MECU of which 1 091 MECU took the form of grants and 3 230 MECU the form of loans. 
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The last article brings us back to the present day with our most recent short-term energy outlook for 
the European Community. 
The section 'Community News' describes many of the recent events which could have an impact on 
energy and energy policy in the European Community. These cover a wide range of meetings includ-
ing meetings of the Energy Council, the meeting of the Research Council which adopted the frame-
work programme for technology research and development (1987-91) and a variety of seminars on 
energy planning, third-party financing, coal production technology and energy efficiency in indus-
try. There are also short articles in this section on improving the efficiency of electricity use and the 
meeting of the Governing Board of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Finally, the section 'Technology focus' contains articles on the development of a long-range naviga-
tion system for use in the exploration of the North Sea, on the transhipment of coal slurries and on 
the centralized management of heating systems. 
Oil and energy prices 
Table 2 
Short- and long-term price and income elasticities for motor 
gasoline 
Country Short-term Longer-term Short-term Longer-term 
price' price2 income3 income3 
elasticity elasticity elasticity elasticity 
FR of Germany 
France 
Italy 
The Netherlands 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
- 0.13 
- 0.55 
- 0.44 
- 0.31 
- 0.44 
- 0.17 
0.10 
0.21 
0.11 
0.14 
0.50 
0.50 
1.35 
0.15 
1.12 
4 
0.63 
0.82 
0.29 
1.13 
' Direct price effect. 
2 Indirect effect through changes in the vehicle stock. 
3 Effect of changes in private consumption. 
' Other variables present. 
(if) Exploration at a more aggregate level of the 
effects over time in changes in price at dif-
ferent price levels. There is some evidence to 
suggest that the long-term demand response to 
price changes depends both on the absolute 
level of prices and upon whether prices are ris-
ing or falling. Some of the research underlying 
the model used by the Commission services 
for simulating the behaviour of the world oil 
market (Aisling) points to a lower response to 
a fall below previous peak oil price levels than 
to an increase above them. This can be ex-
plained theoretically by factors such as more 
competitive pricing by other fuels in a bid to 
retain market shares when the price of oil is 
falling (with a rising oil price, the price of al-
ternatives has also tended to rise, reinforcing 
the trend towards saving, but not sufficiently 
to remove the incentive to switch out of oil), 
the maintenance of a regulatory environment 
which discourages re-investment in oil-
burning equipment (take, for example, the 
Community Directive of 1975 which limits oil 
use in power stations, and which remains in 
force), the fall in relative cost of non-oil 
burning equipment. Table 3 below outlines the 
results for Europe, the USA, Japan and the 
rest of OECD. 
Energy prices and economic 
change 
The full impact of changes in energy prices occurs only as 
price changes work themselves through the economy as a 
whole. Some of them are discernible relatively quickly, 
others take some time to be felt. These economic effects 
occur as energy becomes cheaper or more expensive in re-
lation to other factors of production (capital and labour) 
— affecting the level of investment and expenditure on 
labour in industry — and in relation to other items of 
private consumption, affecting both the pattern of con-
sumption and savings ratios. 
The substitutions that thus occur between factors of 
production have been studied by a number of research 
workers in Europe in the development of an energy-
oriented macro-sectoral model (Hermes) financed under 
the European Community's research programme into en-
ergy systems analysis. Table 4 gives an example of find-
ings for two key industrial categories. 
Table 4 
Long-term price elasticity1 of different factors of production 
in industry 
Investment (K) 
Labour (L)2 
Energy (E) 
Intermediate goods 
K L E 
- 0.15 0.20 - 0.05 
0.06 - 0.06 0.74 
- 0.00 0.20 0.20 
Capital goods 
K L 
- 0.39 0.63 -
0.08 - 0.37 
- 0.06 0.63 -
E 
0.24 
0.29 
0.56 
1 The table shows the full effects of changes in the real price of K, L and 
E on demand for K, L, E over a period of 8 to 10 years. It is derived 
from data for France. 
2 Labour (L) is not a direct measure of employment but of expenditure 
on wages and salaries. 
This shows how important the effects seem to have been. 
In the capital goods industries every 10% increase in en-
ergy prices has meant a cumulative reduction over the 
following 8 to 10 years of 2.4°7o in investment expendi-
ture and a rise in expenditure on wages and salaries of 
2.9%. 
Table 3 
Aisling model 
OECD: Price elasticities of oil demand by region 
Region 
EUR 10 
USA 
Japan 
Rest of OECD 
Short-term 
- 0.06 
- 0.05 
- 0.08 
- 0.04 
Long-term 
increase 
to new peak 
- 0.47 
- 0.64 
- 0.80 
- 0.45 
Long-term 
fall 
below peak 
- 0.24 
- 0.30 
- 0.31 
- 0.24 
Conclusions 
Energy and oil prices do matter. The absolute level, the 
direction in which they are moving and are expected to 
move, and the relative prices of each fuel all play a role, 
directly and indirectly, in influencing the pattern of en-
ergy demand and supply, as well as impacting on the eco-
nomy more widely. Economic science is not yet capable 
of providing as much guidance to policy-makers as they 
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would wish on how those influences will be exerted dur-
ing the coming years, but considerable progress has been 
made in isolating historically the longer-term effects of 
price. 
Just as it would be wrong to try to predict the future 
solely on the basis of a sophisticated but imperfect 
understanding of the role of prices in the past, it would 
be equally unwise to ignore prices altogether and to sup-
pose that energy demand will be determined overwhelm-
ingly by non-price factors such as autonomous technical 
change, demographic change, life-style modifications, 
etc. The challenge for further research and for analysts 
trying to peer into the longer-term future is to find ways 
of integrating econometric techniques with the more 
technological and sociological. 
In the meantime, however, the analyst or the policy-
maker who looks only at the short term and ignores the 
potential longer-term effects of price does so at his peril. 
Econometrics has been described, misleadingly, as akin 
to driving straight ahead while only looking in the rear-
view mirror. It may be just as dangerous to stare re-
solutely ahead without ever glancing behind. 
The US figure implies an elasticity of -0.08, that for Japan of around 
-0.035 and that for Europe of -0.05, before account is taken of the in-
come effects. The recorded figure for the Community is significantly 
below the real short-term elasticities derived from previous historical 
data (close to -0.1%) which were used for much short-term estima-
tion in the mid-1980s — see Energy in Europe No 5, September 1986. 
These apparent elasticities derived from the change in crude oil prices 
are of course lower than those observed on the basis of the smaller 
falls that occurred in the prices of oil products to the consumer over 
this period. But the latter elasticities too are relatively small, bearing 
in mind that the figures for most oil products are based on informa-
tion about deliveries, some of which we know went into stock. 
See Energy in Europe No 6. 
See separate article entitled 'So forecasting is easy!'. 
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So forecasting is easy! 
An invitation to Mr Kevin Ley don, Head of DG XVH's Analyses and Forecasts Division to ad-
dress1 the Royal Irish Academy provided the occasion to reflect on energy futures and the uncer-
tainties surrounding these, and why earlier forecasts were often off the mark. While this article 
draws on the work of Mr Leydon and his colleagues in the Commission Services, the arguments and 
interpretations presented are personal to the author and do not in any way commit either the Com-
mission or any other Community institution. 
Setting the scene 
Leonard Silk, the eminent American economist, set the 
background to the new forecasting environment in his re-
cent article in Foreign affairs2 when he described the 
current state of the world economic and financial system. 
He identified a range of dangers to the system including: 
(i) the high volatility of exchange rates; 
(ii) huge imbalances in trade and growing protection; 
these having been compounded by the inability of 
developing countries to meet their debt obligations; 
(iii) continuing fears of inflation in the midst of sharp 
declines in oil and commodity prices; 
(iv) sluggish growth in the industrial and developing 
countries alike; 
(v) persistent over-capacity and unemployment; 
(vi) aggravating the strings of clashing national interests 
were uncertainty and conflict among the major na-
tions of the West over the right policies for solving 
this complicated set of problems. 
To this list may be added the current failure of con-
fidence in the world's stock markets. This listing in-
dicates the general economic and financial environment 
within which the energy sector will operate. 
The immediate origins of the current situation in the en-
ergy market go back two years. From mid-1985 there 
were indications of a major change in Saudi policy, the 
consequences of which were the subject of much debate 
during the autumn and early winter. With the OPEC de-
cision in December 1985 to seek market share rather than 
to defend the price levels and all that this implied for 
Saudi Arabia in its previous role as swing producer, the 
market responded by marking down the price of crude 
oil by 50% during 1986. This change in oil policy coin-
cided with the devaluation of the US dollar; reducing 
substantially the purchasing power of the lower revenue. 
Going into 1987 the energy markets were for the moment 
'buyers' markets', with reduced balance-of-payments 
pressures and lower inflation in oil importing countries 
increasing the scope for resources to be directed towards 
investment or debt liquidation and growth in the Com-
munity economies. But so far the growth had not mate-
rialized. 
Those who believed this fall in oil prices would boost 
economic growth were disappointed, producers were 
aghast at the loss in revenue, consuming countries were 
pleasantly surprised that demand response was modest 
and energy analysts worked late trying to anticipate 
events in the short term and revamped their earlier fore-
casts! 
Where is the herd? 
Some commentators have remarked on the sociability of 
energy forecasters and their tendency to move in herds. 
Skimming the published literature suggests the herd lying 
in the range of 48 million to 54 million barrels a day 
(mbd) for world oil demand in 1995 (excluding centrally-
planned economies). This spread is significant in itself; 
perhaps more significant is the difference in estimates for 
developing countries and for maturer economies. For the 
former, estimates range between 14 to 18 mbd and for 
the OECD area between 34 to 38 mbd. The uncertainties 
surrounding these numbers include: 
(i) the rate of world economic growth (and the future 
role of the US dollar); 
(ii) the outlook for energy and oil demand and supply in 
other major industrialized countries and particularly 
in the United States; 
(iii) the prospects for the developing countries that are 
not oil exporters; 
(iv) oil production policy in oil exporting developing 
countries and particularly OPEC; 
(v) oil production and export policy in the centrally-
planned economies. 
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The follies of forecasting 
Will the current string of forecasts prove as erroneous 
and as short-lived as those of the preceding 15 years? 
Forecasts made in the mid-1970s for 1985 suggested a 
world oil demand of between 60 and 75 mbd. The actual 
outcome was nearer 50 mbd. Similarly forecasts for the 
year 2000 offered ranges between 75 and 90 mbd. As 
time went on, the early 1980s vintage forecasts identified 
a range of between 60 and 72 mbd. By the mid-1980s the 
forecasts were reduced to between 48 and 54 mbd, which 
in fact is lower than the actual consumption in 1980. 
Why was demand overestimated and supply underes-
timated? Forecasts for the mid-1980s, which were made 
before the first oil shock, turned out to be obsolete al-
most at once. This was a consequence of the substantial 
rise in the cost of energy and the subsequent impact on 
the various factors of production. These influenced the 
long-term economic growth rate resulting in energy con-
sumption estimates which were much too high. But 
simply at the time we did not recognize the major turning 
points which were occurring in the economic structure. 
The essentially political decisions to raise oil prices 
beyond a certain level impacted substantially on the 
fundamental relationships between labour, capital and 
energy. 
A second feature was the growth in interdependence, not 
only in economic matters but also in geo-politics, which 
had created a structure facilitating the transmission of 
economic shocks from one sector through the whole 
economic system. A major change in the price of oil 
therefore not only affected the relationships within the 
sector itself but had consequences right through the 
economic structures and indeed the world trading 
system.3 The problem of inflation, balance of payments 
and debt was severely affected by the sudden transfer of 
enormous rent from one economic agent to another. 
In addition to macroeconomic changes a number of 
other influential factors were at work. 
Firstly the relationship between the North and South was 
raising issues of economic welfare at a world level. The 
argument about a new international economic order was 
coming to a head. Because of the geographical distribu-
tion of oil resources, where essentially the reserves were 
in the 'South', the argument about the oil price left the 
energy sector and became an issue in this wider debate 
about the reshaping of the international order. The im-
porting and exporting countries thus approached the oil 
price question from fundamentally different stand-
points. Industrial countries saw this as essentially an oil 
and energy issue while countries in the 'South' and par-
ticularly OPEC insisted on giving equal emphasis to the 
totality of the North/South dialogue, both because they 
saw themselves as part of the 'South', and because they 
had a special interest as oil producers in discussing other 
aspects of the world economy.4 
Geo-political events were also playing an important role. 
The emergence of détente between the super-powers faci-
litated the development of gas supplies from the USSR to 
Western Europe. Politics also played a major role in the 
Middle East. The link between disturbances in the oil 
market and war is a highly correlated one. Disruptions, 
either physical or in price terms, are linked directly to the 
war situation in the Middle East. Many Arab oil scholars 
have suggested that the Palestinian question is funda-
mental to the oil issue. Added to this is, of course, the 
Iraq/Iranian war and the idealogical undertones sup-
porting that war. Essentially the Middle East is the centre 
of the world oil reserve. Geo-politics will therefore 
continue to play a major role, if not an increasing one, 
given the general assumption that OECD dependence on 
the Middle East for its oil resources will grow in the com-
ing decade.5 
Changes in perceptions 
Was the oil shock sufficient in itself to set in motion such 
a disturbance in the world economic system? Notwith-
standing the importance of oil it was not in itself suffi-
cient. There were other major changes occurring. The 
post-war consensus, based on the Bretton Woods agree-
ments, was faltering and confidence in our understand-
ing of the economic process was being undermined by in-
flation, low growth and the first major signs of serious 
unemployment. 
A powerful intellectual force which influenced both con-
suming and producing countries was the Club of Rome 
report6 on the new international order. The energy 
thinking was based on the belief in the depleting nature 
of oil and the rate at which this depletion was taking 
place. This is an example of Malthusian thinking in the 
twentieth century; largely ignoring the influence of tech-
nology, price and the need nations have to secure their 
strategic resources. The intellectual and emotional 
appeal of this argument was extremely powerful and in-
fluenced not only producing countries but also those who 
intellectually rejected the idea as such. 
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Forecasting 
Yet while this debate was raging, oil engineers were 
busily working on their platforms bringing in new fields 
not only in the industrialized world but perhaps more 
importantly in the Brazils and other regions of the de-
veloping world. Acceptance of this pessimistic view, 
which ignored the role of technology in innovation, has 
had major impact not only on the attitudes of producing 
countries but also in the industrialized world. Implicit in 
the industrial energy policy is the acceptance, however 
uncomfortable that is, of the need for a high price for oil 
and thus for high cost energy. But this has major re-
percussions for industrial and social development. 
The 1970s were a period of major fundamental 
changes in the macroeconomic structure, reflecting 
the stresses and strains in the production process 
arising from inflation, debt and rising interest 
rates. This undermined confidence in managing the 
crisis. Simultaneously, the geo-politics of the 
Middle East were introducing complex and long-
lasting influences. This was taking place against a 
background of developing debate between the 
North and the South in which the oil issue had a 
fundamental role. The intellectual climate of the 
era was essentially pessimistic and Malthusian. 
Serious doubts were raised regarding the survival 
of the world financial system. 
Narrowing the range of uncertainties 
The essential task of energy analysts is to narrow the 
range of uncertainties and to identify plausible orders 
of magnitude for the future evolution of the critical va-
riables that will determine the medium- and long-term 
energy outlook. 
In looking towards the next 'vintage' in energy analysis, 
there are a number of key factors, each complicated and 
subject to its own dynamic, which will influence the 
outcome of the energy sector. Amongst these are: 
(i) changes in the structure of the economic process; 
(ii) shifts in perceptions about the geo-political situa-
tion; 
(iii) the influence of technological innovation, both on 
the supply and the demand for energy (including 
concern about environmental issues); 
(iv) the dynamics of the oil sector itself and the interac-
tion between this sector and other fuels. 
Energy and the economic process 
The impact of and the reactions to the first two oil 
shocks had major repercussions on the economic 
process. The weight of oil in international trade is suffi-
cient to maintain this important relationship and while in 
value terms the measurement of this relationship will 
vary according to the oil price, strategically oil will re-
main an important variable in the world trading process. 
The reaction to these shocks by countries in different 
economic groupings at a world level had important re-
percussions on the economic structures. In general indus-
trialized countries7 reduced their oil dependency by a 
series of actions, including energy saving, substitution 
and lower energy content in the GDP function. Particu-
larly notable here is the Japanese experience where there 
was a substantial reduction, through an aggressive en-
ergy savings policy, in the energy content in GDP. 
Equally Japanese policy was active in diversifying the 
source of fuel imports. France replied by developing in-
digenous resources, i.e. nuclear, and took up the chal-
lenge from the oil shocks by increasing substantially the 
supply of 'national energy' in addition to substitution 
and conservation policies. 
By contrast, countries in the developing world did not 
succeed in reducing the energy content in GDP to the 
same extent. Oil consumption decreased largely because 
of recession, but nonetheless there was in a number of 
key countries an increase in domestic resources through 
investment in oil exploration and development. In an 
interesting paper presented to the 13th Congress at the 
World Energy Conference, the Institute for Economic 
and Legal Issues in Energy at Grenoble calculated the re-
duction in the rate of oil dependency. They distinguished 
two types of broad responses, those which in addition to 
reducing the wastage in energy use sought to invest in the 
energy sector and those countries which concentrated 
largely on improving their trading position.8 
Recovering the trading losses due to higher prices by in-
creased manufacturing exports was one strategy de-
veloped to respond to the earlier crisis. Japan, Germany, 
Italy and South Korea generated large manufactured 
goods surpluses which far exceeded the energy deficit. 
Countries therefore have the alternative of compensating 
for their energy vulnerability by an aggressive commer-
cial policy on external markets. This is not necessarily in 
contradiction with a policy of orientating investment to-
wards the energy sector to improve national energy 
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security. The problem was always how to get the mix 
right. 
The most striking result of the last decade of turbulance 
was the decoupling of the energy /GDP relationship. For 
the Community, energy demand was essentially flat for 
the period 1973/85, despite an increase in GDP of 24%. 
This change in the relationship between gross domestic 
product, industrial output and energy demand is the re-
sult of changing industrial structures, energy conserva-
tion, shift in product mix within industry and orientation 
towards higher value added. The change in industrial 
structure and product mix was a response to the changes 
in the capital, labour and energy production ratios and 
the continued search for economic growth. 
Perhaps the major impact of the energy shock was not so 
much on the direct relationship between energy and 
output but rather on the world economic system itself 
where the impact led to enormous instability, inflation 
and balance-of-payments problems. Rhys and Davis' 
have argued that countries experiencing faster than aver-
age productivity growth have tended also to achieve 
greater than average declines in energy use per unit of 
value added. This is due essentially to the structural 
change within the manufacturing sectors, shifting the 
structural mix towards lighter, higher value-added in-
dustries and enabling an increase in both labour pro-
ductivity and energy-use efficiency. Over the period 
1972-81 value added per person employed increased in 
Japan by 113% and in the United States by 25%. The 
energy use per unit of value added fell in Japan by 54% 
and by 24% in the United States. 
The industrial process itself will be affected by inflation 
and real interest rates which will also impact on exchange 
rates. The oil sector particularly is influenced by the ex-
change rates because oil is denominated in US dollars. 
During the 1980s the oil producers perceived a fall in the 
value of their oil but those in the non-dollar area were 
confronted with a rising price because of the apprecia-
tion of the dollar against their currencies. The 
coincidence of a substantial fall in the oil price with the 
consequences of the 'Plaza Agreement' meant that non-
dollar area consumers benefited substantially. One fur-
ther influence which will be specific to the Community 
area is the decision to progress towards the internal mar-
ket by 1992. This raises issues regarding the economic 
structures of companies and the 'rules of the game' to 
apply within the Community area. 
Consequently, taking a position on any future oil price 
path requires some assumptions about the key macro-
economic factors. But these themselves are subject to 
major degrees of uncertainty. Figure 1 looks at one pos-
sible outcome on GDP per head (wealth) and the balance 
of payments as a percentage of GDP (debt) in the 
principal trading regions. Such a view suggests that the 
balance-of-payments position in the developing countries 
will remain critical, with the risk of limiting growth and 
maintaining pressures on the world financial system. 
Figurei: 
GDP per head (average annual % change) 
Balance of payments as % of GDP 
2 -
1 -
0 -
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% 
>v LDC GDP per head 
\ " \ / 0EC0GDP 
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/ ^ \ \ / OECD BOP as S GDP 
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Source: CISI-Wharton/EEC. 
Geo-politics 
Oil prices in the future, as indeed in the past, will be 
hostage to the fortunes of politics and particularly to the 
politics of the Middle East. Current events in the Gulf 
clearly illustrate the nature of the risks involved. The 
Arabian Peninsula represents the world's 'reserve oil 
well'. Any assessment of the price-tag must take into ac-
count an appreciation of Saudi policy. 
The USSR also represents a major source of energy to 
Western Europe in particular but also on the world oil 
market. The earlier initiatives in détente were accom-
panied by the opening-up of the Soviet gas fields to Wes-
tern consumers. The Gorbachev initiative in the internal 
domestic economy of the Soviet Union may have impor-
tant repercussions on the geo-politics of Western Euro-
pean energy. Conventional wisdom had it — and indeed 
there are some traces of it remaining — that by the end of 
the century the Soviet Union and the centrally- planned 
economies as a whole would become net importers of oil. 
This implies an additional call on the world market of 
somewhat in the order of 1 to 2 mbd. Last year the So-
viet Union and the other CPE countries exported just 
under 2 mbd to the OECD area. 
20 
Forecasting 
There is no doubt that the management of existing oil 
fields has posed problems for the Soviet authorities. 
Problems are technical but perhaps essentially ones of 
economic management. Secretary-General Gorbachev's 
initiatives to improve the economic management of the 
Soviet economy are addressed to such problems, both in 
the energy and other economic sectors. Consequently, 
one must question whether the earlier rather pessimistic 
views of Soviet resources in the future have to be ac-
cepted. To maintain those views suggests that the Gor-
bachev or similar initiatives will fail. 
In addition to the oil fields the Soviets have, of course, 
enormous reserves of gas, but this gas, while important 
in the balance-of-payments issue, is unlikely to replace 
oil as a major earner of foreign exchange because Euro-
pean demand for gas is expected to be relatively flat. 
There are also alternative supplies from Norway and 
from Algeria. Consequently, to earn the foreign reserves 
needed, the Soviet Union may be required to manage 
their energy exports with some care. The Soviets are and 
have been in the past exceptionally shrewd capitalists in 
managing their export energy portfolios.10 Therefore, 
taking together the potential for economic reform and 
the continuing requirements for foreign exchange (the 
external debt has been growing at a very high rate) one 
should reconsider the view held by certain commentators 
that the USSR and the CPEs as a whole are becoming net 
importers of energy. How the relationship will evolve in 
the future will obviously be linked to the strategic geo-
political relationship between the East and the West but 
if one follows the logic of the disarmament discus-
sions, this is one geo-political area where tensions may 
relax rather than tighten. 
Technology, energy efficiency and environment 
Malthus's dire predictions about world starvation did 
not come to fruition because of technology. Similarly, 
the belief in the 1970s in the imminent depletion in the 
1990s of the world's oil reserves will not come to fulfil-
ment for considerable time because of technology. 
Schumpeter is more relevant than Malthus! The impact 
of technological innovation is the hallmark of a dynamic 
economy. Even if, as has been argued, we are economic-
ally stagnating, none the less the expectations of tech-
nological progress over the next decade are extremely 
important. This will apply to the economic process as a 
whole but also to the supply and demand side for energy 
and for oil. The issue of oil reserves is one of nature and 
of man's capacity to find and exploit at reasonable costs. 
Professor Odell has consistently argued that there is 
more oil available at reasonable costs than conventional 
wisdom had it. He was proved right in the past — will he 
continue to be correct in the future? 
The answer hes essentially in technical 'fixes'. Even when 
the engineering knowledge and capability is present mar-
ket inertia may be such as to delay or fail to develop these 
into the market-place. Some argue that with the absence 
of the price incentive similar to that of the 1970s, energy 
efficiency will decrease and this will bring forward the 
next price shock — a variation of the Hog Cycle. On the 
supply side the most important incentives are those 
which encourage investment. 
Demand also has a role to play. There is certainly a con-
cern particularly if public authorities were to lessen the 
signals to the market-place by de-emphasizing energy ef-
ficiency, e.g. higher speed limits, relaxing housing insula-
tion, etc. (See 'What has been happening to energy effi-
ciency' — Energy in Europe No 7, July 1987). But there 
are non-price forces which can compensate — the need to 
remain competitive in regional and world markets will re-
quire manufacturers to ensure their product reflects the 
state of the art in technology and in cost-effectiveness. 
There are problems in forecasting the nature of the 
impacts of current R&D because the effects are often 
cumulative and arrive from an unforeseen synthesis of 
different technologies. 
With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to identify, for ex-
ample, the seeds of the growth in air traffic which came 
about since the last war. The embryo technology of the 
jet, radar, traffic management and other engineering fea-
tures were present even in the early 1940s. How many 
were able to synthesize these various isolated and inde-
pendent streams of technology and put together a 
scenario which predicted today's volume of air traffic? 
Energy efficiency and technology 
Energy efficiency is closely linked to technical 
progress. The changes in industrial output impact 
directly on the energy input requirement. The link 
between energy, technical progress and productiv-
ity growth are interwoven and it is very difficult to 
predict the cumulative effect of this interaction. 
That it does occur is evident from the Japanese ex-
perience. 
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Our own analysis of the changes in energy effi-
ciency suggest that while there continues to be 
some improvement this is not as fast as in the past 
and may indeed be slowing down. Between 1979 
and 1983 final energy demand fell by 12%. This re-
presented 90 million tonnes of oil equivalent. 
Closer examination suggests that about a quarter 
of this was attributable to changes in the climate, 
lower level of economic activity, changes in the 
structure of economic output (energy intensive in-
dustries suffered disproportionately during the re-
cession) and the substitution of gas and electricity 
with higher energy efficiency for oil producers. 
The remaining 75% seems to be attributable to 
genuine improvement in efficiency whether 
through better housekeeping, discrete energy-sav-
ing investments or improved technology. 
demand of increased travel and a shift from public 
transport to the private car. In the freight transport 
sector, technical improvements in vehicle effi-
ciency were more than offset by poor load factors 
in a period of recession. 
Figure 2 shows recent trends in final energy demand, 
economic output and energy efficiency. While there 
continues to be some improvement in energy efficiency, 
the rate of improvement seems to be slowing down 
since 1982. This is challenging the perhaps over-enthu-
siastic arguments cited above. Perhaps it is simply the 
short-term situation of change slowing down after the 
last oil shock — now seven years old. None the less, the 
warning is valuable in recalling that no matter what the 
latent potential is, it has to be realized in the market-
place. 
When analysing the results by sector the most 
clear-cut case is in respect of the residential sector 
where 'energy efficiency' improvements reduced 
energy demand by nearly twice as much as climatic 
factors. In the industrial sector the picture is more 
complicated. On the face of it the overwhelming 
share of the reduction in demand for energy was 
the result of 'energy efficiency improvements' and 
only a small share was due to structural change. 
Looking at the effects of industrial change within 
industrial branches as a result of process changes, 
substitution of materials or changes in the nature 
of products, one finds both good and bad news. 
The gradual shift to production of steel from 
electric arc systems (a process change) has of 
course been increasing specific electricity demand, 
while energy intensity in the construction materials 
industry on the other hand has been falling because 
of a shift away from the use of cement to the use of 
other somewhat less energy-intensive products 
(substitution of materials). On balance, the effects 
have been to push down total energy demand for 
the three branches combined, although not by very 
large amounts. 
Perhaps the most disappointing sector from an 
overall energy efficiency standpoint has been tran-
sport. Passenger transport registered a net im-
provement in efficiency because of a technically 
more efficient vehicle stock, but this was insuffi-
cient to compensate for the upward pressures on 
Figure 2: 
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The potential is certainly there for major improvements. 
If one looks at the R&D supply technology, for example, 
in the electricity sector, there are some promising pros-
pects; including a new generation of gas turbines, ad-
vanced nuclear reactors, fuel cells, wind power and pho-
to voltaics. 
Equally for energy end-use, technology could have even 
more far-reaching consequences. Increased end-use pro-
ductivity in current applications such as improvements in 
motor coupling efficiency, domestic space heating, and 
commercial lighting will extend energy supplies. Perhaps 
the most significant effect will be derived from R&D on 
new electricity uses. The thrust of industrial policy in the 
Community and indeed in the OECD area is to develop 
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Table 2 
Short- and long-term price and income elasticities for motor 
gasoline 
Country Short-term 
price1 
elasticity 
FR of Germany - 0 . 1 3 
France - 0.55 
Italy - 0.44 
The Netherlands - 0.31 
Belgium - 0.44 
United Kingdom - 0 . 1 7 
1 Direct price effect. 
Longer-term 
price1 
elasticity 
- 0.10 
- 0.21 
— 
— - 0.11 
- 0.14 
Short-term 
income1 
elasticity 
4 
0.50 
0.50 
— 1.35 
0.15 
2 Indirect effect through changes in the vehicle stock. 
1 Effect of changes in private consumption. 
4 Other variables present. 
Longer-term 
income1 
elasticity 
1.12 
4 
0.63 
0.82 
0.29 
1.13 
(ii) Exploration at a more aggregate level of the 
effects over time in changes in price at dif-
ferent price levels. There is some evidence to 
suggest that the long-term demand response to 
price changes depends both on the absolute 
level of prices and upon whether prices are ris-
ing or falling. Some of the research underlying 
the model used by the Commission services 
for simulating the behaviour of the world oil 
market (Aisling) points to a lower response to 
a fall below previous peak oil price levels than 
to an increase above them. This can be ex-
plained theoretically by factors such as more 
competitive pricing by other fuels in a bid to 
retain market shares when the price of oil is 
falling (with a rising oil price, the price of al-
ternatives has also tended to rise, reinforcing 
the trend towards saving, but not sufficiently 
to remove the incentive to switch out of oil), 
the maintenance of a regulatory environment 
which discourages re-investment in oil-
burning equipment (take, for example, the 
Community Directive of 1975 which limits oil 
use in power stations, and which remains in 
force), the fall in relative cost of non-oil 
burning equipment. Table 3 below outlines the 
results for Europe, the USA, Japan and the 
rest of OECD. 
Energy prices and economic 
change 
The full impact of changes in energy prices occurs only as 
price changes work themselves through the economy as a 
whole. Some of them are discernible relatively quickly, 
others take some time to be felt. These economic effects 
occur as energy becomes cheaper or more expensive in re-
lation to other factors of production (capital and labour) 
— affecting the level of investment and expenditure on 
labour in industry — and in relation to other items of 
private consumption, affecting both the pattern of con-
sumption and savings ratios. 
The substitutions that thus occur between factors of 
production have been studied by a number of research 
workers in Europe in the development of an energy-
oriented macro-sectoral model (Hermes) financed under 
the European Community's research programme into en-
ergy systems analysis. Table 4 gives an example of find-
ings for two key industrial categories. 
Table 4 
Long-term price elasticity' of different factors of production 
in industry 
Investment (K) 
Labour(L)2 
Energy (E) 
Intermediate goods 
K L E 
- 0.15 0.20 - 0.05 
0.06 - 0.06 0.74 
- 0.00 0.20 0.20 
Capital goods 
K L 
- 0.39 0.63 -
0.08 - 0.37 
- 0.06 0.63 -
E 
0.24 
0.29 
0.56 
1 The table shows the full effects of changes in the real price of K, L and 
E on demand for K, L, E over a period of 8 to 10 years. It is derived 
from data for France. 
2 Labour (L) is not a direct measure of employment but of expenditure 
on wages and salaries. 
This shows how important the effects seem to have been. 
In the capital goods industries every 10% increase in en-
ergy prices has meant a cumulative reduction over the 
following 8 to 10 years of 2.4% in investment expendi-
ture and a rise in expenditure on wages and salaries of 
2.9%. 
Table 3 
Aisling model 
OECD: Price elasticities of oil demand by region 
Region 
EUR 10 
USA 
Japan 
Rest of OECD 
Short-term 
- 0.06 
- 0.05 
- 0.08 
- 0.04 
Long-term 
increase 
to new peak 
- 0.47 
- 0.64 
- 0.80 
- 0.45 
Long-term 
fall 
below peak 
- 0.24 
- 0.30 
- 0.31 
- 0.24 
Conclusions 
Energy and oil prices do matter. The absolute level, the 
direction in which they are moving and are expected to 
move, and the relative prices of each fuel all play a role, 
directly and indirectly, in influencing the pattern of en-
ergy demand and supply, as well as impacting on the eco-
nomy more widely. Economic science is not yet capable 
of providing as much guidance to policy-makers as they 
15 
Energy in Europe 9/1987 
would wish on how those influences will be exerted dur-
ing the coming years, but considerable progress has been 
made in isolating historically the longer-term effects of 
price. 
Just as it would be wrong to try to predict the future 
solely on the basis of a sophisticated but imperfect 
understanding of the role of prices in the past, it would 
be equally unwise to ignore prices altogether and to sup-
pose that energy demand will be determined overwhelm-
ingly by non-price factors such as autonomous technical 
change, demographic change, life-style modifications, 
etc. The challenge for further research and for analysts 
trying to peer into the longer-term future is to find ways 
of integrating econometric techniques with the more 
technological and sociological. 
In the meantime, however, the analyst or the policy-
maker who looks only at the short term and ignores the 
potential longer-term effects of price does so at his peril. 
Econometrics has been described, misleadingly, as akin 
to driving straight ahead while only looking in the rear-
view mirror. It may be just as dangerous to stare re-
solutely ahead without ever glancing behind. 
The US figure implies an elasticity of -0.08, that for Japan of around 
-0.035 and that for Europe of -0.05, before account is taken of the in-
come effects. The recorded figure for the Community is significantly 
below the real short-term elasticities derived from previous historical 
data (close to -0.1%) which were used for much short-term estima-
tion in the mid-1980s — see Energy in Europe No 5, September 1986. 
These apparent elasticities derived from the change in crude oil prices 
are of course lower than those observed on the basis of the smaller 
falls that occurred in the prices of oil products to the consumer over 
this period. But the latter elasticities too are relatively small, bearing 
in mind that the figures for most oil products are based on informa-
tion about deliveries, some of which we know went into stock. 
See Energy in Europe No 6. 
See separate article entitled 'So forecasting is easy!'. 
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An invitation to Mr Kevin Leydon, Head of DG XVII's Analyses and Forecasts Division to ad-
dress1 the Royal Irish Academy provided the occasion to reflect on energy futures and the uncer-
tainties surrounding these, and why earlier forecasts were often off the mark. While this article 
draws on the work of Mr Leydon and his colleagues in the Commission Services, the arguments and 
interpretations presented are personal to the author and do not in any way commit either the Com-
mission or any other Community institution. 
Setting the scene 
Leonard Silk, the eminent American economist, set the 
background to the new forecasting environment in his re-
cent article in Foreign affairs1 when he described the 
current state of the world economic and financial system. 
He identified a range of dangers to the system including: 
(i) the high volatility of exchange rates; 
(ii) huge imbalances in trade and growing protection; 
these having been compounded by the inability of 
developing countries to meet their debt obligations; 
(iii) continuing fears of inflation in the midst of sharp 
declines in oil and commodity prices; 
(iv) sluggish growth in the industrial and developing 
countries alike; 
(v) persistent over-capacity and unemployment; 
(vi) aggravating the strings of clashing national interests 
were uncertainty and conflict among the major na-
tions of the West over the right policies for solving 
this complicated set of problems. 
To this list may be added the current failure of con-
fidence in the world's stock markets. This listing in-
dicates the general economic and financial environment 
within which the energy sector will operate. 
The immediate origins of the current situation in the en-
ergy market go back two years. From mid-1985 there 
were indications of a major change in Saudi policy, the 
consequences of which were the subject of much debate 
during the autumn and early winter. With the OPEC de-
cision in December 1985 to seek market share rather than 
to defend the price levels and all that this implied for 
Saudi Arabia in its previous role as swing producer, the 
market responded by marking down the price of crude 
oil by 50% during 1986. This change in oil policy coin-
cided with the devaluation of the US dollar; reducing 
substantially the purchasing power of the lower revenue. 
Going into 1987 the energy markets were for the moment 
'buyers' markets', with reduced balance-of-payments 
pressures and lower inflation in oil importing countries 
increasing the scope for resources to be directed towards 
investment or debt liquidation and growth in the Com-
munity economies. But so far the growth had not mate-
rialized. 
Those who believed this fall in oil prices would boost 
economic growth were disappointed, producers were 
aghast at the loss in revenue, consuming countries were 
pleasantly surprised that demand response was modest 
and energy analysts worked late trying to anticipate 
events in the short term and revamped their earlier fore-
casts! 
Where is the herd? 
Some commentators have remarked on the sociability of 
energy forecasters and their tendency to move in herds. 
Skimming the published literature suggests the herd lying 
in the range of 48 million to 54 million barrels a day 
(mbd) for world oil demand in 1995 (excluding centrally-
planned economies). This spread is significant in itself; 
perhaps more significant is the difference in estimates for 
developing countries and for maturer economies. For the 
former, estimates range between 14 to 18 mbd and for 
the OECD area between 34 to 38 mbd. The uncertainties 
surrounding these numbers include: 
(i) the rate of world economic growth (and the future 
role of the US dollar); 
(ii) the outlook for energy and oil demand and supply in 
other major industrialized countries and particularly 
in the United States; 
(iii) the prospects for the developing countries that are 
not oil exporters; 
(iv) oil production policy in oil exporting developing 
countries and particularly OPEC; 
(v) oil production and export policy in the centrally-
planned economies. 
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The follies of forecasting 
Will the current string of forecasts prove as erroneous 
and as short-lived as those of the preceding 15 years? 
Forecasts made in the mid-1970s for 1985 suggested a 
world oil demand of between 60 and 75 mbd. The actual 
outcome was nearer 50 mbd. Similarly forecasts for the 
year 2000 offered ranges between 75 and 90 mbd. As 
time went on, the early 1980s vintage forecasts identified 
a range of between 60 and 72 mbd. By the mid-1980s the 
forecasts were reduced to between 48 and 54 mbd, which 
in fact is lower than the actual consumption in 1980. 
Why was demand overestimated and supply underes-
timated? Forecasts for the mid-1980s, which were made 
before the first oil shock, turned out to be obsolete al-
most at once. This was a consequence of the substantial 
rise in the cost of energy and the subsequent impact on 
the various factors of production. These influenced the 
long-term economic growth rate resulting in energy con-
sumption estimates which were much too high. But 
simply at the time we did not recognize the major turning 
points which were occurring in the economic structure. 
The essentially political decisions to raise oil prices 
beyond a certain level impacted substantially on the 
fundamental relationships between labour, capital and 
energy. 
A second feature was the growth in interdependence, not 
only in economic matters but also in geo-politics, which 
had created a structure facilitating the transmission of 
economic shocks from one sector through the whole 
economic system. A major change in the price of oil 
therefore not only affected the relationships within the 
sector itself but had consequences right through the 
economic structures and indeed the world trading 
system.3 The problem of inflation, balance of payments 
and debt was severely affected by the sudden transfer of 
enormous rent from one economic agent to another. 
In addition to macroeconomic changes a number of 
other influential factors were at work. 
Firstly the relationship between the North and South was 
raising issues of economic welfare at a world level. The 
argument about a new international economic order was 
coming to a head. Because of the geographical distribu-
tion of oil resources, where essentially the reserves were 
in the 'South', the argument about the oil price left the 
energy sector and became an issue in this wider debate 
about the reshaping of the international order. The im-
porting and exporting countries thus approached the oil 
price question from fundamentally different stand-
points. Industrial countries saw this as essentially an oil 
and energy issue while countries in the 'South' and par-
ticularly OPEC insisted on giving equal emphasis to the 
totality of the North/South dialogue, both because they 
saw themselves as part of the 'South', and because they 
had a special interest as oil producers in discussing other 
aspects of the world economy.4 
Geo-political events were also playing an important role. 
The emergence of détente between the super-powers faci-
litated the development of gas supplies from the USSR to 
Western Europe. Politics also played a major role in the 
Middle East. The link between disturbances in the oil 
market and war is a highly correlated one. Disruptions, 
either physical or in price terms, are linked directly to the 
war situation in the Middle East. Many Arab oil scholars 
have suggested that the Palestinian question is funda-
mental to the oil issue. Added to this is, of course, the 
Iraq/Iranian war and the idealogical undertones sup-
porting that war. Essentially the Middle East is the centre 
of the world oil reserve. Geo-politics will therefore 
continue to play a major role, if not an increasing one, 
given the general assumption that OECD dependence on 
the Middle East for its oil resources will grow in the com-
ing decade.5 
Changes in perceptions 
Was the oil shock sufficient in itself to set in motion such 
a disturbance in the world economic system? Notwith-
standing the importance of oil it was not in itself suffi-
cient. There were other major changes occurring. The 
post-war consensus, based on the Bretton Woods agree-
ments, was faltering and confidence in our understand-
ing of the economic process was being undermined by in-
flation, low growth and the first major signs of serious 
unemployment. 
A powerful intellectual force which influenced both con-
suming and producing countries was the Club of Rome 
report6 on the new international order. The energy 
thinking was based on the belief in the depleting nature 
of oil and the rate at which this depletion was taking 
place. This is an example of Malthusian thinking in the 
twentieth century; largely ignoring the influence of tech-
nology, price and the need nations have to secure their 
strategic resources. The intellectual and emotional 
appeal of this argument was extremely powerful and in-
fluenced not only producing countries but also those who 
intellectually rejected the idea as such. 
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Yet while this debate was raging, oil engineers were 
busily working on their platforms bringing in new fields 
not only in the industrialized world but perhaps more 
importantly in the Brazils and other regions of the de-
veloping world. Acceptance of this pessimistic view, 
which ignored the role of technology in innovation, has 
had major impact not only on the attitudes of producing 
countries but also in the industrialized world. Implicit in 
the industrial energy policy is the acceptance, however 
uncomfortable that is, of the need for a high price for oil 
and thus for high cost energy. But this has major re-
percussions for industrial and social development. 
The 1970s were a period of major fundamental 
changes in the macroeconomic structure, reflecting 
the stresses and strains in the production process 
arising from inflation, debt and rising interest 
rates. This undermined confidence in managing the 
crisis. Simultaneously, the geo-politics of the 
Middle East were introducing complex and long-
lasting influences. This was taking place against a 
background of developing debate between the 
North and the South in which the oil issue had a 
fundamental role. The intellectual climate of the 
era was essentially pessimistic and Malthusian. 
Serious doubts were raised regarding the survival 
of the world financial system. 
Narrowing the range of uncertainties 
The essential task of energy analysts is to narrow the 
range of uncertainties and to identify plausible orders 
of magnitude for the future evolution of the critical va-
riables that will determine the medium- and long-term 
energy outlook. 
In looking towards the next 'vintage' in energy analysis, 
there are a number of key factors, each complicated and 
subject to its own dynamic, which will influence the 
outcome of the energy sector. Amongst these are: 
(i) changes in the structure of the economic process; 
(ii) shifts in perceptions about the geo-political situa-
tion; 
(iii) the influence of technological innovation, both on 
the supply and the demand for energy (including 
concern about environmental issues); 
(iv) the dynamics of the oil sector itself and the interac-
tion between this sector and other fuels. 
Energy and the economic process 
The impact of and the reactions to the first two oil 
shocks had major repercussions on the economic 
process. The weight of oil in international trade is suffi-
cient to maintain this important relationship and while in 
value terms the measurement of this relationship will 
vary according to the oil price, strategically oil will re-
main an important variable in the world trading process. 
The reaction to these shocks by countries in different 
economic groupings at a world level had important re-
percussions on the economic structures. In general indus-
trialized countries' reduced their oil dependency by a 
series of actions, including energy saving, substitution 
and lower energy content in the GDP function. Particu-
larly notable here is the Japanese experience where there 
was a substantial reduction, through an aggressive en-
ergy savings policy, in the energy content in GDP. 
Equally Japanese policy was active in diversifying the 
source of fuel imports. France replied by developing in-
digenous resources, i.e. nuclear, and took up the chal-
lenge from the oil shocks by increasing substantially the 
supply of 'national energy' in addition to substitution 
and conservation policies. 
By contrast, countries in the developing world did not 
succeed in reducing the energy content in GDP to the 
same extent. Oil consumption decreased largely because 
of recession, but nonetheless there was in a number of 
key countries an increase in domestic resources through 
investment in oil exploration and development. In an 
interesting paper presented to the 13th Congress at the 
World Energy Conference, the Institute for Economic 
and Legal Issues in Energy at Grenoble calculated the re-
duction in the rate of oil dependency. They distinguished 
two types of broad responses, those which in addition to 
reducing the wastage in energy use sought to invest in the 
energy sector and those countries which concentrated 
largely on improving their trading position.8 
Recovering the trading losses due to higher prices by in-
creased manufacturing exports was one strategy de-
veloped to respond to the earlier crisis. Japan, Germany, 
Italy and South Korea generated large manufactured 
goods surpluses which far exceeded the energy deficit. 
Countries therefore have the alternative of compensating 
for their energy vulnerability by an aggressive commer-
cial policy on external markets. This is not necessarily in 
contradiction with a policy of orientating investment to-
wards the energy sector to improve national energy 
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security. The problem was always how to get the mix 
right. 
The most striking result of the last decade of turbulance 
was the decoupling of the energy/GDP relationship. For 
the Community, energy demand was essentially flat for 
the period 1973/85, despite an increase in GDP of 24%. 
This change in the relationship between gross domestic 
product, industrial output and energy demand is the re-
sult of changing industrial structures, energy conserva-
tion, shift in product mix within industry and orientation 
towards higher value added. The change in industrial 
structure and product mix was a response to the changes 
in the capital, labour and energy production ratios and 
the continued search for economic growth. 
Perhaps the major impact of the energy shock was not so 
much on the direct relationship between energy and 
output but rather on the world economic system itself 
where the impact led to enormous instability, inflation 
and balance-of-payments problems. Rhys and Davis' 
have argued that countries experiencing faster than aver-
age productivity growth have tended also to achieve 
greater than average declines in energy use per unit of 
value added. This is due essentially to the structural 
change within the manufacturing sectors, shifting the 
structural mix towards lighter, higher value-added in-
dustries and enabling an increase in both labour pro-
ductivity and energy-use efficiency. Over the period 
1972-81 value added per person employed increased in 
Japan by 113% and in the United States by 25%. The 
energy use per unit of value added fell in Japan by 54% 
and by 24% in the United States. 
The industrial process itself will be affected by inflation 
and real interest rates which will also impact on exchange 
rates. The oil sector particularly is influenced by the ex-
change rates because oil is denominated in US dollars. 
During the 1980s the oil producers perceived a fall in the 
value of their oil but those in the non-dollar area were 
confronted with a rising price because of the apprecia-
tion of the dollar against their currencies. The 
coincidence of a substantial fall in the oil price with the 
consequences of the 'Plaza Agreement' meant that non-
dollar area consumers benefited substantially. One fur-
ther influence which will be specific to the Community 
area is the decision to progress towards the internal mar-
ket by 1992. This raises issues regarding the economic 
structures of companies and the 'rules of the game' to 
apply within the Community area. 
Consequently, taking a position on any future oil price 
path requires some assumptions about the key macro-
economic factors. But these themselves are subject to 
major degrees of uncertainty. Figure 1 looks at one pos-
sible outcome on GDP per head (wealth) and the balance 
of payments as a percentage of GDP (debt) in the 
principal trading regions. Such a view suggests that the 
balance-of-payments position in the developing countries 
will remain critical, with the risk of limiting growth and 
maintaining pressures on the world financial system. 
Figure 1: 
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Geo-politics 
OU prices in the future, as indeed in the past, will be 
hostage to the fortunes of politics and particularly to the 
politics of the Middle East. Current events in the Gulf 
clearly illustrate the nature of the risks involved. The 
Arabian Peninsula represents the world's 'reserve oil 
well'. Any assessment of the price-tag must take into ac-
count an appreciation of Saudi policy. 
The USSR also represents a major source of energy to 
Western Europe in particular but also on the world oil 
market. The earlier initiatives in détente were accom-
panied by the opening-up of the Soviet gas fields to Wes-
tern consumers. The Gorbachev initiative in the internal 
domestic economy of the Soviet Union may have impor-
tant repercussions on the geo-politics of Western Euro-
pean energy. Conventional wisdom had it — and indeed 
there are some traces of it remaining — that by the end of 
the century the Soviet Union and the centrally- planned 
economies as a whole would become net importers of oil. 
This implies an additional call on the world market of 
somewhat in the order of 1 to 2 mbd. Last year the So-
viet Union and the other CPE countries exported just 
under 2 mbd to the OECD area. 
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There is no doubt that the management of existing oil 
fields has posed problems for the Soviet authorities. 
Problems are technical but perhaps essentially ones of 
economic management. Secretary-General Gorbachev's 
initiatives to improve the economic management of the 
Soviet economy are addressed to such problems, both in 
the energy and other economic sectors. Consequently, 
one must question whether the earlier rather pessimistic 
views of Soviet resources in the future have to be ac-
cepted. To maintain those views suggests that the Gor-
bachev or similar initiatives will fail. 
In addition to the oil fields the Soviets have, of course, 
enormous reserves of gas, but this gas, while important 
in the balance-of-payments issue, is unlikely to replace 
oil as a major earner of foreign exchange because Euro-
pean demand for gas is expected to be relatively flat. 
There are also alternative supplies from Norway and 
from Algeria. Consequently, to earn the foreign reserves 
needed, the Soviet Union may be required to manage 
their energy exports with some care. The Soviets are and 
have been in the past exceptionally shrewd capitalists in 
managing their export energy portfolios.10 Therefore, 
taking together the potential for economic reform and 
the continuing requirements for foreign exchange (the 
external debt has been growing at a very high rate) one 
should reconsider the view held by certain commentators 
that the USSR and the CPEs as a whole are becoming net 
importers of energy. How the relationship will evolve in 
the future will obviously be linked to the strategic geo-
political relationship between the East and the West but 
if one follows the logic of the disarmament discus-
sions, this is one geo-political area where tensions may 
relax rather than tighten. 
Technology, energy efficiency and environment 
Malthus's dire predictions about world starvation did 
not come to fruition because of technology. Similarly, 
the belief in the 1970s in the imminent depletion in the 
1990s of the world's oil reserves will not come to fulfil-
ment for considerable time because of technology. 
Schumpeter is more relevant than Malthus! The impact 
of technological innovation is the hallmark of a dynamic 
economy. Even if, as has been argued, we are economic-
ally stagnating, none the less the expectations of tech-
nological progress over the next decade are extremely 
important. This will apply to the economic process as a 
whole but also to the supply and demand side for energy 
and for oil. The issue of oil reserves is one of nature and 
of man's capacity to find and exploit at reasonable costs. 
Professor Odell has consistently argued that there is 
more oil available at reasonable costs than conventional 
wisdom had it. He was proved right in the past — will he 
continue to be correct in the future? 
The answer lies essentially in technical 'fixes'. Even when 
the engineering knowledge and capability is present mar-
ket inertia may be such as to delay or fail to develop these 
into the market-place. Some argue that with the absence 
of the price incentive similar to that of the 1970s, energy 
efficiency will decrease and this will bring forward the 
next price shock — a variation of the Hog Cycle. On the 
supply side the most important incentives are those 
which encourage investment. 
Demand also has a role to play. There is certainly a con-
cern particularly if public authorities were to lessen the 
signals to the market-place by de-emphasizing energy ef-
ficiency, e.g. higher speed limits, relaxing housing insula-
tion, etc. (See 'What has been happening to energy effi-
ciency' — Energy in Europe No 7, July 1987). But there 
are non-price forces which can compensate — the need to 
remain competitive in regional and world markets will re-
quire manufacturers to ensure their product reflects the 
state of the art in technology and in cost-effectiveness. 
There are problems in forecasting the nature of the 
impacts of current R&D because the effects are often 
cumulative and arrive from an unforeseen synthesis of 
different technologies. 
With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to identify, for ex-
ample, the seeds of the growth in air traffic which came 
about since the last war. The embryo technology of the 
jet, radar, traffic management and other engineering fea-
tures were present even in the early 1940s. How many 
were able to synthesize these various isolated and inde-
pendent streams of technology and put together a 
scenario which predicted today's volume of air traffic? 
Energy efficiency and technology 
Energy efficiency is closely linked to technical 
progress. The changes in industrial output impact 
directly on the energy input requirement. The link 
between energy, technical progress and productiv-
ity growth are interwoven and it is very difficult to 
predict the cumulative effect of this interaction. 
That it does occur is evident from the Japanese ex-
perience. 
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Our own analysis of the changes in energy effi-
ciency suggest that while there continues to be 
some improvement this is not as fast as in the past 
and may indeed be slowing down. Between 1979 
and 1983 final energy demand fell by 12%. This re-
presented 90 million tonnes of oil equivalent. 
Closer examination suggests that about a quarter 
of this was attributable to changes in the climate, 
lower level of economic activity, changes in the 
structure of economic output (energy intensive in-
dustries suffered disproportionately during the re-
cession) and the substitution of gas and electricity 
with higher energy efficiency for oil producers. 
The remaining 75% seems to be attributable to 
genuine improvement in efficiency whether 
through better housekeeping, discrete energy-sav-
ing investments or improved technology. 
demand of increased travel and a shift from public 
transport to the private car. In the freight transport 
sector, technical improvements in vehicle effi-
ciency were more than offset by poor load factors 
in a period of recession. 
Figure 2 shows recent trends in final energy demand, 
economic output and energy efficiency. While there 
continues to be some improvement in energy efficiency, 
the rate of improvement seems to be slowing down 
since 1982. This is challenging the perhaps over-enthu-
siastic arguments cited above. Perhaps it is simply the 
short-term situation of change slowing down after the 
last oil shock — now seven years old. None the less, the 
warning is valuable in recalling that no matter what the 
latent potential is, it has to be realized in the market-
place. 
When analysing the results by sector the most 
clear-cut case is in respect of the residential sector 
where 'energy efficiency' improvements reduced 
energy demand by nearly twice as much as climatic 
factors. In the industrial sector the picture is more 
complicated. On the face of it the overwhelming 
share of the reduction in demand for energy was 
the result of 'energy efficiency improvements' and 
only a small share was due to structural change. 
Looking at the effects of industrial change within 
industrial branches as a result of process changes, 
substitution of materials or changes in the nature 
of products, one finds both good and bad news. 
The gradual shift to production of steel from 
electric arc systems (a process change) has of 
course been increasing specific electricity demand, 
while energy intensity in the construction materials 
industry on the other hand has been falling because 
of a shift away from the use of cement to the use of 
other somewhat less energy-intensive products 
(substitution of materials). On balance, the effects 
have been to push down total energy demand for 
the three branches combined, although not by very 
large amounts. 
Perhaps the most disappointing sector from an 
overall energy efficiency standpoint has been tran-
sport. Passenger transport registered a net im-
provement in efficiency because of a technically 
more efficient vehicle stock, but this was insuffi-
cient to compensate for the upward pressures on 
Figure 2: 
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The potential is certainly there for major improvements. 
If one looks at the R&D supply technology, for example, 
in the electricity sector, there are some promising pros-
pects; including a new generation of gas turbines, ad-
vanced nuclear reactors, fuel cells, wind power and pho-
tovoltaics. 
Equally for energy end-use, technology could have even 
more far-reaching consequences. Increased end-use pro-
ductivity in current applications such as improvements in 
motor coupling efficiency, domestic space heating, and 
commercial lighting will extend energy supplies. Perhaps 
the most significant effect will be derived from R&D on 
new electricity uses. The thrust of industrial policy in the 
Community and indeed in the OECD area is to develop 
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higher added value sectors: sectors more linked to 
electricity use than to other fuels." 
Similarly in the oil sector, application of state of the art 
technology will reduce the cost of exploration and de-
velopment of smaller oil fields than were previously 
available. But there is cause for concern. Will this potential 
be realized or will an era of low oil prices allow a relaxa-
tion of the effort toward greater technical efficiency? 
Whatever one's answer to these questions, one thing is 
clear: energy supply and demand efficiency is the most 
important single factor influencing energy levels over the 
long run. When one looks back at the earlier energy 
studies, the lack of attention to this factor is perhaps the 
most striking. 
Public concern about environmental issues has now de-
veloped to a stage where energy choices will be in-
fluenced by the environmental impact. The link between 
energy and climate is important. The combustion of fos-
sil fuels results in carbon dioxide (COJ and nitrous oxide 
(N20). These gases, particularly C02, effect the earth's 
radiation balance. Scientific opinion12 suggests that an in-
crease in concentration of C02 from 300 PPM to 
600 PPM is likely to cause the global average tempera-
ture to rise by ±1.5 degrees centigrade. The objective 
here is not to look in detail at this argument but simply to 
take note of the importance which environmental 
considerations will play in energy policy discussions. 
Again the interaction between technology and the ener-
gy/environmental debate will be important. Solutions to 
the environmental issue are closely related to the techno-
logy issue in the energy sector itself. Developments in 
«¡generation, fuel cells, energy storage, more high effi-
cient gas turbines, super heat pump energy accumulation 
systems and super conductive electric power generation 
equipment combine to give not only more efficiency in 
the energy sector but also to reduce the environmental 
impact. 
'King oil or citizen oil' 
One influential view is that while oil is plentiful at the 
moment and OPEC's influence weak, it is only a matter 
of years before OPEC regains its driving role in de-
termining the world price of oil and pursues an aggres-
sive high oil price policy. The argument runs on the basis 
of increasing oil demand in response to the substantial 
price fall in 1986, with reducing supply from non-OPEC 
sources. The reported fall in US production of 0.7 mbd 
is quoted to support this latter argument. 
One needs to distinguish between the geology/economics 
of oil and the role of political influence. In the 1970s the 
arguments for increasing oil prices were based on geo-
logy and demand factors. Depletion of oil resources at an 
early date was one of the standard views adopted while 
simultaneously oil demand would continue to rise at 
rates lower than historic trends but none the less bullish; 
so that quickly, and in some cases from 1985" onwards, 
it was argued that we would be in a major crisis. 
Today's conventional wisdom is somewhat different; re-
serves are sufficient to cover expected oil demands into 
the early twenty-first century; the prevailing price reflects 
a closer relationship with the long-run supply curve and 
technology is influencing the cost of production and 
improving the discovery rate. The concern is not there-
fore with geology and demand but rather with confi-
dence and politics. Confidence in the future of oil re-
quirements justifying continued investment and politics 
because OPEC has a choice between two fundamentally 
different strategies. This choice is between a high price/ 
low volume strategy and a low price/high volume one. 
In determining the outcome over the next 15 years, the 
challenge for oil is: 
(i) to compete with demand from developing gas and 
electricity networks; 
(ii) to compete with technology/energy efficiency on the 
demand side; 
(iii) oil-to-oil competition. 
This challenge will be played out against short-term 
versus long-term economic interests, political 'acci-
dents', reactions to the macroeconomic situation and to 
the revenue requirements of producing States. In the 
short term, oil has the characteristic of many other com-
modities and will react to short-term 'future expecta-
tions'. The power of short-term influences on longer-
term thinking should not be underestimated. 
The fundamentals affecting the medium- to long-term 
outlook for oil depend on one's views on: 
(i) the reserve situation; 
(ii) the price level required to cover the costs of putting 
oil on the market. 
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Figure 3 shows, using a life cycle model,14 world oil 
production estimates well into the next century. These 
are based on an assumed two trillion barrels of ultimate 
recoverable oil reserves. The three scenarios examine the 
consequences of different oil production rates — zero 
growth after 1984, 1% and 2% annual rate of growth. 
Placing the different ranges of oil demand forecasts on 
this we note that certainly on the basis of the more recent 
estimates, much below those of earlier vintages, there 
seems no geologically­based pressure on the supply and 
demand balance until 2010­20. 
Figure 3: 
Models of the world's oil production (2 trillion barrels) 
(mbd) (Billion barrels) 
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Scenario 1 
(production growth at an annual rate of OK after 1984) 
Current production levels will continue until the year 2045 and then decrease. 
Scenario 2 
(at an annual rate of 1%) 
Oil production levels will Increase by about 50% over the current levels by the year 2025, and 
will then start decreasing. 
Scenario 3 
(at an annual rate of 2%) 
Oil production levels will Increase by about 60% over the current levels by the year 2010 and 
will then start decreasing. 
Source: Institute for Energy Economics, Tokyo 1987. 
Figure 4: 
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Source: Prof. P. Odell. 
If this Une of reasoning is correct then we may expect an 
increase in supply of 'new oil' in the Western World 
from 1.7 mbd to 4.2 to 6.2 mbd in 2000, an average 
world cost of USD 7­8 (USD 8­9 excluding the Middle 
East; this compares with a figure of USD 6­7 today). The 
cost reductions implied in developing new oil would also 
impact on conventional oil. 
Figure 5: 
Cutting costs: Impact on proven oil reserves 
Figure 4 tracks the actual price of oil and relates this to 
Professor Odell's estimated long­run supply price." The 
argument here is that the forecasts for oil prices are con­
verging more with the long­run supply price than was 
previously the case, but none the less remain sub­
stantially above the ratio established in the period 1950­
70. Consequently, the argument would run that the re­
serve situation indicated above is compatible with the 
price required from the consumer to cover the necessary 
production levels. 
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Figure 5, reflecting work done by the French Petroleum 
Institute,16 suggests that there are substantial cost reduc-
tion potentials available. The estimate of production 
costs for 1985 at a world level was calculated at USD 5-6 
a barrel. Following the trend this would suggest a cost 
estimate of between USD 10-12 in the year 2000; but 
there is another scenario based on improved technology. 
Source: Balacearía, J . C. and Hopper, w. H.. New oils, technical 
strategies, economics and policy, 13th Congress of the World Energy 
Conference. 
Critics to the arguments developed here may accept the 
reserve, price and cost arguments but argue that the 
problem is essentially political and will point to the fact 
that the world's oil reserve lies essentially in the Middle 
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East and consequently security of supply is determined 
by the stability in this region. 
The role of OPEC 
When OPEC took control of the determination of prices 
in 1973 it was aided by two factors; the first was 
'confidence' based on the political situation, and indeed, 
war situation, in the Middle East. The second factor was 
the demand situation and the lack of alternative sources 
to meet this demand other than from OPEC. 
Demand has fallen and is not expected to rise at the same 
rate as previously. Oil has been decoupled from 
economic growth at least in the developed countries but 
also this potential exists in the developing countries of 
the world. 
The history of oil prices from 1973 reflects different re-
plies to the fundamental strategic question: should 
OPEC follow a high price/low volume strategy or a low 
price/high volume one? The 'bottom line' is the revenue 
returns to the producing countries. OPEC revenue dec-
lined from a high in 1980 of USD 279 billion to an es-
timated USD 75 billion in 1986. 
But an aggressive oil price policy will encounter the three 
challenges mentioned above, i.e. competition from gas 
and electricity, even faster improvements in end-use tech-
nology and continuing oil-to-oil competition, both bet-
ween OPEC producers and between OPEC and non-
OPEC producers. Certainly prices can fluctuate widely 
in the short term, and probably will, but the margin of 
manoeuvre is much more constrained than was the situa-
tion in 1973. The search for new links between producers 
and end-users will also provide an incentive towards 
greater stability. 
While oil may have lost its throne, it is none the less a 
major fuel and will continue to be so for many years to 
come. The instability in the demand/supply relationship 
has improved. Oil had too dominant a role previously. 
Now, with the development of gas and electricity net-
works and improving end efficiencies and choices with 
multi-firing possibilities, the market structure is more ro-
bust than before. 
Concluding comment 
The arguments presented are not a forecast; they indicate 
the range of possibilities and developmental opportuni-
ties which lie in the future. World prices have fluctuated 
in the past and there is no reason to believe that in the fu-
ture they will not maintain this characteristic. Their pre-
diction is highly uncertain but there are sufficient 
strategic variables which can, by active policy measures, 
alleviate the shocks along the route, if not eliminate 
them. 
Energy analysts can take some heart from the conclu-
sions from a very useful report prepared a few years ago 
on The future of oil prices." 'The emphasis should not be 
on trying to get forecasters to build a better mouse-
trap. Rather the emphasis should be on the users' side — 
to better understand what a forecast is, its limitations, 
and what it cannot do — and to focus on the assump-
tions, not on the number. This will enable the decision-
maker to go beyond forecasting to a more constructive 
planning process, more suited to the challenges ahead. 
That process should be guided by the recognition that 
uncertainty — and volatility and turbulence — are inhe-
rent in the future of oil. The industry will continue to 
change, probably not in smooth evolution, and prices 
will fluctuate. The perils of prophecy call for a new 
orientation in forecasting, strategic planning, and deci-
sion-making. Firms cannot predict the future, but they 
can plan and be prepared for it, and so turn uncertainty 
into opportunity.' 
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Third-party financing—a novel method of 
accelerating energy efficiency investments 
This article was the keynote speech at a recent Commission seminar on third-party financing held in 
Luxembourg. The author is Mr James Wolf, the Executive Director of the Alliance to Save Energy, 
a Washington-based non-profit coalition of business, government, and consumer leaders dedicated 
to increasing the efficiency of energy use. In this article, Mr Wolf introduces the concept of third-
party financing and examines the evolution of the technique in the United States. 
Third-party financing — or 'performance contracting' 
— is a growing, dynamic industry in the United States. 
Like any new industry, it endured turmoil and change in 
its early years. It is still evolving in terms of the services 
offered to energy users and the types of firms in the in-
dustry. But most importantly, energy users, utilities, and 
governments acknowledge that performance contracting 
can and should play an integral role in an overall strategy 
of supplying our energy needs. 
Performance contracting is the term we use to describe a 
comprehensive approach for obtaining energy efficiency 
improvements. It is much more than just a novel method 
of financing. It typically includes a package of services: 
the design, financing and installation of energy efficiency 
measures, and the regular maintenance and service of the 
equipment. 
The key features and benefits 
Its two key features are firstly, there is no up-front 
capital investment by the energy user and secondly, 
the payments by the energy user are in some way 
tied to the energy savings that are actually 
achieved. This second feature is why we call it per-
formance contracting, the energy user pays only 
for performance. If there are no energy savings 
from the equipment, the energy user does not pay. 
In addition, any payments for the equipment and 
services are guaranteed to be less than the value of 
the energy savings realized. A variety of types of 
contracts fit within this definition of performance 
contracting — shared-savings agreements, install-
ment purchases, guaranteed leases, or sales of en-
ergy contracts. 
Performance contracting satisfies numerous needs and 
provides many attractions to the energy user. First, per-
formance contracting firms provide the financing for the 
energy improvements. When interest rates are high or 
capital is difficult to access, this is the most obvious at-
traction. This was particularly true in the United States 
during the late 1970s, when the industry first started. 
There are four other significant benefits of per-
formance contracting that make it appealing to the 
energy user. These are the technical engineering ex-
pertise of performance contracting firms, their 
ability to service and maintain equipment, their 
willingness to assume several of the risks involved 
in investing in energy conservation projects, and 
the convenience of 'one-stop shopping'. 
These benefits may be highly valued by energy users be-
cause of staff limitations. Some energy users do not have 
proficient energy engineering staff committed to evaluat-
ing technology opportunities or new applications. Other 
firms do not have a staff dedicated to service and maint-
ain equipment to ensure it is performing at peak effec-
tiveness. 
These benefits may also be highly valued because of the 
attitudes or concerns of the management of the energy 
user. Management may be risk averse, declining to invest 
in conservation opportunities for several reasons. They 
may fear 'technical risk' — that a technology will not 
achieve the engineering savings estimates. They may fear 
'economic risk' — for example, that future energy prices 
will not rise as fast as projected and consequently the re-
turn on the conservation investment would be lower than 
forecast. A performance contract may be attractive to 
these managers because they shift these risks to another 
party. 
Finally, management may value the convenience 
provided by a performance contracting firm. Instead of 
going to several firms — technical audit firms, engineer-
ing design firms, contractors, banks and others — to 
procure conservation improvements, the energy user 
goes to one source. 
Energy users will evaluate these advantages of per-
formance contracting differently. Some will be more at-
tracted to one of the attributes, while others may focus 
on them equally. The final performance contract that is 
negotiated will have to reflect the specific needs of the 
energy user. 
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Energy service companies 
New businesses known as energy service companies — or 
Escos — were the first firms to offer performance con-
tracting in the United States. The growth of Escos 
changed the energy conservation market dramatically. 
The attractiveness of their new marketing strategy was 
immediately recognized by manufacturers and vendors 
of equipment. These businesses began to offer new fi-
nancing programmes for their products as well. They 
feared that they would lose to Escos, sales that had been 
made to traditional customers if they did not offer these 
new options. They also found these new programmes al-
lowed them to sell products to energy users who pre-
viously had been unresponsive to their sales promotions. 
The firms offering performance contracts now include 
Escos, manufacturers and vendors of specific energy ef-
ficiency equipment, architectural and engineering firms, 
subsidiaries of utilities and other entities. Each of them 
has seen new markets develop as the concept of per-
formance contracting permeates the market. 
In the United States, performance contracting in the 
broadest sense is a rapidly growing industry. From the 
Esco perspective, a majority of the business is presently 
in developing alternative energy supply sources — pri-
marily small scale cogeneration. This development has 
been fostered by changes in regulatory laws enacted 
several years ago and the continuing problem of high 
electricity prices, due in part to the great expense of new 
nuclear generating plants. 
Escos are, however, also successfully marketing per-
formance contracting for conservation improvements. 
The market in which this is growing most rapidly is what 
we call the 'institutional' sector — non-profit institutions 
such as schools and universities, hospitals, and govern-
mental facilities. Indeed many governments — local, 
State as well as our federal government — enacted spe-
cial laws to permit and encourage use of performance 
contracting in their jurisdictions as well as their own fa-
culties. The institutional sector alone encompasses a 
multi-billion dollar market. 
The market 
The reason this sector is growing most rapidly is that 
non-profit institutions find almost all the attributes of 
performance contracting attractive. Schools, universi-
ties, and hospitals are always short of capital. If capital is 
available, their first priority is always the fulfilment of 
their primary mission. They will hire more teachers or 
purchase new diagnostic equipment before paying atten-
tion to energy costs. They also often do not have the in-
house technical expertise needed to evaluate technology 
options, to design them for installation, or to service and 
maintain them. 
One college's experience with performance contracting 
demonstrates its attractiveness. An Esco installed 
USD 1.2 million of equipment reduced the college's en-
ergy use by 45%. These energy savings are worth 
USD 538 000 a year and are now being shared by the col-
lege and Esco. The college receives 20% — currently over 
USD 100 000 a year in savings. 
Government is another prime candidate in the in-
stitutional sector to take advantage of performance 
contracting. Those in government — at least in the 
United States — well know the difficulty of ob-
taining funds for projects. Whether at the local, 
State or federal level, there is intense competition 
for funds — for education, roads, police, basic re-
search, defense and other perceived critical needs. 
Making major expenditures of scarce taxpayer dol-
lars for energy savings may not have much imme-
diate political payoff. No politician wants to raise 
taxes — especially if there are alternative means to 
provide a service or accomplish an objective. Per-
formance contracting allows governmental facili-
ties to reduce their energy costs without the ex-
penditure of taxpayer dollars — a politician's 
dream. 
Several governmental officials have recognized these be-
nefits. When school districts have signed performance 
contracts, mayors have issued press releases proclaiming 
new teachers will be hired financed by the energy savings 
— all at no cost to the taxpayer. Last year our federal 
government enacted legislation to permit performance 
contracting in federal buildings and facilities. Several 
demonstration projects are now being sponsored by the 
Department of Energy's Federal Energy Management 
Programme. 
There is also some performance contracting activity in 
the commercial and industrial sectors, but these market 
areas are developing more slowly. Shared-savings prog-
rammes in particular are developing slowly because these 
energy users are often reluctant to share any energy sav-
ings with an outside firm. After months of discussions 
with commercial or industrial firms about energy savings 
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opportunities, the Escos often found that the energy 
users would then finance and complete the project them-
selves. The Escos engaged in a long, expensive, educa-
tional process in convincing the energy user that real sav-
ings are achievable. For the Esco, however, there is no 
benefit unless a performance contract is signed. Accord-
ingly, they are concentrating their marketing efforts on 
other sectors. 
The necessary skills 
We have learned that to be successful performance con-
tracting firms require skills in three essential areas — en-
gineering, financing, and marketing. If a firm lacks any 
of these three skills, it will fail. 
Good engineering is required as the backbone of a suc-
cessful performance contracting firm. Providing capital 
for inappropriate or poorly engineered technology is a 
prescription for disaster. 
Equipment that is well designed and engineered will gen-
erate energy savings when financed and installed. Inap-
propriate or poorly engineered technology — even when 
financed and installed — will never generate savings. 
Some firms in the United States mistakenly concentrated 
only on the financing aspects, and not the engineering 
soundness of their early proposals. 
The required financing skills include not only knowing 
how to structure successful deals, but also how to ensure 
sound capitalization of the company to sustain cash 
flow. Sound capitalization is essential because of the tim-
ing inherent in the structure of a performance contract. 
The Esco bears all the up-front costs, but achieves its re-
turn over a long period of time. While typically five to 
seven years, the contracts may be as long as 10 years. 
Several factors can affect Escos during this long con-
tractual period. Most in the United States, for example, 
did not forecast the decline in oil and natural gas prices 
which we have experienced the last few years. Since 
Escos did not project this decline when they entered into 
performance contracts several years ago, they overes-
timated their revenues. To assume the risks of widely 
fluctuating energy prices, Escos must have adequate 
capitalization or access to financing. 
The third requirement for success is marketing skill — 
one that many firms in the US initially did not focus on 
because they underestimated the marketing barriers to 
performance contracting. We need to better understand 
the concerns, attitudes and behaviour of the end user. 
Technical feasibility or cost-effectiveness of technology 
may not even be their primary consideration. They may 
be more worried about operational control of their facil-
ity, or some other issue. Performance contracting must 
be marketed — potential users will not be lined-up 
around the block. 
While performance contracting has many attrac-
tions to an energy user, it is a new concept. The 
legal and institutional arrangements of per-
formance contracting are not widely understood by 
the potential clients of Escos. These will take time 
to explain and appreciate. 
Another marketing barrier is that often several depart-
ments in an organization will have to get involved in 
making a decision whether to sign a performance con-
tract. Some of the people in these departments will be in-
itially totally unfamiliar with performance contracting 
and only have a limited interest — if any — in energy. 
For a school, it may include the School Board; for a 
hospital, the Board of Directors. 
Performance contracting involves much more than 
dealing with just the energy engineer and procurement 
department. This is both a benefit and burden of the 
comprehensiveness of the performance contracting ap-
proach. Escos must know — and incorporate in their 
internal financial plan — that it takes several months to 
more than a year to successfully negotiate a performance 
contract, and several years to realize the full income po-
tential of the project. 
Government involvement 
Having assessed performance contracting from the per-
spective of both the energy user and Esco, it is ap-
propriate to turn to the question of government involve-
ment. Governments have essential roles and responsibili-
ties to nurture and promote performance contracting if 
they are committed to making energy users more energy 
efficient. Their actions should be designed to address 
issues in all the areas necessary for success — engineer-
ing, financing and marketing. At least five specific ac-
tions should be taken. 
First, governments should review their own laws and reg-
ulations to ensure there are none which unintentionally 
restrict the use of performance contracting or make it un-
duly burdensome. In the United States, this has included 
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enacting special laws to permit governments to enter into 
long-term contracts. In addition, procurement regula-
tions have been reviewed and revised. Since the Esco 
proposes both what it is willing to do to a facility and 
what type of shared-saving arrangement it desires, the 
traditional 'low-bid' approach to buying technology is 
not workable. 
Second, governments should actively promote the use of 
performance contracting in their own facilities. This will 
help firms in the industry both by giving them receptive 
customers and by setting a showcase example for other 
energy users that performance contracting is viable and 
beneficial. 
In Massachusetts, for example, the State entered a 
performance contract which has resulted in a 35% re-
duction in energy bills in a building complex. The 
USD 2.7 million cost of the equipment was paid for by 
the Esco, not the taxpayer. Indeed, in just two years over 
USD 2.3 million in energy costs has been saved. The 
State — or taxpayers — have received 50% of this 
bonanza. It certainly is a showcase. 
Our federal government recognizes the need to promote 
performance contracting. Last year it enacted legislation 
allowing performance contracting in federal facilities. 
This year, however, it is considering legislation specific-
ally encouraging the use of performance contracting. 
The legislation contains, for example, incentives for 
agencies which use performance contracting. It allows 
them to keep a portion of the energy savings for their 
own budgetary use. Their annual appropriation from the 
Congress will not go down automatically to reflect their 
decreased energy costs. 
Third, governments should sponsor seminars for energy 
users explaining both the advantages and disadvantages 
of different performance contracting approaches, and 
how they compare with other options to obtain energy 
improvements. This educational effort is essential to 
complement the marketing efforts of the firms in the in-
dustry. 
As noted, energy users will find performance contracting 
a totally new approach for procuring energy savings in-
vestments. The Escos themselves will not be credible 
marketers of the concept because they will be viewed as 
merely trying to sell their services. They will be received 
with great scepticism. 
To educate energy users, governments should sponsor se-
minars conducted by organizations with no vested inter-
est in the product. We at the Alliance to Save Energy — 
as a non-profit institution which doesn't manufacture, 
install or provide conservation technology — have been 
sponsored by several of our State governments to con-
duct seminars for energy users. We have prepared 
manuals and guidebooks which explain how to evaluate 
performance contracting and the features in a contract. 
The seminars are typically day-long sessions, and 
conducted separately for two audiences — one for non-
profit or institutional organizations; the other for com-
mercial and industrial firms. 
We encourage Escos to attend these seminars and allow 
them to make brief presentations to the audience about 
their services. This allows energy users to meet several 
competitors simultaneously, and provides Escos with ex-
posure to several potential clients at once. It is an effi-
cient marketing tool from the perspective of both the 
Escos and energy users. We, however, retain control and 
responsibility for the guidebook and the overall instruc-
tion at the seminar. 
The fourth role of government is to sponsor demonstra-
tions of actual performance contracting deals by provid-
ing technical assistance or other incentives for the pro-
ject. One State demonstration, for example, targets 
schools and local municipalities. The State conducts se-
minars, prepares model contracts and makes personnel 
available to review technical proposals and help ne-
gotiate final contracts. The government worked with the 
associations representing school districts and municipali-
ties so that the lessons from the demonstration project 
would be able to be easily transferred to other facilities. 
Another demonstration is being conducted by the 
Alliance. We are pooling several energy users — small 
social service agencies that typically would not be served 
by Escos — and assembling them as a package for an 
Esco. We are providing technical assistance to the 
smaller agencies. We are pleased that eight Escos ex-
pressed interest in bidding on the package and the 
agencies are now in the final selection stages. We are 
hopeful this will be a model for smaller agencies across 
the country. 
The fifth action for governments is to provide special 
support services. The nature of these services will vary 
depending on economic conditions and the state of the 
industry. It might include, for example, approving engi-
neering methodologies to establish baseline energy con-
sumption; certifying technical competence and financial 
soundness of firms; providing insurance of energy sav-
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ings if not privately available; or providing financial 
backing to Escos for projects designed to serve selected 
end-users. Different levels of government in the United 
States are providing many of these services. For example, 
one State established an approved bidders list of Escos 
after reviewing the financial and technical competence of 
firms; another State is establishing a pool of money 
available to Escos as financing for projects designed to 
serve local governments within that State. 
Conclusions 
Performance contracting is not a panacea for the energy 
challenges that face us. It is, however, evolving in the 
United States into an integral component of private and 
public strategies to make us more energy efficient. This 
evolution needs the active participation and support of 
businesses, governments and consumers — an Alliance 
devoted to seizing the opportunities presented. 
Performance contracting will, I am confident, grow and 
flourish in the European Community. I hope there are 
relevant lessons for you from both the successes as well 
as the failures we have experienced in the United States. I 
hope that our experience will enable you to develop and 
promote a performance contracting industry appropriate 
for your energy needs, culture, and economies. The en-
ergy markets are global; we are truly interdependent. 
Performance contracting works — it will help us all 
achieve our common goal of energy efficiency. 
30 
Proposal for a Council Recommendation 
to the Member States on developing 
the exploitation of renewable energy 
sources in the Community (COM(87)432 
final of 28 September 1987) 
On 16 September the Commission approved a Commu-
nication to the Council containing a proposal for a 
Council Recommendation to the Member States on the 
development of renewable energy sources in the Com-
munity.' 
Prior to this, in November 1986, on a proposal from the 
Commission, the Council had adopted a Resolution on a 
Community orientation to develop new and renewable 
energy sources,2 in which it emphasized the need for 
adequate development of these sources in the Commun-
ity. 
This Communication has been drawn up with a view to 
achieving the aims set out in the orientation; among 
other things, it lists the priorities as regards developing 
renewable energy sources as a whole. In addition, as part 
of the work envisaged in the orientation, the Commis-
sion intends to submit to the Council later on proposals, 
sector by sector, concerning the specific problems in-
volved in exploiting these sources. 
In the Communication the Commission analyses the pre-
sent situation, the prospects and the obstacles to the de-
velopment of renewable energy sources, and in particular 
those which in the present state of the art offer the best 
prospects for increased penetration of the energy market, 
namely: 
(i) solar energy (thermal and photovoltaic); 
(ii) biomass and energy from waste; 
(iii) wind energy; 
(iv) hydroelectricity and, in particular, low-power in-
stallations. 
The main conclusions drawn from the analysis carried 
out are as follows: 
(a) progress in developing renewable energy sources has 
been substantial following the energy crises, thanks 
to the variety of programmes launched. However, 
the price trends for conventional forms of energy 
have started affecting development in recent years, 
and there is still a risk of a major slowdown which 
could compromise the results already achieved, 
demobilize researchers and engineers and irre-
versibly weaken the young renewable-energy equip-
ment industry. This would be all the more serious in 
that the industry has a considerable development 
potential capable of meeting the needs of the de-
veloping countries as well as those of Community 
countries; 
(b) in addition, the use of renewable energy sources is 
being hindered by several obstacles which are not di-
rectly related to their competitiveness. The main ob-
stacles are legislative and administrative procedures 
which are inadequate or non-existent, barriers to the 
free movement of equipment in the run-up to the 
completion of the internal market, the terms for 
supplying electricity generated from renewable re-
sources to the public grid, a lack of understanding of 
the potential and possibilities offered by renewable 
sources, especially at regional and local level, and 
the lack of appropriate financing structures; 
(c) consequently, although renewable energy sources 
could well cover up to 5% of the Community's en-
ergy needs by the year 2000, this will not be achieved 
unless the obstacles are removed and the develop-
ment of these sources is encouraged. 
The Commission therefore proposes an initial series of 
measures which the Council should recommend the 
Member States to undertake; basically, the aim is: 
(i) to introduce appropriate legislation and administra-
tive procedures; 
(ii) to pursue or step up research, development and 
demonstration programmes; 
(iii) to circulate information about the potential, 
production possibilities, experience gained and the 
technical equipment available; 
(iv) to promote industrial cooperation and enlarge the 
markets (common rules for certification, etc.); 
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(v) to ensure satisfactory terms for sales of electricity 
generated from renewable energy sources; 
(vi) to establish appropriate, flexible financing struc-
tures. 
The message contained in the Commission's Commu-
nication to the Council is that the present relaxation of 
tension on the world energy scene and the abundance of 
conventional energy sources may well continue for a time 
— one that is difficult to predict but is certainly not un-
limited — and those energy sources are not in-
exhaustible. We should not now hesitate to take action to 
improve our energy supply in the future through greater 
diversification and optimum exploitation of our re-
sources. The promotion of renewable energy sources is a 
long-term task; it must not be allowed to depend on un-
predictable events, nor must too much be expected of it 
too soon. Only by pursuing a resolute, positive long-term 
policy aimed at developing renewable energy sources, 
and by paying less attention to short-term phenomena, 
will these sources be able to play a significant rather than 
a marginal role in the Community's energy balance. 
1 COM(87) 432 final of 28.9.1987. 
1 OJ C 316 of 1.12.1986. 
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Economics of building fast breeder reactors 
From the start of the commercial nuclear power programmes and through the 1950s and 1960s, it 
was generally accepted that the spent fuel f rom the early types of nuclear reactors would be repro-
cessed and the resulting plutonium burned in fast breeder reactors (FBRs). In this way, the limited 
quantities of uranium then discovered would be sufficient to fuel the world's nuclear power prog-
rammes for centuries rather than decades. 
The major advantage of the FBR over other types of reactors, such as the light water reactors 
(LWRs) which now produce the large majority of the Community's nuclear electricity and the gas 
cooled reactors in use in the United Kingdom, is that this type of reactor can extract over 50 times 
more energy from natural uranium. Using the FBR reactor would mean that the energy extractable 
from known uranium resources would be at least twice that from exploitable coal reserves and more 
than an order of magnitude greater than from the world's oil resources. 
With the slow growth in energy demand during the last decade, coupled with the successes of the 
uranium explorers which have resulted in the discovery of large new deposits, there is less incentive 
to economize on the use of uranium. Given the fact that the present level of uranium resources is 
sufficient to cover the requirements of the present generation of nuclear power reactors into the next 
century, the FBR will not be introduced on a significant scale — as a matter of necessity — for 
several years. 
However, the fast breeder reactor has several interesting features in addition to economies in the use 
of uranium which would suggest that its introduction should not be delayed until uranium became in 
short supply. Of particular importance are the benefits from the point of view of safety of using li-
quid metal (sodium) as a coolant. The fact that the metal remains liquid over a wide range of tem-
peratures even at atmospheric pressure, together with its very high thermal conductivity (about 80 
times that of water) and its high latent heat of vaporization means that it is a very efficient material 
for carrying the heat away from the core under normal operating conditions. These features can also 
be very beneficial under certain possible accident situations. Another important advantage of the 
fast breeder is that it has an even smaller impact on the environment than the light water reactor, re-
leasing even less heat and radioactive effluents to rivers, seas or the atmosphere. 
The major present drawback to the fast breeder is its initial capital cost. The first commercial scale 
FBR, Superphenix 1, cost around 2.5 times more per installed KWh than comparable pressurized 
light water reactors (PWRs) in France. Figures such as this have caused some people to dismiss the 
reactor type as uneconomic. They would be very relevant if the cost of building Superphenix 1 — a 
prototype — was to be representative of that of future FBRs. To investigate this possibility, the 
Commission placed a contract for a study on the effect on costs of building several FBRs in a batch, 
i.e. in a similar fashion to the way LWRs are constructed in some countries. 
The following article is based on the results of this study which showed that the gap between the 
costs of building FBR and PWR could be substantially reduced. These results were reported to a 
conference on Fast Breeder Systems held in Richland, USA from 13 to 17 September 1987. ' 
In the early 1970s, the French government decided to uranium. While France does have substantial resources 
pursue strongly the nuclear option for the generation of of natural uranium — the largest in the Community — 
electricity. It was, however, realized that while this these could not support the size of programme envisaged 
would help to reduce the country's dependence on im- beyond the turn of the century. Therefore, while external 
ported oil, it would require ever-growing quantities of supplies were available, it was considered important to 
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follow the development of the much more uranium­effi­
cient fast breeder reactor — especially as concern was 
being expressed over the limited extent of the world's 
uranium resources. 
In 1977, following on from the successes of the experi­
mental fast reactor Rhapsodie — operating since 1967 — 
and the bringing into operation of the demonstration fast 
reactor Phénix in 1976, construction began of the 
world's first commercial size breeder reactor — Super­
phenix 1 — at Creys­Malville near Lyons. Initially three 
Community Member States were involved directly in the 
project — France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Ger­
many. This was later increased to five by the participa­
tion of Belgium and the Netherlands and then to six by 
the inclusion of the United Kingdom. The reactor was 
completed in 1985 and came fully on line in 1986. 
Superphenix 
Superphenix 1 is a liquid metal­cooled fast breeder 
reactor (LMFBR), i.e. it is a reactor in which fast neu­
trons ejected during the heat producing fission reaction 
in the core produce ('breed') more plutonium than is 
consumed.2 It has a rated thermal power of 3 000 MW 
and its net electrical output is 1 200 MWe. The nuclear 
steam supply system (NSSS) consists of a reactor core 
sitting in a large pool of molten sodium (see Figure 1). 
This primary sodium system transfers the heat produced 
in the core to the intermediate heat exchangers. From 
there it is carried in the secondary sodium circuit to a 
steam generator. From this point the plant is very similar 
to more conventional generating stations with the steam 
driving turbogenerators to produce the electricity. 
Fig. 1: 
Flow chart of a Superphenix - type pool breeder NSSS 
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The reactor core consists of a central part surrounded by 
a series of blankets. The central part contains the fuel as­
semblies, made up of pins of uranium and plutonium ox­
ides, which produce the heat and the control rods used — 
as the name implies — to control the reaction and to shut 
down the reactor. The blankets consist of depleted or 
natural uranium which capture neutrons escaping from 
the central core and also act as a radiation shield. The 
core contains a little less than 5 tonnes of plutonium and, 
including the blankets, over 100 tonnes of uranium. 
The full core sits in a large pool containing 3 500 tonnes 
of molten sodium. This sodium is pumped up through 
the core taking away the heat of the reaction. Before en­
tering the core, the sodium has a temperature of 395°C. 
On leaving the core its temperature is 545°C. As men­
tioned earlier, the use of sodium as a coolant has distinct 
advantages. The large quantity of sodium in the pool, its 
low viscosity and its excellent thermal conductivity 
means that the system has a considerable thermal inertia. 
This gives the operator several hours in which to take ac­
tion after shutdown before the core overheats and is 
damaged. 
Between the reactor's fuel and the outside environment 
there are four barriers (see Figure 2). The stainless steel 
cladding of the fuel; the containment formed by the main 
stainless steel reactor vessel and its cover; the primary 
containment consisting of a safety vessel and dome; and 
the secondary containment of the reactor building 
constructed of one metre­thick reinforced concrete. 
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Fig. 2: Containment system 
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cost savings which could be obtained by batch produc-
tion of fast breeder reactors. 
The method used to evaluate 
cost savings 
The first stage of the study was to determine the current 
cost of building an exact replica of Superphenix 1. It was 
assumed that this would be done by the same suppliers, 
using the same regulations and standards as for Super-
phenix 1. However, because the reactor would not be a 
prototype, savings could be made on some of the con-
struction costs (e.g. by using existing machining equip-
ment) and by improved scheduling to reduce the const-
ruction time. 
The second stage was to evaluate the effect of batch 
production of reactor units, using several different 
scenarios: 
Economic comparisons with 
other plants 
Superphenix 1 is a prototype. Because it is a prototype it 
was expensive to build. Its cost of construction — in 
terms of French francs per KWh of installed capacity — 
was around 2.5 times that of pressurized water reactors 
(PWRs) operating in France. 
It is unfair and misleading to make such a comparison. 
There are already hundreds of PWRs operating 
throughout the world. In France there were 49 units in 
service by the end of 1986 and 44 of these had been com-
pleted during the past 10 years. The more recent PWRs 
have therefore benefited from many years of experience 
in construction of the type and, even more importantly, 
from the benefits of scale arising from batch production. 
On the other hand, Superphenix 1 is the first of its kind 
and it was built as a single unit. 
However, in order to ensure the continuation of fast 
reactor development, it is essential to demonstrate that 
future projects can be financially viable in relation to the 
more traditional light water reactors (LWRs). For this 
reason, the Commission contracted Novatome — the 
builders of the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) for 
Superphenix 1 and Electricité de France (EdF) — res-
ponsible for the overall project as well as the conven-
tional construction work on the site — to calculate the 
(a) two reactor units, both on the same site; 
(b) four reactor units, all on the same site; 
(c) 12 reactor units, with four reactors on each of three 
different sites.3 
On the siting of the reactors, for the nuclear part of the 
plant, all the sites have the same characteristics as that 
for the prototype at Creys-Malville. For the non-nuclear 
part of the plant, three different types of site were 
considered: 
(i) a site similar to that for Superphenix 1 (open cooling 
circuit, air cooling system for second and all follow-
ing units). This type of site was studied for all three 
scenarios; 
(ii) a 'dry' site similar to that for the reactor at Civaux, 
France (riverside, closed cooling circuit). This type 
of site was only studied as one of the three sites for 
Scenario c; 
(iii) a site similar to the location of the reactor to be built 
at Le Carnet, France (seaside, cooling circuit open 
to the sea). This type of site was only studied as one 
of the three sites for Scenario c. 
Other variables studies included 'twinning' units on two 
and four unit sites (having some equipment and installa-
tions common to two units) and a reduction in the 
component and spare part inventory relative to Super-
phenix 1. 
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Consultations with suppliers 
Wherever possible, the original suppliers were consulted 
concerning the tenders for each scenario. 
For the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS), the manu-
facturers contributing to the study represented two-
thirds of the original supplies and installations for Super-
phenix 1. Analysis of the remaining one-third of the cost 
was based on replies/estimates obtained from other 
manufacturers making similar equipment or offering 
similar services to the original Superphenix suppliers. 
This analysis also took into account Novatome's knowl-
edge gained from experience of the design and construc-
tion of Superphenix 1. Those engineering costs that were 
over and above the component costs were also analysed. 
For the non-nuclear steam supply system (non-NSSS), 20 
companies and manufacturers were contacted, which to-
gether had been awarded contracts for Superphenix 1 
covering 70% of the cost of this part of the plant. These 
included: main civil engineering contractors; suppliers of 
the main machine room equipment; suppliers of ventilat-
ing and air conditioning equipment; and all suppliers of 
electrical equipment and installations. The remaining 
tenders — representing the remaining 30% of the cost — 
were analysed individually by EdF. 
Results 
The study showed that building a second Superphenix, 
using the same suppliers, no new research, re-use of 
existing machining equipment and placing the orders im-
mediately after completion of Superphenix 1, would 
have resulted in a saving of a little over 26% of the cons-
truction costs (27% for the NSSS and 25% for the non-
NSSS part of the project). It also showed that the replica 
would take 30 months less to build which, taking into ac-
count interest charges, would have resulted in savings on 
the overall investment cost of 31.5%. 
Moving to two units on the one site would result in a fur-
ther saving of 11%, 8.5% on the NSSS and 13.8% on the 
non-NSSS. The reason for the difference in the savings is 
that 'twinning' has a greater impact on the non-NSSS 
part of the plant. 
Increasing from two units on a site to four units on a site 
gives an additional saving of 7%. Here the savings on the 
NSSS are a further 8.5%, mainly as a result of further 
economies brought about by batch production of the 
major equipment, while the savings on the non-NSSS 
only increase by 5.3%. 
Finally, in a scenario where 12 units on three different 
sites had been ordered directly after Superphenix 1 had 
been completed, the study showed that a further saving 
of 3% could have been expected. This means that the 
construction costs per unit could show a saving over the 
cost of the prototype of slightly more than 40%. The 
benefit from building the reactors in batches — i.e. the 
savings on building one of the 12 units over the cost of 
building a single replica of Superphenix 1 — was cal-
culated at 20%. 
These results are summarized in the following table: 
Compared methods of 
construction 
Reconstruction/ 
Superphenix 1 
2 units/reconstruction 
4 units/2 units 
12 units/4 units 
12 units/Superphenix 1 
12 units/reconstruction 
NSSS 
- 27 
- 8.5 
- 8.5 
- 4.5 
- 41.5 
- 20.0 
Savings Vt 
non-NSSS 
- 25 
- 13.5 
- 5.3 
- 1.5 
- 39.0 
- 19.5 
Total 
Unit 
- 26 
- 11 
- 7 
- 3 
- 40.5 
- 19.8 
In summary, removal of the 'prototype effect', i.e. 
building a second Superphenix 1, would be ex-
pected to result in a saving of 26% of the cost of 
construction. Building the reactors in batches 
would result in cost savings of a further 20% 
(12 unit batch). If savings on interest charges, resul-
ting from reductions in construction schedules, 
are also taken into account the overall savings on 
investment costs would be at least 45%. 
Substantial savings could be made in constructing a 
number of fast breeder reactors following the same de-
sign as Superphenix, though the unit cost would still ex-
ceed that of a conventional light water reactor by some-
thing in the region of 50%. However, studies are now 
going ahead on the further development of a new Eu-
ropean FBR. In addition to benefiting from all the ex-
perience of having built a commercial-sized fast reactor, 
the new design should also have more favourable 
economics as a result of a variety of technological ad-
vances during the last decade. Of course, a new pro-
totype could not be expected to have comparable 
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economics of construction with a series built PWR, 
though the gap between the two could well be narrower 
(than between Superphenix and a PWR) and would be 
further reduced after removal of the 'prototype effect' 
and after the benefits of building in batches are taken 
into account.4 
1 Charrault, J-C; Macqueron, J. F.; Grangier, Y.; Leduc, J. and Lion, 
R.: The effect on costs of building fast breeder reactors identical to 
SPX1 in batches'. Paper presented at the symposium on Fast Breeder 
Systems, Richland, USA, September 1987. 
2 Ertaud, André; 'Superphenix'. Published by Novatome (France). 
3 Though this scenario — leading to over 14 GWe of new electricity ca-
pacity over a short period of time — may seem rather large, it is in 
mie with nuclear capacity additions achieved by some countries in the 
past. It is a rate which could be required to be repeated in the future, 
certainly on a Community scale. 
4 It is worth noting that in its 'Illustrative nuclear programme for the 
Community' (COM(85)401 final) the Commission proposed that the 
development of the FBR should aim at an economically competitive 
design for such a reactor being on offer by 2005 and being brought 
into commercial service towards 2015. 
37 
Financial support (grants and loans) from the 
Community to the energy sector in 1986 
In 1986 the Community granted the energy sector finan-
cial support (grants and loans) totalling 4.3 billion ECU, 
of which 1 091.1 million ECU took the form of grants 
and 3 230.4 million ECU took the form of loans. 
Grants from the General Budget 
and the ECSC Budget 
The very considerable increase in European Regional 
Development Fund grants for energy infrastructure in 
1986 meant that Community grants to the energy sector 
were above the 1 billion ECU mark, compared with 
885.9 million ECU in 1985. 
Table 1 gives a breakdown of grants by budget heading 
for 1985 and 1986: 
Table 1 
Community grants to the energy sector in 1985 and 1986, by 
budget heading 
Energy (Chapter 70) 
Energy R&D (Chapter 73) 
ERDF 
Integrated Mediterranean 
programmes 
ECSC Budget 
Total 
1985 
MECU 
150.0 
387.1 
247.1 
— 101.7 
885.9 
<R> 
16.9 
43.7 
27.9 
— 11.5 
100.0 
1986 
MECU % 
158.6 14.5 
364.5 33.4 
420.3 38.5 
1.4 0.1 
146.3 13.5 
1 091.1 100.0 
With 420.3 million ECU the ERDF is once again, as in 
1983, the main purveyor of Community funds (38.5% of 
the total) for the energy sector, exceeding the appropria-
tions from the research and development chapter 
(33.4%). 
The ERDF grants were allocated to a large extent to the 
generation and distribution of electricity in Greece in 
particular and the natural gas network in Spain and Italy. 
Aid from the energy chapter (Chapter 70 of the General 
Budget) essentially concerns new energy technologies: oil 
and gas technological development projects (37.9 million 
ECU in 1986) and demonstration and industrial pilot 
projects (113.3 million ECU in 1986). 
With 14.5% of the total, the energy chapter is slightly 
ahead of the ECSC Budget (13.4%). Nevertheless, ECSC 
grants (146.3 million ECU) reached the highest level for 
the last six years as a result of the considerable amount of 
aid granted to the redeployment of workers (Article 
56 (2)(b) of the ECSC Treaty) in the United Kingdom 
(80.9 million ECU). 
The breakdown of the energy grants paid out in 1985 and 
1986 by sector is set out in Table 2. 
Community energy 
Solid fuels 
Oil and gas 
Nuclear energy 
— fission 
— fusion 
Electricity 
New and renewable 
energy sources 
Rational use of energy 
Others 
Total 
Table 2 
grants in 1985 and 1986, by sector 
1985 
MECU 
123.5 
113.4 
319.4 
121.2 
198.2 
175.2 
73.5 
75.8 
5.1 
885.9 
% 
13.9 
12.8 
36.0 
13.7 
22.3 
19.8 
8.3 
8.6 
0.6 
100.0 
1986 
MECU 
164.9 
214.8 
338.0 
150.7 
187.3 
236.7 
55.4 
74.2 
7.1 
1 091.1 
<R> 
15.1 
19.7 
31.0 
13.8 
17.2 
21.7 
5.1 
6.8 
0.6 
100.0 
The contraction of solid fuels in both absolute and rela-
tive terms in 1986 and in 1985 compared with 1984 is 
the result of the lack of success before the Council of 
the new Commission proposal to transfer extra re-
sources of 60 MECU to the ECSC Budget in order to 
increase social welfare aid for workers in the coal in-
dustry. In 1984, the same amount was assigned by the 
Council for the restructuring of the coal industry. 
The funding for nuclear energy (338 million ECU in ap-
propriations for commitments), the sector which con-
tinues to be the biggest single recipient of Community 
funds, is entirely from the research appropriations which 
are allocated primarily to the European fusion prog-
ramme (170 million ECU), followed by JRC direct ac-
tion relating to fission (reactor safety, radioactive waste 
management, fissile materials, nuclear fuels and the 
operation of the HFR reactor) with 121.8 million ECU. 
The major expansion of ERDF assistance benefited the 
hydrocarbons sector (mainly natural gas), followed by 
the electricity sector, both of which increased in relative 
terms compared with 1985 (21.7% in the case of electri-
city and 19.7% in the case of oil and gas in 1986). The 
drop in subsidies granted to new and renewable energy 
sources and to the rational use of energy is the result of 
a different annual allocation of total resources planned 
in the 1985-88 R&D programme in this area. 
Table 3 gives a more detailed breakdown for 1986. 
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Loans granted to the energy 
sector under the Community's 
financial instruments 
Loans to the energy sector reached record levels in 1986, 
amounting to 3 230.4 million ECU. The increase, 
amounting to 27.4% in real terms compared with 1985, 
was not significantly influenced by the accession of Spain 
and Portugal since the loans granted to them by the 
Community's financial institutions (from the EIB's re-
sources only) were comparatively small in 1986. 
Despite this trend, energy's share (37.8%) of the total 
amount of loans granted by the Community's four finan-
cial instruments is still less than in some earlier years (e.g. 
1981 and 1983). However, the energy sector is still the 
main user of available funds as a result of Community 
grants and loans. 
The total 1986 amount of 3 230.4 million ECU breaks 
down as follows: 
By source of funding 
(i) With 2.6 billion ECU, the EIB was once again the 
main source of Community funds for the energy 
sector. Although smaller than in 1985, the EIB's 
share of the total amount of loans granted to the 
energy sector is still some 80%, while the nominal 
increase over 1985 is 15.8%. 
The three loans from the New Community Instru-
ment (NCI) in the energy sector totalled 91.1 million 
ECU, including 8.7 million ECU in the form of a 
global loan to Italy. The other two loans were 
granted to a coal-fired power station in Ireland and 
a district-heating network in Denmark. 
(ii) Euratom loans, which had fallen off in recent years 
because of the gradual depletion of the ceiling au-
thorized by the Council, took off again in 1986, fol-
lowing the increase to 3 000 MECU decided upon in 
December 1985. In fact, the total amount of loans in 
1986 more than doubled compared with 1985 (443.2 
compared with 211.0 million ECU), reaching the 
highest level since the existence of this lending in-
strument. By the end of 1986, the Commission had 
paid out a total of 2 577.5 million ECU since the be-
ginning of Euratom lending activities. 
(iii) With a loan to a German company of 103.6 billion 
ECU, in 1986 the ECSC resumed its intervention in 
favour of the coal industry, following the very low 
rate of involvement in 1984 and the total lack of in-
volvement in 1985. 
ECSC loans to finance power stations (Article 54(2) 
of the ECSC Treaty) have been declining since 1983. 
In 1986 only one loan was granted, namely 8.7 mil-
lion ECU in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Nine loans at subsidized interest rates totalling 
9.6 million ECU were paid out for investment to 
promote consumption of Community coal in indus-
try in the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland and 
Italy. 
By recipient sector 
With a very similar total to that of 1985, the nuclear 
sector kept its first place in the Community borrowing 
stakes (accounting for approximately 36% of the total). 
The nuclear energy loans, totalling 1 155.9 million ECU, 
were more evenly divided in 1986 between the EIB and 
Euratom and were granted to virtually all the countries 
carrying out a nuclear power station building prog-
ramme. For the first time in several years, Belgium did 
not call upon Community funds to finance its nuclear in-
stallations. 
As in 1985, the oil and gas sector was in second place be-
hind nuclear energy as regards the utilization of Com-
munity loans, albeit limited to the EIB's own resources. 
These EIB loans made it possible to carry out a vast 
range of projects from the development of oil and gas 
fields in Italy and natural gas fields in the United 
Kingdom to natural gas networks in Denmark, Spain, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, and the moder-
nization of refining centres in Greece. 
A total of 786.1 million ECU of loans was granted by the 
EIB (729.6 million ECU), the NCI (47.8 million ECU) 
and the ECSC (8.7 million ECU) to assist electricity gen-
eration, transmission and distribution projects. About 
half of the loans in question were granted to Italy for 
primary electricity generation projects and transport in-
frastructure and transfrontier interconnection projects. 
It was of particular interest to the objectives of the Com-
munity's energy policy that five loans (four EIB loans 
and one ECSC loan) were granted in the Federal Re-
public of Germany to power stations using or converted 
to solid fuels. 
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The 103.6 million ECU loan granted by the ECSC (Ar-
ticle 54(1) of the Treaty) to a German coal company 
made it possible, after two very poor years, to improve 
the situation as regards Community lending to the solid 
fuels sector. 
Nevertheless, we are still very far removed from the 
levels of 1982 and 1983 when the EIB and the NCI, 
alongside the ECSC, financed productive investment in 
the sector, in particular in France, Greece and Ireland. 
The funding of investment to encourage rational use of 
energy and the use of new energy sources was, at 
306.5 million ECU, lower in 1986 than in 1984 and in 
1985. In 1986 the Federal Republic of Germany joined 
the ranks of the two countries which generally use Com-
munity funds for this type of investment, namely Italy 
and Denmark, with a loan for a major district heating 
network in Saarland. 
The (EIB) global loan technique for small- and medium-
scale investment by industries and local authorities in Une 
with the Community energy objectives in these two areas 
was only used in Italy in 1986. 
By recipient Member State 
Although its share was lower than in 1984 and 1985, Italy 
remained the largest borrower of Community energy in-
vestment funds, with 1.9 billion ECU and 33% of the 
total amount of loans granted to the energy sector in 
1986. 
By calling upon the EIB's own resources and Euratom 
loans, in particular to finance its nuclear programme 
(power stations and waste storage) and the development 
of natural gas fields in the North Sea, the United 
Kingdom borrowed nearly 1 billion ECU and is very 
close on the heels of Italy (approximately 30% of the 
total). Nearly two-thirds of the total loans to the United 
Kingdom from the EIB, the ECSC and Euratom are for 
the financing of energy sector budgets. 
Unlike in the past, 1986 stands out, where the Federal 
Republic of Germany is concerned, because of its con-
siderable amount of applications for Community fund-
ing for the implementation of a wide range of energy 
projects: nuclear power stations, thermal power stations 
and co-generation plant (coal and lignite), and district 
heating networks fuelled by residual heat, and gas 
pipelines, totalling 447.6 million ECU, accounting for 
nearly 14% of the total amount of Community funds lent 
to the energy sector. 
France called upon Euratom only for the financing of the 
Flamanville nuclear power station and the European Su-
perphénix project and on the EIB for two electricity pro-
jects totalling 245.4 million ECU; Its share (7.6%) was 
less than in previous years. 
Denmark generally borrows from the EIB (own re-
sources and NCI resources), mainly to finance energy 
projects. In 1986 over 80% of the loans granted to this 
country as a whole, totalling 227.9 million ECU, con-
cerned two natural gas transmission and distribution 
projects (73.1 million ECU) and six district heating net-
work construction and extension projects (154.8 million 
ECU). 
A very big loan of over 100 million ECU was granted in 
Greece for the modernization of the structure of the ref-
ining industry. Two loans were also granted in Greece to 
build two small hydroelectric power stations and a high-
voltage line (24.5 million ECU in all). 
After two years of virtual absence from the Community 
capital market for energy investment, in 1986 Ireland 
came back more or less to its 1983 borrowing level. Two 
EIB loans and one NCI loan were granted to the public 
electricity enterprise for the building of a thermal coal-
fired power station and the extension and upgrading of 
the high-voltage network (117.0 million ECU in all). An 
Article 54(2) ECSC loan, with interest rebates, for in-
vestment to promote the sale of Community coal was 
also granted to Ireland. 
The two new Member States made their first appearance 
in the sphere of Community financing of energy invest-
ment with three EIB loans granted in Spain (27.3 million 
ECU in all) for the construction of an hydroelectric 
power station and a gas pipeline network and in Portugal 
(29.1 million ECU) for a series of electricity projects. 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were not in-
volved in Community lending activities in 1986 in the 
energy sector. 
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Table 3 
Community grants for energy projects in 1986 
by recipient sector and source of funding 
(General Budget and ECSC Budget) 
1. Solid fuels 
General Budget 
Demonstration projects 
Liquefaction and gasification 
ERDF 
ECSC Budget 
Interest subsidies 
Coking coal 
Research and development 
Redeployment of workers 
2. Oil and gas 
Community technological 
development projects 
ERDF 
3. Nuclear fission 
Transport and radioactive materials 
Research and development 
Direct action — JRC 
Cost-sharing 
4. Nuclear fusion 
Research and development 
Direct action — JRC 
Cost-sharing 
5. Electricity 
ERDF 
IMPs 
6. New and renewable energy sources 
Demonstration projects 
ERDF 
Research and development 
Direct action — JRC 
Cost-sharing 
7. Rational use of energy 
Demonstration projects 
Energy saving 
Substitution of oil and gas 
ERDF 
IMPs 
Research and development 
Direct action — JRC 
Cost-sharing 
8. Energy planning 
9. Others 
MECU 
164.9 
18.6 
18.4 
0.2 
146.3 
5.9 
6.0 
22.4 
112.0 
214.8 
37.9 
176.9 
150.7 
0.4 
150.3 
121.8 
28.5 
187.3 
17.3 
170.0 
236.7 
235.8 
0.9 
55.4 
39.8 
1.7 
13.9 
6.4 
7.5 
74.2 
55.1 
34.5 
20.6 
5.7 
0.5 
12.9 
5.0 
7.9 
6.6 
0.5 
Grand total 1091.1 
15.1 
1.7 
1.7 
— 
13.4 
0.5 
0.5 
2.1 
10.3 
19.7 
3.5 
16.2 
13.8 
— 
13.8 
11.2 
2.6 
17.2 
1.6 
15.6 
21.7 
21.6 
0.1 
5.1 
3.6 
0.2 
1.3 
0.6 
0.7 
6.8 
5.0 
3.2 
1.8 
0.5 
— 
1.2 
0.5 
0.7 
0.6 
100.0 
Table 4 
Loans granted (MECU) 
1986 
EIB 
NCI 
ECSC 
Euratom 
Total 
1» 
Solid 
fuels 
103.6 
103.6 
3.2 
Oil and Nuclear 
gas energy 
878.3 
878.3 
27.1 
712.7 
443.2 
1 155.9 
35.7 
Electri­
city 
729.6 
47.8 
8.7 
786.1 
24.6 
Rue 
&NRES 
253.6 
43.3 
9.6 
306.5 
9.4 
Total 
2 574.2 
91.1 
121.9 
443.2 
3 230.4 
% 
79.8 
2.8 
3.7 
13.7 
100 
Table 5 
Loans granted 1986 
EIB 
NCI 
ECSC 
Euratom 
Toul 
« 
D 
302.2 
— 121.0 
24.4 
447.6 
13.8 
DK 
193.3 
34.6 
— 
— 227.9 
7.0 
E 
27.3 
— — 
— 27.3 
0.8 
F 
22.3 
— — 227.1 
234.4 
7.6 
OR 
123.1 
— — 
— 123.1 
3.9 
IRL 
69.2 
47.8 
0.9 
— 117.9 
3.6 
I 
939.4 
8.7 
— 97.6 
1043.7 
32.6 
Ρ 
29.1 
— — 
— 29.1 
0.9 
UK 
866.3 
— — 98.1 
964.4 
29.8 
EC 
2 374.2 
91.1 
121.9 
443.2 
3 230.4 
<h 
79.8 
2.8 
3.7 
13.7 
too 
Table 6 
Loans granted to the energy sector by Community financial 
institutions 
(MECU) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1983 1986 
EIB 
N O 
ECSC 
Euratom 
Total 
216.9 
96.9 
297.6 
70.2 
997.0 1112.2 1431.4 1228.3 1643.3 1894.72 231.3 2 374.2 
149.3 108.0 93.6 131.4 313.4 230.0 9.4 91.1 
278.7 323.2 37.2 302.9 396.2 124.4 90.8 121.9 
132.4 181.3 337.6 361.8 366.4 186.0 211.0 443.2 
693.3 1103.6 1377.6 1724.7 1939.8 2 024.6 2 721.3 2 433.12 542.3 3 230.4 
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Short-term energy outlook in the European 
Community 
Introduction 
From now on the short-term energy outlook will cover the whole of the Community of Twelve, i.e. 
including Spain and Portugal. This important extension of our field of analysis alters the Commun­
ity's energy profile, since on the basis of the (provisional) annual energy balance for 1986 the in­
crease in total gross inland energy consumption for that year was 1.8% for the Community of Ten 
plus Spain, but 8.2% for Portugal, with the result that the increase in energy consumption for the 
Community of Twelve (EUR 12) was nearly 2% (Box A). 
It should also be pointed out that as a result of revising the data, the trend for 1986 (a year in which 
the price of oil fell considerably) is significantly different f rom the estimates in Energy in Europe 
Nos 7 and 8 in which the increase in total energy demand in 1986 was put at only 1 % (Boxes Β and 
D). 
However, the data available at the time of writing (covering six to eight months of the current year) 
would seem to bear out the forecast made in Nos 7 and 8 which indicated that overall energy de­
mand would remain virtually stable in 1987. According to our present estimates, and assuming 
normal weather conditions in the fourth quarter of 1987, the increase in apparent total energy con­
sumption in the Community of Twelve should not exceed Ο.6Ψ0. 
However, this picture of stability conceals a major redistribution of the major forms of energy, and 
in particular a spectacular breakthrough by gas (of the order of 6%). At the same time, solid fuel de­
mand was sluggish, oil product demand fell by just under 2% and nuclear power generation in­
creased, but by less than originally forecast. 
These developments are to a large extent attributable to the significant increase in the price of oil. 
Barring an (unlikely) slump at the end of the year, the average (cif) price f or crude oil imported by 
the Community in 1987 should be around USD 18/b compared with USD 14.4/b in 1986. 
Any forecast for 1988 is subject at present to considerable uncertainty. Following the stock ex­
change crash of 19 October 1987 the world economic outlook is very uncertain. 
Is there a risk of a recession in the United States in 1988 and/or 1989? How would this affect the Eu­
ropean economy? How much will the dollar be worth in 1988? Will the price of oil slump again? 
These are just some of the questions which add to the uncertainties attaching to any forecast. 
In this climate of uncertainty our forecasts f or 1988 are based on a few key working assumptions: 
that the GDP growth rate for the Community of Twelve will be low but positive (1.5% on average) 
and that neither oil prices nor the dollar will slump, in other words the price of crude will remain un­
changed in current ECU terms. 
On the basis of these assumptions and normal weather conditions, overall energy demand in 1988 is 
likely to be slightly higher than in 1987. 
Natural gas is likely to continue to make inroads, but at a slower pace (increasing by 2%), while 
solid fuels and especially oil products should continue to lose ground. In all probability electricity 
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demand will increase slightly, in line with GDP, and nuclear energy will continue to expand, at a rate 
between 3 and 4%. 
However, since this set of assumptions is, like any other set of assumptions, open to discussion a few 
alternative scenarios are illustrated enabling readers to get an idea of the possible alternative de­
velopments next year (Box F). 
We shall now move on to a more detailed presentation of 
recent trends and the latest short-term forecasts done by 
the Directorate-General for Energy (DG XVII) for 
EUR 12. 
As a result of the transition to EUR 12 the previous ver­
sion of the short-term energy model (STEM) has not 
been used, and instead a prototype of the new version of 
the model (STEM 12 being prepared by DG XVII) en­
abled us to carry out a few simulations and test the inter­
nal consistency of the forecasts. As usual, however, mar­
ket information has also been used. 
This analysis is based on the statistics available as at 
10 November 1987. 
Box A 
From the Community of Ten to the Community of 
Twelve 
The following table summarizes the changes 
caused by the transition from EUR 10 to EUR 12. 
Gross Inland energy consumption 
EUR 10 
Spain 
Portugal 
EUR 12 
EUR 10 
Spain 
Portugal 
EUR 12 
EUR 10 
Spain 
Portugal 
EUR 10 
Sources: 
1980 
943 650 
69606 
9528 
1024 784 
92.3 
6.8 
0.9 
100.0 
1981 
912383 
69 340 
9 373 
991096 
1982 1983 
'000 toe 
886349 187122 
67 009 67 035 
10 376 10 454 
963 734 964 611 
Percentage change 
- 3 . 5 
- 0 . 4 
- 1.6 
- 3 . 3 
- 2.9 0.1 
- 3.4 0.0 
10.7 0.8 
- 2.8 0.1 
1984 
912109 
68 383 
10 437 
990 929 
2.8 
2.0 
- 0 . 2 
2.7 
Percentage share of the total 
92.1 
7.0 
0.9 
100.0 
92.0 92.0 
7.0 6.9 
1.0 1.1 
100.0 100.0 
1980-84: Energy Statistical Yearbook 1985, 
92.0 
6.9 
1.1 
100.0 
Eurostat. 
1985: Revised annual balance, 18 November 1987. 
1986: Provisional balance, 18 November 1987. 
1985 
948 319 
70 303 
10 283 
1986 
965 709 
71595 
11126 
1 028 90S 1 048 430 
4.0 
2.8 
- 1.5 
3.8 
92.2 
6.8 
1.0 
100.0 
1.8 
1.8 
8.2 
1.9 
92.1 
6.8 
1.1 
100.0 
Box Β 
Data sources and definitions 
On the occasion of this transition to EUR 12 and 
in order to avoid any confusion, it would be useful 
to give some details about the source and content 
of the data used in this report. 
The main source of data is the monthly Eurostat 
publication 'Energy: Monthly statistics'. The data 
in question cover the main energy variables with a 
comparatively short time-lag (three to five months 
on average). However, these data are not directly 
comparable with the annual statistics published in 
the Eurostat Yearbook. In other words, the sum 
total for 12 months may be rather different from 
the value for the year as a whole published later in 
the Yearbook. In addition, there are several dif­
ferences between the definitions. By way of an ex­
ample, the monthly statistics relate to deliveries 
and not consumption; the stocks measured mon­
thly do not always include all the stocks measured 
annually; inputs to power stations exclude private 
generation, etc. 
In some cases we have made certain adjustments to 
bring the monthly data more into line with the an­
nual data. Nevertheless, there are still some signifi­
cant differences. In addition, by their very nature 
the monthly data are frequently revised, and this 
may lead to considerable changes in certain time 
series. 
The monthly data are also a source of information 
for the quarterly primary energy balances (ex­
pressed in toe) published by Eurostat every three 
months. Consequently, these balances may be 
slightly different from the annual balance pub­
lished later, particularly where stock changes are 
concerned. In addition, these balances exclude cer­
tain energy sources which are recorded in the an­
nual balance as, for example, household refuse, 
etc. 
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(box Β continued) 
In earlier numbers of Energy in Europe these bal­
ances, after a number of slight adjustments, 
provided a source of information for Tables 1 and 
2 in the annex. However, as these balances were 
not regularly revised following revision of the basic 
data it was possible that certain initial errors might 
be perpetuated. 
For this reason, from this edition onwards we 
would prefer to update the data periodically as and 
when the basic data are revised. This explains cer­
tain differences which readers may note if they 
compare the toe data in Tables 1 and 2 of the 
annex with the figures published in Eurostat's 
monthly bulletin. 
Working assumptions 
The key assumptions underlying the energy forecasts for 
the Community of Twelve are shown in Table I. 
The 1.5% growth rate is less than the Commission's Sep­
tember 1987 forecast (2.3%). Unfortunately, the Com­
mission had not adjusted its macroeconomic forecasts by 
the time of writing of this report. Consequently, v the 
1.5% assumption may turn out to be rather pessimistic. 
However, quite apart from these internal trends the Eu­
ropean economy will be affected to a greater or lesser ex­
tent in 1988 by the economic situation in the United 
States, which is quite unpredictable on the basis of the in­
formation currently available. For this reason, we are 
giving a brief alternative projection (Box F) based on a 
2.5% assumption. 
Table I 
EUR 12: Main forecasting assumptions 
2.9 
2.45 
2.4 
2.35 
2.3' 
2.25 
M 
Graph 1 — EUR 12: Quarterly energy ratio 
(seasonally adjusted gross inland 
consumption/real GDP index) 
— ratio 
— trend 
^ ^ \ ~ / \^~~ 
Forecast 
1 2 3 4 83.1 2 J J M.I 2 3 1 17.1 2 3 1 a i 1 
Quarter 
3 < 
GDP 
Consumer expenditure 
Industrial production 
Inflation 
1985 
2.5 
2.6 
3.4 
6.1 
1986 1987 
Percentage growth 
2.5 2.2 
4.1 3.1 
2.0 1.4 
3.6 3.3 
1988 
1.5 
1.75 
1.0 
3.5 
1 ECU = USD 
Average crude oil 
import price 
(cif, USD/b) 
(cif, ECU/b) 
(cif, 1986 ECU/b) 
0.760 0.983 1.151 1.223 
27.5 
36.4 
37.7 
14.5 
14.9 
14.9 
18.1 
15.7 
15.2 
19.2 
15.7 
14.7 
Degree days — 
Difference from the 'mean' 11.7 0.7 8.0 0.0 
Source: Eurostat, DG XVII. 
We considered using, as a working assumption, a crude 
oil import price unchanged in ECU terms. However, ex­
perience has shown that the price of oil can vary consi­
derably with slight fluctuations in supply or demand on 
the world market. To illustrate this we have carried out 
two simulations with our world oil market model 
(Aisling) which show two alternative situations of bal­
ance on the oil market, one with 19.2 current dollars a 
barrel in 1988 and the other with 14.2 current dollars a 
barrel. The results are given in Box C. 
In addition, Box F gives an alternative projection for 
1988 based on an average price of USD 14.2/b. 
Energy prices 
(i) Crude oil 
In the wake of OPEC's decisions at the end of 1986 crude 
prices steadily increased between December 1986 and 
Graph 2 — EUR 12: Quarterly marcoeconomic indicators 
. Industrial production (seasonally 
ad|usled) 1980 - 100 
- Consumer expend. 
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EUR 12: 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 (9 months) 
1 Q 1985 
2 Q 1985 
3 Q 1985 
4 Q 1985 
1 Q 1986 
2 Q 1986 
3 Q 1986 
4 Q 1986 
1 Q 1987 
2 Q 1987 
3 Q 1987 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
Table Π 
Average erode oil Import price (cif) 
SUSD/b 
30.05 
29.00 
27.59 
14.42 
17.94 
27.86 
27.57 
26.74 
28.00 
20.56 
12.74 
11.33 
13.40 
17.12 
18.13 
18.60 
16.77 
17.44 
17.40 
18.06 
18.11 
18.23 
18.58 
18.87 
18.30 
ECU/b 
33.76 
36.75 
36.16 
14.65 
16.83 
40.73 
37.98 
34.06 
32.83 
22.28 
13.28 
11.18 
12.91 
15.22 
15.77 
16.49 
15.08 
15.44 
15.37 
15.74 
15.58 
15.98 
16.53 
16.90 
15.99 
Percentage change on 
previous period 
(in ECU) 
- 2.3 
8.9 
­ 1.6 
­ 59.5 
5.4 
­ 6.8 
­ 10.3 
­ 3.6 
­ 32.1 
­ 40.4 
­ 15.8 
15.4 
17.9 
3.6 
4.6 
10.6 
2.4 
­ 0.5 
2.4 
­ 1.0 
2.6 
3.4 
2.2 
­ 5.4 
Sources: 1. Commission of the European Communities, Bulletin of en-
ergy pnces 1/87 
2. DG XVII, Registration of crude oil imports, 10/87. 
August 1987 when, because of the troubles in the Gulf, 
prices reached their maximum level (average cif import 
price for the Community of USD 18.9/b. Since then 
there has been a slight fall, with the result that the 
average (cif) price for 1987 should, we think, be around 
USD 18/b. 
prices in ECU terms was much lower, as Table II 
indicates. 
How are prices likely to develop in 1988? Just before 
19 October several observers came to the conclusion that 
the price of crude would be stable in 1988 or even in­
crease slightly. A figure of USD 20/b was beginning to 
be seriously envisaged. The situation changed suddenly 
at the end of October. As the demand forecasts were 
down to a greater or lesser extent, the feeling emerged 
that there was surplus supply. Against this background 
the OPEC meeting scheduled for December 1987 takes 
on considerable importance. 
As Box C shows, it is very difficult to make a short­term 
forecast for the price of oil in the present conditions. 
Moreover, the decisive factor as far as the European 
economies are concerned is the import price expressed in 
national currency. This necessitates an additional fore­
cast about the parity of the dollar. In view of the volatil­
ity of the exchange markets it will be understood why we 
have decided to adopt a 'neutral' working assumption, 
i.e. an unchanged current price expressed in ECU for 
1988. 
(ii) Oil products 
Extending the scope of our analysis to all 12 countries 
makes it necessary to alter the variables for the average 
final consumer prices for all energy products, including 
of course those relating to oil product prices. The values 
indicated in Table HI below are weighted averages of the 
prices in the 12 Community countries. 
However, the value of the dollar fell considerably in 1987 
in relation to European currencies, so the increase in 
On the basis of the information for the first three quart­
ers of 1987 average oil product prices have increased 
Graph 3 - E U R 12: 
Average crude oil import price/barrel (cif) 
ECU/USD 
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Box C 
The price of oU: will 1988 be a repeat of 1986? 
The forecasts made in this article are based on the 
assumption that oil prices expressed in ECU will 
not alter in 1988 compared with 1987. This as­
sumption presupposes the maintenance of dis­
cipline within OPEC. However, if world growth 
slows down and hence the demand for oil is low, 
the possibility of a further reduction in the price of 
oil cannot be ruled out in 1988. 
To illustrate this point, using DG XVH's Aisling 
model we have carried out a simulation illustrating 
how the price of crude could fall by USD 5 com­
pared with the reference case. 
The following table indicates two scenarios which 
are, it should be made clear, based on exactly the 
same macroeconomic assumptions as our forecasts 
for the Community: comparatively weak world 
growth and a slight decrease in the value of the dol­
lar relative to the main European currencies and 
the yen. 
According to this model, if OPEC brought an 
additional 1.3 million barrels a day onto the mar­
ket, the average price of crude might fall by USD 5 
despite the considerable reduction in OECD 
production, in particular in the United States. 
This price slump is attributable to the low short­
term price elasticity of world demand. In this even­
tuality, 1988 would be a repeat of 1986. 
The world oil market: two scenarios for 1988 
(excluding the centrally-planned economy countries) 
slightly. However, on average for the year as a whole 
they are likely to be lower than in 1986. 
Supply (Mbd) 
1. OPEC production 
2. Production of OECD and 
rest of the world 
3. Net exports from CPE 
countries 
4. Processing gains 
1986 1987 1988A 1988B Diff 
19.3 18.8 19.3 20.6 + 1.3 
25.3 25.5 25.7 25.1 ­ 0.6 
1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Total 
Demand (Mbd) 
1. OECD 
2. Rest of the world 
Total 
Stock changes, statistical 
difference 
Price of crude 
(calculated, USD/b) 
47.5 
34.9 
11.8 
46.7 
0.8 
13.6 
47.2 
35.2 
12.1 
47.3 
­ 0.1 
18.1 
47.8 
35.4 
12.3 
47.7 
0.1 
19.2 
48.5 
35.9 
12.4 
48.3 
0.2 
14.2 
+ 0.7 
+ 0.5 
+ 0.1 
+ 0.6 
+ 0.1 
­ 5.0 
Source: Aisling model (DG XVII). 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Table III 
EUR 12: OU product prices in ECU 
Percentage change 
Gasoline Diesel 
(ECU/10000 
718 962 
752 359 
624 504 ­
616 724 
(9 months) 
1Q85 
2Q85 
3 Q 85 
4Q85 
1Q86 
2Q86 
3Q86 
4Q86 
1Q87 
2Q87 
3Q87 
Sources 
738 712 ­
781681 
756 154 ­
732 887 ­
663 029 ­
623 982 ­
610446 ­
600 560 ­
609 380 
621080 
619 711 ­
DGXVII: 
ft (ECU/1 0001) 
3.8 481.426 
4.6 505 879 
■ 17.0 3% 368 ­
392 681 
0.1 514 939 
5.8 516 453 
■ 3.3 491 626 ­
■ 3.1 500 498 
9.5 437 337 ­
■ 5.9 409 777 ­
■ 2.2 375 570 ­
1.6 362 787 ­
1.5 384 556 
1.9 382 611 ­
0.2 410 875 
on previous period 
Heating oil 
•ft (ECU/10001) 
5.5 
5.1 
21.6 
2.6 
0.3 
4.8 
1.8 
12.6 
6.3 
8.3 
3.4 
6.0 
0.5 
7.4 
370 298 
395 758 
257 897 
243 957 
421089 
401036 
371390 
389 516 
310 914 
270 136 
225 596 
224 940 
242 920 
236 243 
252 707 
ft 
5.5 
6.9 
­34.8 
8.1 
­ 4.8 
­ 7.4 
4.9 
­20.2 
-13.1 
­16.5 
­ 0.3 
8.0 
­ 2.7 
7.0 
RFC 
(ECU/t) 
239.352 
239 082 
117 918 
114 812 
287 904 
248 270 
215 718 
204 434 
162 129 
115 649 
89 986 
103 910 
108 296 
113 984 
122 157 
Oil Bulletin; IEA; DG XVII estimates. 
«Λ 
18.6 
­ 0.1 
­50.7 
11.8 
­13.8 
­13.1 
­ 5.2 
­20.7 
­28.7 
­22.2 
15.5 
4.2 
5.3 
7.2 
It is expected that oil product prices will stabilize in 1988 
on the basis of our crude oil price assumption. 
(iii) Natural gas 
Table IV clearly shows that gas import prices reflect, 
with a slight time­lag, oil price fluctuations, in ac­
cordance with the mechanisms provided for in gas con­
tracts. The steady fall since the beginning of 1986 
speeded up in the fourth quarter of 1986 and the first 
quarter of 1987. 
Table IV 
Average (elf) price of imported natural gas 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1 Q 1986 
2 Q 1986 
3 Q 1986 
4 Q 1986 
1 Q 1987 
2 Q 1987 
USD/toe 
161.25 
151.80 
149.47 
152.96 
143.85 
166.83 
156.27 
140.82 
109.20 
94.63 
94.76 
ECU/toe 
164.59 
170.52 
189.69 
200.45 
146.16 
180.75 
162.95 
139.01 
105.20 
84.12 
82.40 
Percentage change 
3.6 
11.2 
5.7 
­ 27.1 
­ 5.2 
­ 9.8 
­ 14.7 
­ 24.3 
­ 20.0 
­ 2.1 
Source: IEA. 
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As import prices affect the final consumer prices, the lat-
ter have also tended to fall. 
Table V (indices of average prices in ECU terms: provi-
sional DG XVII estimates) indicates these trends. For ex-
ample, the average gas prices for industry fell by nearly 
20% in 1986. These price trends increased the relative 
competitiveness of gas and were no doubt one of the 
main factors in its rapid expansion in 1987. 
EUR 12 
1984 
1985 
1986 
: Average final 
Table V 
consumer price for natural gas : 
Indices (first quarter 1984 = 100) and 
percentage change on previous quarter 
Households 
103.2 
108.2 
100.7 
1987* (6 months) 85.8 
1 Q 1984 
2 Q 1984 
3 Q 1984 
4 Q 1984 
1 Q 1985 
2 Q 1985 
3 Q 1985 
4 Q 1985 
1 Q 1986 
2 Q 1986 
3 Q 1986 
4 Q 1986 
1 Q 1987· 
2 Q 1987· 
100.0 
103.2 
106.6 
103.0 
104.7 
108.8 
112.5 
106.9 
106.0 
103.8 
99.5 
93.5 
85.9 
85.7 
• Provisional estimate. 
Sources: IEA 
4.8 
- 6.9 
1.7 
3.2 
3.3 
- 3.4 
1.7 
3.9 
3.5 
- 5.0 
- 0.9 
- 2.0 
- 4.1 
- 6.1 
- 8.1 
- 0.2 
.; DG XII estimates. 
Table VI 
Industry 
103.9 
112.8 
92.3 
67.5 
100.0 
102.7 
105.0 
107.8 
112.2 
114.3 
113.6 
111.1 
108.4 
98.4 
88.0 
74.6 
68.6 
66.4 
EUR 12: Industry: relative price of natural gas, 
I Q 1984 
2 Q 1984 
3 Q 1984 
4 Q 1984 
1 Q 1985 
2 Q 1985 
3 Q 1985 
4 Q 1985 
1 Q 1986 
2 Q 1986 
3 Q 1986 
4 Q 1986 
1 Q 1987 
2 Q 1987 
indices (first quarter 1984 
Gas/RFO 
100 000 
98 783 
99 381 
94 643 
88 052 
104 064 
119 010 
122 752 
151 078 
192 288 
221093 
162 383 
143 165 
131740 
= 100) 
Gas/coal 
100 000 
104 815 
104 568 
106 327 
109 693 
110 852 
110 088 
107 204 
104 574 
100 018 
91 048 
78 470 
72 719 
8.6 
18.2 
1.9 
2.7 
2.2 
2.8 
4.0 
1.9 
1.6 
2.2 
2.4 
9.2 
10.5 
15.2 
8.1 
3.1 
Sources: Tables III, VI and VII. 
Our forecasts for the end of 1987 and particularly for 
1988 are to a large extent determined by the relative 
prices for natural gas, especially in industry. 
In this connection, it is interesting to examine the trends 
for the relative prices for gas compared with RFO (re-
sidual fuel oil), and compared with the coal used by in-
dustry (Table VI). 
It emerges from Table VI that gas has recently become 
more competitive compared with coal since the end of 
1985, and compared with RFO in particular since the 
fourth quarter of 1986. 
We have assumed that this general downward trend in 
gas prices could fade to a greater or lesser extent towards 
the end of 1987, particularly where households are con-
cerned. 
However, it may well be that the relative price of gas will 
continue to improve, albeit very slightly, compared with 
other fuels in industry. 
(iv) Coal 
There has been some delay in receiving the information 
concerning the price of coal, so the consumer price 
trends after the first quarter of 1987 are as yet unclear. 
EUR 12: 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
(6 months) 
1Q1985 
2 Q1985 
3 Q1985 
4 Q1985 
1 Q 1986 
2Q1986 
3 Q 1986 
4 Q 1986 
1 Q 1987 
2 Q 1987 
Table VII 
Average price of imported steam coal (USD and 
ECU/toe) 
Average final consumer prices (ECU/t) 
Percentage change on previous quarter 
Imported steam coal 
USD/toe 
51.0 
51.6 
48.3 
43.6 
51.0 
52.3 
50.6 
52.5 
50.2 
49.4 
47.8 
45.8 
43.2 
44.0 
ECU/toe 
64.7 
68.2 
49.3 
37.3 
74.6 
72.0 
64.5 
61.5 
54.4 
51.5 
47.2 
44.1 
38.4 
38.3 
Sources: Commission of the European 
1/87; IEA; DO XVII estimates. 
It 
5.4 
- 27.7 
9.6 
- 3.4 
- 10.5 
- 4.5 
- 11.6 
- 5.3 
- 8.4 
- 6.5 
- 13.0 
- 0.4 
Households 
ECU/t 
193.8 
203.6 
203.5 
199.5 
202.2 
203.5 
209.3 
207.3 
204.5 
201.1 
201.1 
201.3 
It 
5.1 
- 0.0 
- 0 . 6 
1.4 
0.7 
2.8 
- 1.0 
- 1.4 
- 1.7 
- 0.0 
0.1 
Communities, Bulletin oj 
Industry 
ECU/t 
94.1 
97.0 
92.7 
96.2 
97.1 
97.1 
97.5 
97.5 
92.6 
91.0 
89.6 
88.8 
•ft 
3.1 
- 4.4 
0.7 
0.9 
0.0 
0.4 
0.0 
- 5.0 
- 1.7 
- 1.5 
- 0 . 9 
' energy prices. 
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Box D 
What happened in 1986? 
How did energy demand develop in the Commun-
ity in 1986? We now have a clearer answer to this 
very interesting question, remembering that 1986 
was a year in which oil prices fell very consid-
erably. 
The following table summarizes how our statistical 
information about 1986 developed according to the 
two sources available: the quarterly balances and 
the annual balances. 
According to the most recent estimates overall en-
ergy demand increased by just over 2% in 1986, 
i.e. more rapidly than was thought earlier on the 
basis of the quarterly data. 
This table illustrates in fact the differences which 
exist according to the sources and the extent of 
Gross inland energy consumption 
Consolidated quarterly data (Mtoe) 
Energy in Europe Nos 7 and 8 Energy in Europe No 9 
1985 1986 1985 1986· % 
Solid fuels 
OU 
Natural gas 
Nuclear 
Primary 
electricity 
Other 
Total 
218.0 
412.9 
182.1 
116.4 
11.8 
1.2 
EUR 10 
210.6 
420.1 
184.5 
123.2 
12.0 
1.2 
- 3.4 
1.7 
1.3 
5.8 
1.7 
0.0 
240.3 
456.3 
184.5 
125.5 
15.5 
EUR 12 
231.1 
472.2 
186.8 
138.2 
15.2 
942.4 951.6 1.0 1 022.2 1 043.5 
3.8 
3.5 
1.3 
10.1 
1.9 
2.1 
• Provisional estimates, data available on 10 November 1987. 
Source: DG XVII. 
possible revisions. By way of comparison, the fig-
ures used for the relevant tables in the annex were 
as follows: 
In addition, the first provisional annual balance 
for 1986 provides information about the trend in 
the demand for oil products during this period of 
rapidly falling prices. 
Final consumption of oil products 
(Ml) 
1985 1986 Percentage 
change 
1. Gasoline 91 255 95 068 4.2 
2. Kerosene 21 789 22 788 4.6 
3. Gas oil/fluid fuel oil 158 885 167 498 5.4 
4. Residual fuel oil 39 689 38 469 - 3 . 1 
5. Other 19 373 20 307 4.8 
Total 330 991 344 130 4.0 
1. Industry 
2. Transport 
3. Households and others 
Total 
51 672 
172 316 
107 003 
53 275 
181 525 
109 330 
330 991 344 130 
3.1 
5.3 
2.2 
4.0 
Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities, 
annual balances, 
1985: Unpublished revision, 18/11/87, 
1986: Provisional unpublished estimates, 18/11/87. 
These figures indicate that, with the exception of 
residual fuel oil, final consumption of oil products 
increased significantly in 1986. However, when one 
considers the extent of the price variation, it will be 
seen that the short-term elasticities are low, even 
though they may be higher than was thought 
hitherto. 
Gross inland energy consumpt ion (Mtoe) 
1985A 
Quarterly balance 
1985B 1986 1985 A 
Annual balance 
1985B 1986 
Solid fuels 
OU 
Natural gas 
Nuclear 
Primary electricity 
Other 
Total 
218.6 
411.3 
181.2 
115.1 
16.0 
942.2 
218.6 
411.0 
182.1 
115.0 
16.0 
942.7 
EUR 10 
210.8 
419.7 
184.5 
121.9 
15.9 
EUR 10 
952.8 
-3.6 
2.1 
1.3 
6.0 
-0.6 
1.1 
217 983 
416 131 
182 347 
118 336 
12 045 
1 410 
948 252 
218 050 
416 131 
182 347 
118 336 
12 045 
1 410 
948 319 
212 650 
426 615 
184 220 
128 758 
11 944 
1 452 
965 709 
2.5 
2.5 
1.1 
8.8 
0.8 
3.0 
1.8 
Solid fuels 
OU 
Natural gas 
Nuclear 
Primary electricity 
Other 
Total 
238.4 
456.4 
183.5 
122.5 
19.9 
1020.7 
238.4 
456.1 
184.5 
122.5 
19.9 
1021.4 
EUR 12 
229.7 
465.9 
187.0 
131.7 
19.3 
1033.6 
EUR 12 
-3.6 
2.1 
1.4 
7.5 
-3.0 
1.2 
237 656 
462 673 
184 699 
125 711 
15 764 
1 664 
1028 167 
238 394 
462 673 
184 699 
125 711 
15 764 
1 664 
1028 905 
232 126 
474 290 
186 843 
138 473 
15 037 
1 661 
1048 430 
— 2.6 
2.5 
1.2 
10.2 
— 4.6 
— 0.2 
1.9 
Sources: Statistical Office of the European Communities 
A. Quarterly balances: 
1985A: Energy monthly statistics 4 /86 , 
1985B, 1986: Energy monthly statistics 4 /87 ; 
Annual balances: 
1985A: Energy Statistical Yearbook 198S, published in March 19877, 
198SB: Unpublished revision, 18/11/87, 
1986: Provisional unpublished estimate, 18/11/87. 
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The main conclusion to emerge from Table VII is that 
despite the considerable fall in world prices and hence in 
import prices in 1986, inland prices went down only very 
slightly. This was no doubt detrimental to the consump-
tion of coal in the Community. 
Import prices may continue to fall a little before the end 
of 1987 and then stabilize at that level next year. 
Consumer prices might also fall slightly in 1988. 
By way of conclusion, it should be pointed out that the 
present consumer price formation mechanisms for the 
various fuels are somewhat unclear, with the result that a 
degree of uncertainty remains concerning relative price 
movements at the end of 1987 and in 1988. It may well 
be, therefore, that unforeseeable changes in relative 
prices will affect the specific demand for individual fuels 
rather significantly. 
Overall energy 
As indicated in the introduction, a major revision of the 
data relating to 1986 indicates that, contrary to what was 
thought earlier, total energy consumption increased by 
approximately 2% (2.1% on the basis of the consolidated 
quarterly data) in that year. These differences are set out 
in Box D. 
The main point which emerges from the data is the larger 
increase in oil consumption than previously reported, 
which tends to show that the short-term price elasticity of 
demand is not quite as low as had been thought hitherto 
(see article 'Do oil and energy prices matter?' on 
page 13). In addition, it would seem that nuclear heat 
production increased more rapidly than originally es-
timated. 
In 1987, following a particularly cold first quarter in 
which overall energy consumption was 0.7% up on the 
first quarter of 1986, there has been a reversal of the 
trend. Thus, at the end of the first three quarters of 1987 
overall energy consumption did not appear to have re-
turned to a level equivalent to that of 1986. 
Despite the spectacular growth of natural gas (7.2% in 
the first seven months of the year), the big drop in oil 
product consumption, the stagnation of solid fuels and 
the slower than expected growth of nuclear power have 
resulted, during that period, in slightly lower energy con-
sumption than in the corresponding months of 1986. 
However, barring unexpectedly good weather, all the 
conditions seem likely to be met, particularly as regards 
prices, for a recovery in consumption in the fourth 
quarter. Ultimately, therefore, overall consumption in 
1987 might be some 0.6% up on 1986. 
According to our forecasts, slower economic growth in 
1988 will be the main factor influencing energy trends. 
With an unchanged current crude price level, oil will con-
tinue to lose ground, mainly to natural gas and nuclear 
power. Moreover, unless the price of coal slumps unex-
pectedly, it would seem that solid fuels have hardly any 
chance of occupying the ground lost by oil. 
Things might change, however, if for one reason or an-
other (considerable weakening of world demand and/or 
lack of discipline among OPEC countries) crude prices 
again fell significantly (Box C). In this case (which now 
seems much more probable than an abrupt increase in 
prices, which would only result from unforeseeable 
supply-side factors), the consumption profile would of 
course be quite different. This eventuality is examined in 
BoxF. 
Graph 5 — EUR 12: Seasonally adjusted quarterly 
energy consumption 
Graph 6 — EUR 12: Seasonally adjusted quarterly 
primary energy supply 
- Forecast 
S7.1 3 3 
Quarter 
. Forecast 
4 SS.l 2 
Quarter 
87 .1 3 3 4 Bfl.l 2 
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For a better understanding of these forecasts, a more de­
tailed analysis should be made by major energy category. 
(i)Oil 
The demand profile differs from one product to another. 
Gasoline deliveries, which increased by nearly 5% in 
1986, will no doubt rise again in 1987. However, it is 
likely that in 1988 deliveries will level off under the com­
bined effect of the following three factors: lower growth, 
an end to or a slowing­down of the fall in real prices, and 
the spin­off effects of the renewal of the car stock. 
On the other hand, the demand for kerosene/jet fuel, 
which is less sensitive to price variations, will probably 
increase again next year. 
It is almost certain that demand for heating oil will be 
lower in 1987 following the consumer stockpiling which 
occurred in 1986. However, a slight increase in deliveries 
is on the cards in 1988 once these stocks have been 
exhausted. A 2% increase in heating oil and diesel de­
liveries is therefore predicted for 1988. 
The long­term trend to use alternatives to residual fuel 
oil will probably continue. In 1986 deliveries fell by some 
3.5 million tonnes despite favourable prices and stock­
piling by power stations. In 1987 a further reduction is 
expected, possibly once again in excess of 3 million 
tonnes, mainly to the benefit of natural gas. On the basis 
of our price assumptions and under the combined effect 
of lower demand from power stations and a slowing­
down in industrial production, it is possible that this 
downward movement will continue and even speed up in 
1988. 
It may well be, however, that this trend will be limited by 
certain technical factors. In that case, our forecast for 
Graph 7 — EUR 12: Seasonally adjusted quarterly 
oil consumption and net imports 
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(slight decrease) and stock changes which are very diffi­
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be lower. As a result, net imports as a proportion of in­
land oil consumption could fall from 70.7% in 1987 to 
70.2% in 1988. 
(ii)Gas 
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slightly, 1987 was a spectacular year for natural gas. 
Thanks to a particularly favourable price environment 
(Table VI), gas consumption increased very rapidly in 
the first two quarters of the year. Of the major consum­
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many (19% in the first seven months of 1987). The bad 
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Box E 
Deliveries of residual fuel oil 
In recent years the use of residual fuel oil has cons-
tantly decreased. Total deliveries in EUR 12 fell 
from 155 million tonnes in 1980 to 75 million 
tonnes in 1986. According to our forecasts this 
downward trend may well continue in 1987 and 
1988. 
For a better understanding of these trends and the 
reasons underlying our forecast, it would be inter-
esting to be able to pinpoint the various factors af-
fecting deliveries. Econometric analysis enables us 
to obtain an initial response to this question, al-
though the reality is much more complicated. 
The following table highlights the separate effects 
of the various factors which seem to affect de-
liveries of residual fuel oil in the period 1986-88. 
RFO deliveries 
(Mt) 
Total deliveries 
Change 
Determining factors: 
1. Electricity-generating 
sector 
2. Industrial production 
3. Price of RFO 
4. Price of other fuels 
5. Structural changes 
6. Other 
Total 
1985 
78.1 
1986 
74.6 
- 3.5 
- 3.8 
1.0 
8.4 
- 1.1 
- 7.7 
- 0.3 
- 3.5 
1987 
70.8 
- 3.8 
1.0 
0.7 
0.4 
- 1.7 
- 5.1 
0.9 
3.8 
1988 
65.5 
- 5.3 
- 1.2 
0.5 
0.2 
- 0.8 
- 4.0 
0.0 
- 5.3 
It will be noted that an important role is played by 
what might be termed 'structural changes', 
meaning a long-term trend made up of several phe-
nomena: changes in industrial structure, improve-
ments in efficiency, and substitution independent 
of short-term price fluctuations, etc. 
Since it is very difficult to predict such changes, 
there will always be a considerable amount of un-
certainty attaching to any forecasts of deliveries of 
fuel oil. 
Although we do not have complete information about 
final consumption by sector, it would seem that demand 
was strong both in industry and in households. In addi-
tion, as will be seen further on, consumption increased 
considerably in power stations in 1987. 
Thus, despite a marked increase in production (4.4% in 
the first seven months), imports increased, covering 
nearly 36% of consumption in the Community. 
This exceptional state of affairs is unlikely to be repeated 
in 1988. Our forecasts indicate that, given normal wea-
ther conditions, the average increase in gas consumption 
should be around 2%. Accordingly, natural gas should 
continue to make inroads in industry, replacing fuel oil 
to some extent. At the same time, the development of the 
distribution networks should encourage consumption in 
households. 
Be that as it may, the demand for gas is rather sensitive to 
variations in relative prices, as has been seen in the past. 
If the trend in relative prices differs from what we have 
assumed, this could have a significant effect on con-
sumption. 
(iii) Solid fuels 
The solid fuel market in 1987 was particularly sluggish. 
Although, because of a statistical change made at the be-
ginning of 1987 (to include the black lignite which is 
produced in Spain and used almost exclusively in power 
stations under hard coal instead of under lignite) the 1987 
data are not strictly comparable with the 1986 data, there 
has been a reduction in deliveries of coal in all sectors. 
However, it should be noted that our information about 
consumption and stock changes in power stations is not 
particularly clear. Nevertheless, following major stock-
piling in 1985 and 1986, it would seem that stocks levelled 
off in 1987, although the situation differs to a great ex-
tent from one country to another. Consequently, the 
data relating to the increase in deliveries probably under-
estimates the increase in coal use in the electricity-gen-
erating sector. If black lignite is left out of the calcula-
tions, coal consumption in power stations would seem to 
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have increased by 2 to 3% in 1987. This explains a slight 
increase in apparent consumption (after black lignite 
consumption is added) despite the reduction in total de-
liveries. 
A further reduction in production, of the order of six to 
seven million tonnes, is forecast for 1988. Total de-
liveries will probably decrease further, despite a slight in-
crease in deliveries to industry. The coking sector will 
probably again be affected because of weak demand 
from the steel industry. 
Thus, overall, and despite the uncertainty surrounding 
power stations, solid fuel consumption could fall by 
about 0.5% in 1988. 
first half of 1987 compared with the corresponding 
period 1986 in the United Kingdom and Belgium and 
virtually came to a halt in Italy. 
In addition, hydroelectricity production has decreased, 
particularly in Spain and Italy, and conventional thermal 
electricity production has increased. All fuels seem to 
have benefited from this increase, especially natural gas. 
This is the case in particular in Italy and Germany (over 
30% in the first half of the year). 
The case of Germany is fairly characteristic. During the 
first six months of 1986 overall consumption in conven-
tional thermal power stations increased by 2.2%. 
Consumption of coal and lignite fell and consumption of 
oil products and gas increased considerably. 
(iv) Electricity 
The rate of growth in demand for electricity in 1987 
would seem to be 2.8 to 3%, slightly higher than the aver-
age rate for 1986. The difference is mainly attributable to 
the weather conditions at the beginning of the year. 
Where 1988 is concerned, lower growth is expected, in 
the vicinity of the GDP growth rate. 
There are some interesting features about 1987 where 
electricity generation is concerned. 
First of all, the increase in the production of nuclear heat 
would seem to be much slower than in 1986 (2.5% com-
pared with 10%). On the basis of the available statistics, 
net nuclear electricity production was lower during the 
For 1988 our forecasts assume an increase in nuclear 
power production and a slight reduction in conventional 
production. All fuels except natural gas and lignite will 
probably be affected. 
(v) Net imports 
On the basis of these forecasts, the Community's net en-
ergy import requirements should again fall in 1988. 
Net imports as a proportion of total primary energy con-
sumption in 1988 could be around 44%, oil's share 
falling to below 32%. 
Graph 9 — EUR 12: Seasonally adjusted natural gas 
supply and demand 
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Box F 
Three alternative scenarios for 1988 
As indicated in the introduction, the macroe­
conomic environment for 1988 is very uncertain. 
We are therefore putting forward some alternative 
scenarios. 
Scenario A: More rapid economic growth. The 
average GDP growth rate in 1988 is assumed to be 
2.5% compared with 1.5% in the reference fore­
cast. 
Scenario B: Price (cif) of imported crude oil 
USD 14.2/b compared with USD 19.2/b in the 
reference forecast. 
Scenario C: Colder year than usual ( + 9 degree 
days). 
The following table sets out the differences com­
pared with the reference forecast: 
1988: Three alternative scenarios 
Gross inland primary energy consumption 
(Mtoe) 
Difference compared with 
the reference forecast 
Scenario Scenario Scenario 
A B C 
Reference 
forecast 
Solid fuels 
ou 
Natural gas 
Nuclear and 
230.0 + 3.6 ­ 3.5 + 0.8 
458.5 + 5.8 + 8.3 + 0.5 
202.7 + 2 . 2 + 1 . 6 + 2.9 
primary 
electricity 
Total 
161.8 
1 053.0 
+ 0.3 
+ 11.9 
0.0 
+ 6.4 
0.0 
+ 4.2 
In the specific case of Scenario Β deliveries of oil 
products might alter as follows: 
1988: Scenario Β (fall in the price of oU) 
Inland deliveries of oil products 
(Mt) 
Gasolene 
Kerosene/jet fuel 
Gas oil and fluid fuel oil 
Residual fuel oil 
Other oil products 
Total 
Reference forecast 
97.8 
23.8 
169.8 
65.5 
75.6 
432.5 
Difference compared with 
the reference forecast 
+ 0.6 
+ 0.1 
+ 2.9 
+ 3.1 
+ 1.0 
+ 7.7 
It should be pointed out that these three scenarios 
are independent of each other, in other words their 
effects could be cumulative. In the event, for ex­
ample, of more rapid growth with a lower price 
and a cold year, overall primary energy consump­
tion in 1988 could exceed 1 075 Mtoe, whereas if 
the converse is true (low growth, high prices and 
good weather), it could be around 1 030 Mtoe. 
Graph 11 — EUR 12: Quarterly inputs for electricity 
generation (seasonally adjusted) 
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Table 1 — EUR 12 
Primary energy balance 
(Last revision: 23 November 1987) 
(Mtoe) 
Table 3 — EUR 12 
Oil and natural gas: Supply and disposal 
(Last revision: 23 November 1987) 
Primary production 
Solid fuels: 
Hard coal 
Lignite 
ou Natural gas 
Primary electricity 
Nuclear 
Total 
Net imports 
Solid fuels: 
Hard coal 
ou Natural gas 
Electricity 
Total 
Change in stocks 
Solid fuels: 
Hard coal 
Coke 
ou Natural gas 
Total 
Bunkers 
Gross inland consumption 
Solid fuels: 
Hard coal 
Coke 
Lignite 
ou Natural gas 
Nuclear 
Primary electricity 
Total 
Net imports as! % 1 
of consumption 
Hard Coal 
ou Natural gas 
Total 
OU imports as % of 
total energy consumption 
1984 
141.4 
105.3 
36.2 
145.5 
119.4 
14.8 
104.2 
525.3 
57.9 
57.0 
349.2 
57.3 
1.5 
465.9 
— 15.3 
— 12.6 
— 3.5 
— 3.5 
0.4 
— 18.5 
23.8 
217.4 
177.7 
2.7 
37.0 
474.5 
176.2 
104.2 
16.3 
988.7 
32.1 
70.1 
32.5 
46.0 
34.5 
1985 
168.2 
132.7 
35.5 
149.2 
126.7 
14.4 
125.5 
583.9 
63.7 
63.6 
334.0 
59.4 
1.2 
458.3 
— 5.0 
— 1.3 
— 2.6 
0.7 
1.6 
— 2.7 
26.2 
240.3 
201.0 
1.2 
38.1 
456.3 
184.5 
125.5 
15.5 
1022.2 
31.6 
69.2 
32.2 
43.7 
31.9 
Table 2 — EUR 12 
Electricity: Supply, disposal and 
1986 
173.5 
139.2 
34.3 
150.1 
123.6 
14.0 
138.2 
599.4 
60.3 
60.5 
356.3 
64.6 
1.2 
482.5 
5.8 
5.1 
1.5 
3.7 
1.4 
11.0 
30.5 
231.1 
197.7 
— 2.6 
35.9 
472.2 
186.8 
138.2 
15.2 
1043.5 
30.6 
70,9 
34.6 
44.9 
33.2 
1987 
171.3 
136.7 
34.5 
144.2 
128.2 
13.3 
141.4 
598.4 
61.5 
62.0 
348.6 
70.9 
1.2 
482.2 
3.8 
1.8 
1.2 
— 0.3 
0.5 
4.1 
28.8 
231.1 
199.0 
— 1.8 
33.8 
464.4 
198.5 
141.4 
14.5 
1049.9 
31.2 
70.7 
35.7 
44.7 
32.3 
generation 
(Last revision: 23 November 1987) 
Electrical power (TWh) 
Total generation 
Total generation 
without pumping 
of which: 
Primary 
Derived: 
Nuclear 
Conventional thermal 
Total net production 
Gross inland consumption 
Available for internal market 
Consumption internal market 
Input to thermal power 
stations (Mtoe) 
Hard coal 
Lignite 
Petroleum products 
Natural gas 
Derived gas 
Total 
Production nuclear 
heat (TWh) 
1984 
1 499.9 
1 482.9 
172.1 
1 310.8 
399.0 
911.7 
1 419.5 
1 517.9 
1 420.5 
1 322.2 
95.4 
32.5 
50.9 
24.8 
5.3 
208.9 
1 212.1 
1985 
1 570.4 
1 551.7 
166.9 
1 384.8 
483.2 
901.6 
1 485.5 
1 584.2 
1 480.6 
1 376.8 
108.5 
32.6 
39.3 
22.7 
5.6 
208.6 
1 459.7 
1986 
1 606.0 
1 588.7 
163.0 
1 425.7 
522.0 
903.6 
1 519.3 
1 620.2 
1 516.3 
1 413.5 
112.2 
30.5 
35.7 
21.9 
5.7 
206.0 
1 606.4 
1987 
1 654.9 
1 639.5 
154.7 
1 484.8 
542.6 
942.2 
1 561.9 
1 668.9 
1 560.7 
1 453.8 
119.1 
30.0 
36.6 
24.5 
7.4 
217.6 
1 644.5 
1988 
167.3 
132.6 
34.6 
142.2 
131.6 
13.6 
146.5 
601.2 
63.3 
64.2 
342.2 
70.7 
1.7 
477.9 
2.7 
0.8 
1.2 
— 3.4 
— 0.5 
— 1.1 
29.4 
230.0 
198.1 
— 2.5 
34.4 
458.5 
202.7 
146.5 
15.3 
1053.0 
32.4 
70.2 
34.9 
44.2 
31.6 
1988 
1.677.8 
1 662.1 
158.6 
1 503.5 
567.1 
936.4 
1 582.8 
1 697.7 
1 587.0 
1 474.3 
118.2 
30.0 
35.5 
24.8 
6.9 
215.3 
1 703.0 
1. ou (Mr; 
Primary production 
Change in stocks 
Net imports 
Bunkers 
Apparent consumption 
Inland deliveries: 
Motor gasoline 
Gas/diesel oU 
Heavy fuel oU 
Kerosenes 
Other products 
Total 
Power stations: 
Consumption 
2. Natural gas (Mtoe) 
Primary production 
Change in stocks 
Net imports 
Apparent consumption 
of which: 
Power stations: 
Final consumption (est) 
1984 
144.0 
— 3.5 
348.1 
24.5 
471.2 
91.6 
155.9 
98.2 
21.0 
78.9 
445.6 
53.3 
119.4 
0.4 
57.3 
176.2 
24.8 
145.8 
1985 
147.7 
0.7 
331.2 
27.0 
451.2 
91.2 
162.2 
78.1 
21.7 
77.2 
430.4 
41.1 
126.7 
1.6 
59.4 
184.5 
22.7 
154.6 
Table 4 — EUR 12 
Solid fuels: 
1986 
148.5 
3.8 
354.0 
31.4 
467.3 
95.6 
170.4 
74.6 
22.8 
78.9 
442.3 
37.3 
123.6 
1.4 
64.6 
186.8 
21.9 
157.0 
: Supply and disposal 
(Last revision: 23 November 1987) 
1. Hard coal (Mt) 
Primary production 
Recovered production 
Change in stocks: 
Collieries 
Power Plants 
Total 
Net imports 
Apparent consumption 
Deliveries to: 
Power plants 
Coking plants 
All industries 
Households 
Patent plants 
Other 
Total 
Consumption in power 
stations 
2. Hard coke (Mt) 
Coking plants 
Production 
Change in stocks 
Deliveries to the 
iron and steel 
industry 
3. Lignite (Mt) 
Production 
Consumption in 
power stations 
1984 
172.6 
6.0 
— 8.0 
— 13.0 
—21.1 
86.4 
286.1 
146.0 
75.1 
28.8 
16.0 
2.8 
1.6 
270.2 
159.1 
56.2 
— 5.2 
52.1 
186.4 
168.5 
1985 
217.5 
7.6 
— 10.3 
8.1 
— 2.2 
96.4 
323.7 
188.9 
81.3 
33.6 
18.3 
3.4 
1.8 
327.1 
180.8 
60.8 
— 3.9 
53.2 
183.0 
171.3 
1986 
228.2 
6.8 
0.3 
8.2 
8.4 
91.7 
318.3 
195.2 
78.1 
31.3 
18.1 
3.4 
1.4 
327.5 
187.0 
58.4 
2.2 
47.9 
176.9 
160.3 
1987 
142.6 
— 0.4 
345.9 
29.7 
459.3 
97.8 
166.5 
70.8 
23.4 
77.4 
436.0 
38.3 
128.2 
0.5 
70.9 
198.5 
24.5 
165.5 
1987 
224.1 
4.7 
2.6 
0.4 
3.0 
93.9 
319.8 
198.8 
71.4 
30.4 
16.6 
3.1 
1.6 
321.7 
198.4 
53.9 
1.8 
44.6 
178.0 
153.9 
1988 
140.6 
— 3.4 
339.5 
30.3 
453.2 
97.8 
169.8 
65.5 
23.8 
75.6 
432.5 
37.1 
131.6 
— 0.5 
70.7 
202.7 
24.8 
169.3 
1988 
217.4 
4.8 
1.8 
— 0.4 
1.4 
97.3 
318.1 
196.6 
68.7 
31.6 
16.1 
3.1 
1.5 
317.7 
197.0 
51.5 
1.7 
41.7 
178.6 
155.5 
Note: From 1987 Spanish black lignite ('negro') is included in hard coal figures. 
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Table 5 — EUR 12 Quarterly primary energy balance 
(Last revision: 23 November 1987) 
(Mtoe) 
Primary production 
Solid fuels: 
Hard coal 
Lignite 
OU 
Natural gas 
Primary electricity 
Nuclear 
Total 
Net imports 
Solid fuels: 
Hard coal 
OU 
Natural gas 
Electricity 
Total 
Change in stocks 
Solid fuels: 
Hard coal 
Coke 
OU 
Natural gas 
Total 
Bunkers 
Gross inland consumption 
Solid fuels: 
Hard coal 
Coke 
Lignite 
OU 
Natural gas 
Nuclear 
Primary electricity 
Total 
Net imports as % 
of consumption 
Hard coal 
OU 
Natural gas 
Total 
OU imports as % of total 
energy consumption 
1 Q 8 6 
45.5 
36.3 
9.2 
39.5 
43.4 
3.5 
38.5 
170.4 
13.9 
13.8 
83.4 
17.5 
0.1 
114.9 
— 7.1 
— 6.9 
0.0 
— 7.4 
— 6.5 
—20.9 
7.2 
67.3 
57.8 
— 0.2 
9.7 
123.1 
67.3 
38.5 
3.6 
299.8 
23.9 
64.0 
26.0 
37.4 
27.1 
2 Q 86 
43.0 
34.7 
8.3 
36.1 
25.8 
4.7 
32.4 
142.0 
16.9 
17.1 
94.3 
15.0 
0.7 
126.8 
6.5 
6.4 
0.2 
4.3 
3.9 
14.7 
8.0 
54.1 
46.2 
— 0.7 
8.6 
118.1 
36.8 
32.4 
5.4 
246.9 
37.1 
74.7 
40.7 
49.7 
37.0 
3 Q 86 
40.2 
32.3 
8.0 
37.7 
20.5 
3.1 
30.4 
132.0 
14.6 
14.7 
94.8 
14.0 
0.4 
123.8 
6.2 
5.6 
0.7 
10.6 
5.0 
21.8 
7.9 
49.4 
42.1 
— 1.0 
8.2 
114.1 
29.5 
30.4 
3.5 
226.9 
34.9 
77.7 
47.5 
52.7 
40.4 
4 Q 86 
44.8 
35.9 
8.9 
36.7 
34.0 
2.7 
36.8 
155.0 
15.0 
14.9 
83.9 
18.1 
0.0 
117.0 
0.3 
0.0 
0.6 
— 3.7 
— 1.1 
— 4.5 
7.3 
60.3 
51.6 
— 0.7 
9.4 
117.0 
53.2 
36.8 
2.7 
269.9 
28.8 
67.5 
34.1 
42.2 
30.3 
1 Q 87 
44.1 
35.4 
8.7 
37.7 
46.6 
3.4 
39.5 
171.3 
14.6 
14.4 
85.5 
19.6 
0.2 
119.9 
— 4.9 
— 5.3 
0.2 
— 5.2 
— 6.9 
— 17.0 
6.9 
64.1 
55.6 
— 0.4 
8.9 
121.5 
73.1 
39.5 
3.6 
301.8 
25.8 
66.6 
26.8 
38.8 
27.7 
2 Q 87 
41.8 
33.7 
8.1 
35.1 
25.7 
4.3 
30.8 
137.7 
15.5 
15.3 
84.8 
18.4 
0.4 
119.1 
2.3 
1.8 
0.1 
2.2 
5.2 
9.7 
7.2 
55.5 
47.7 
— 0.1 
8.0 
110.5 
38.8 
30.8 
4.6 
240.4 
32.1 
72.1 
47.3 
48.1 
34.3 
3 Q 87 
40.5 
32.0 
8.4 
34.4 
19.9 
3.1 
32.2 
130.1 
14.9 
15.5 
89.9 
14.5 
0.6 
119.8 
5.8 
5.2 
0.5 
.5.3 
3.9 
14.9 
7.3 
50.0 
42.8 
— 0.8 
8.0 
111.7 
30.6 
32.2 
3.6 
228.2 
36.2 
75.5 
47.5 
50.9 
38.2 
4 Q 87 
44.9 
35.6 
9.3 
37.1 
36.0 
2.6 
38.8 
159.4 
16.6 
16.8 
88.4 
18.4 
0.1 
123.4 
0.6 
0.0 
0.5 
— 2.5 
— 1.6 
— 3.5 
7.4 
61.5 
53.0 
— 0.5 
9.0 
120.6 
56.0 
38.8 
2.6 
279.5 
31.7 
69.1 
32.8 
43.0 
30.8 
1 Q 88 
43.1 
34.3 
8.8 
36.9 
44.7 
3.5 
40.6 
168.9 
15.4 
15.2 
87.3 
19.5 
0.1 
122.3 
— 5.0 
— 5.4 
0.2 
— 3.5 
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Informal meeting of Energy 
Ministers 
An informal meeting of Energy Ministers took place, at 
the initiative of the Danish Presidency, in Denmark on 21 
September 1987. Three themes were discussed at the 
meeting — encouraging the more efficient use of energy; 
stimulation of new and renewable energies and the rela-
tionship between energy and the environment with par-
ticular reference to the Brundtland report. 
At the meeting Commissioner Nie Mosar underlined the 
impact these three topics had on the long-term energy 
security of the EC and on the attainment of the 1995 
Community energy objectives. Now that energy prices 
were low the outlook for improved energy efficiency and 
the possibility of a greater contribution from new and re-
newables were now more uncertain. Energy policy must 
act to support continuity in the investments necessary to 
ensure that the potential for further energy efficiency 
and new and renewable energies was realized. Since both 
these elements are by and large environmentally benefi-
cial their continued development would improve the en-
vironmental aspects of energy use. 
The two themes of energy efficiency and new and re-
newable energies have been under discussion at recent en-
ergy councils and a detailed recommendation on new and 
renewable energies, which is designed to assist the de-
velopment and exploitation of these energies, was to be 
considered by Ministers at their meeting in November. 
At the informal meeting Ministers felt that some of the 
problems facing the greater commercialization of new 
and renewable energies needed more detailed considera-
tion. Suggested follow-up on this aspect was to be 
proposed by the Commission at the next meeting of En-
ergy Ministers in November. 
Energy Council—13 November 
1987 
The Council of Ministers met in Brussels on 13 No-
vember. The meeting was chaired by Mr Svend Erik 
Hovmand, Minister for Energy (Denmark). The Com-
mission was represented by Mr Nie Mosar, Commis-
sioner for Energy. 
On the basis of a Communication from the Commission 
the Council released a recommendation on developing 
the exploitation of renewable energy sources in the Com-
munity. The Council also took note of the Commission's 
intention to organize for autumn 1988 an international 
conference, among the objectives of which would be to 
identify opposition to the commercialization of such 
sources of energy. 
On the basis of a Communication from the Commission 
concerning improvements in the efficiency of electricity 
use, the Council recognized the importance of this objec-
tive and took note of the intention of the Commission to 
present to the Council, in the course of the second 
quarter of 1988, in association with all the partners con-
cerned (producers, distributors and consumers of 
electricity) a work programme in this field. 
The Council had an exchange of views on the Commis-
sion's proposal for a directive concerning information on 
the energy efficiency of buildings. It emphasized the im-
portance that it attaches to the problems of energy effi-
ciency in general and noted that the building sector 
accounts for more than 38% of the Community's final 
energy consumption. The Council invited the Commis-
sion to reflect on the possibility of the conclusions taking 
the form of a Recommendation rather than a Directive. 
Concerning the study of the costs supported by the ref-
ining industry in Member States in order to conform to 
environment legislation, the Council expressed the view 
that it should be given greater depth by contacts between 
the Member States and the Commission. 
Finally, the Council had an exchange of views on the oil 
situation and on the energy aspects of bioethanol. 
The Research Council adopts the 
framework programme for 
research and technological 
development (1987-91) 
In Brussels on 28 September the European Community 
Research Ministers formally adopted the framework 
programme for research and technological development 
(1987-91) which had been under discussion for a year and 
on which the Council had adopted a mutually agreed 
position at the end of July. The 1987-91 programme will 
provide a general framework for the Community's ac-
tivities in the field of research and technology for the 
next five years. It sets out the objectives, priorities and 
overall budget for these activities and the breakdown by 
major sector. 
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It is based on the Single Act which formally assigns the 
Community responsibilities concerning research and 
technological development. The underlying philosophy is 
simple: the intention is not, of course, to transfer to the 
Community level a maximum amount of research being 
conducted in Europe (a pointless exercise) but rather to 
cany out on a Community scale all the research which, 
for one reason or another, it is more useful, more 
profitable, and more effective to conduct at that level: 
research in areas where the problems which, in the nature 
of things, affect the European Community as a whole, 
e.g. protection of the environment and health; research 
which is beyond the financial and human resources of in-
dividual Member States, such as research into controlled 
thermonuclear fusion; research which will help to com-
plete the internal market by providing the basis for com-
mon standards; and research in areas where it is essential 
to make maximum possible use of the complementary 
knowledge and skills existing in Europe. The latter is the 
most general case. 
The Decision of 28 September sets the total amount 
deemed necessary for the framework programme at 
5 396 million ECU (of which no more than 4 533 million 
ECU will have to be committed before the end of 1991), 
without prejudice to the 1 084 million ECU for prog-
rammes already decided upon or in progress. The total 
amount represents the sum allocated to specific prog-
rammes to be adopted during the period. 
There are eight main areas of activities and the break-
down between them is as follows: 
An examination of the breakdown shows that energy re-
search (area 5) still accounts for a significant proportion 
of Community research and technological development. 
The basic principle underlying the Community's activi-
ties in this area is to maintain and develop a European 
technological capacity which is as diversified as possible, 
since the best way of guaranteeing the European Com-
munity's energy self-sufficiency is to diversify its energy 
sources and ensure a close match between the forms of 
energy exploited and the needs. 
With this aim in view, the Community's endeavours will 
continue to be deployed in various directions, covering 
controlled thermonuclear fusion, fission energy and non-
nuclear energy — meaning alternative energy sources, 
optimum exploitation of fossil energy sources, rational 
use of energy, etc. 
Where fusion is concerned, research will continue under 
the JET programme and detailed design work will be 
Framework programme of Community activities in the field of research 
and technological development (1987-91) 
Breakdown of the amount deemed necessary between the various 
activities envisaged 
(million ECU) 
1. 
1.1. 
1.2. 
1.3. 
2. 
2.1. 
2.2. 
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3. 
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3.4. 
4. 
4.1. 
4.2. 
4.3. 
5. 
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Radiation protection 
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Science and technology for manufacturing industry 
Science and technology of advanced materials 
Raw materials and recycling 
Technical standards, measurement methods 
and reference materials 
Exploitation and optimum use of biological resources 
Biotechnology 
Agro-industrial technologies 
Competitiveness of agriculture and management 
of agricultural resources 
Energy 
Fissions nuclear safery 
Controlled thermonuclear fusion 
Non-nuclear energies and rational use of energy 
Science and technology for development 
Exploitation of the sea bed and use of marine resources 
Marine science and technology 
Fisheries 
Improvement of European S/T cooperation 
Stimulation, enhancement and use of human resources 
Use of major installations 
Forecasting and assessment and other back-up 
measures (including statistics) 
Dissemination and utilization of S/T research results 
80 
34 
261 
1 600 
550 
125 
400 
220 
45 
180 
120 
105 
55 
440 
611 
122 
80 
50 
30 
180 
30 
23 
55 
Total 
375 
2 275 
845 
280 
1 173 
80 
80 
288 
5 396 
started on the NET, the next major experimental fusion 
machine. Focusing mainly on nuclear safety problems, 
the Community's activities in the fission sphere will re-
late to reactor safety and radioactive waste management 
(JRC activities and shared-cost programmes) and the de-
commissioning of nuclear installations. The 1985-88 non-
nuclear energy research programme will be followed by a 
new, fourth programme once it is completed. 
European Parliament 
Plans went ahead for a major public hearing organized 
by the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology 
of the European Parliament on European coal policy to 
take place in Brussels on 1 December morning and 2 
December afternoon. Amongst those invited were 
Dr Helga Steeg (IEA, OECD); Dr H. Messerschmidt 
(FR of Germany); Mr Gheyselinck (Belgium); 
Mr Cerezuela (Spain); Dr Tamburiini (Italy). 
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Amongst the subjects being examined are: the present 
state of the world coal markets, prospects for transform-
ing that market in the years to come with particular em-
phasis on international trade questions and social and 
regional consequences of changes in the structure of the 
coal market. 
Further information can be obtained from the Secreta-
riat of the Committee on Energy — Ms Tove Fihl, Eu-
ropean Parliament, Office 5/57, Schuman Building, 
L-2929, Luxembourg. 
The Committee will also be examining in the weeks 
ahead the revision of thermonuclear fusion research pro-
ject and changes to the JET regulations. One question 
the Committee will be looking at very closely will be the 
advantages and opportunities for international coopera-
tion between the Community and its main competitiors 
in the fusion field — Japan, USA and the USSR. 
The STOA (Science and Technology Option Assessment) 
project set up, under the aegis of the Commission, a 
workshop on thermonuclear fusion in Oxford, England 
on 12 and 13 November. Amongst those participating 
were: Mr Rolf Linkohr (FR of Germany, S); 
Mr Bernhard Sälzer (FR of Germany, PPE); 
Mr Gordon Adam (United Kingdom, S). The rapporteur 
is Mr Alman Metten (The Netherlands, S). 
The Committee had adopted, some months ago, a report 
on fast breeder reactors which was presented to the Sep-
tember plenary session of the European Parliament by 
Mr Michel Poniatowski, Chairman of the Committee 
(France, LDR). On his recommendation, however, Par-
liament decided to send the report back to Committee in 
view of the new situation following incidents at the Su-
perphenix reactor at Creys-Malville in France. The Com-
mittee has appointed Mr Madron Seligman (United 
Kingdom, ED) to take over the report. He will be com-
menting on decisions which the French Government is 
expected to take at the end of this year concerning the fu-
ture of the project. 
Mrs Bloch von Blottnitz (FR of Germany, ARC) will be 
reporting to the Committee on an idea put forward by 
Mr Robles Piquer (Spain, ED) to make 1989 the Com-
munity year for alternative energy. The rapporteur sup-
ports this idea and will be putting her report to the Com-
mittee in October and November. If adopted, Parliament 
will ask the Commission to take on board this proposal. 
Economic and Social 
Committee—the consequences 
of Chernobyl 
The Chernobyl nuclear accident raised once again the 
question of the operation of nuclear installations and the 
national and international responsibilities that go with it. 
Even if no direct lessons can be learnt from the Cher-
nobyl accident as regards the physical design of Western 
reactors, since they are fundamentally different, the 
Member States and the Community should, nevertheless, 
learn from this accident, and in particular, in the view of 
the ECSC, pay more attention to nuclear safety. 
One of the points raised by Chernobyl is that one can 
never rule out the possibility of a nuclear accident oc-
curring which will have an impact extending beyond 
1 000 kilometres. 
The Economic and Social Committee has already repeat-
edly expressed its concern in the past and has made 
recommendations on the subject. In 1977, for example, it 
proposed a nuclear safety code for the Community. 
The Committee has once again discussed this issue, and 
at its July 1987 plenary session adopted an Own-initiative 
Opinion on the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear 
accident (rapporteur: Mr Flum — FR of Germany, 
Workers' Group, co-rapporteur: Mr von der Decken 
— FR of Germany, Various Interests Group). 
The Opinion compares the safety arrangements in force 
at Chernobyl and in Western Europe and analyses the 
nuclear accident. In addition, the Committee draws con-
clusions from the accident and other accidents which 
have occurred in the West, in particular as regards 
improving the safety of nuclear installations and the need 
for international agreements on the harmonization of 
reactor safety standards and an international system for 
evaluating reactor safety. 
While emphasizing that the Chernobyl nuclear accident 
must be seized upon as an opportunity to continue the 
discussions about the risks and advantages of the new 
technologies, in conjunction with the economic and so-
cial circles, the Committee makes a number of recom-
mendations aimed in particular at the Community in-
stitutions. 
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It urges the Commission to make full use of its 
powers to make recommendations concerning the 
limit values for the radioactive contamination of 
food, and calls upon the Member States to estab-
lish the legal basis for setting such limit values. 
The Committee also urges that an overall examination of 
the existing energy supply structure should go hand-in-
hand with the planning of complementary or alternative 
solutions, such as new nuclear fission systems with ex-
tensive inherent safety, the enormous potential of energy 
saving, renewable energy sources, particularly solar en-
ergy and the further development of nuclear fusion. 
The Committee believes that this approach offers the ad-
vantage of economic and technological continuity, a high 
degree of flexibility, a high level of job security and a 
socio-political consensus. 
ECSC Consultative Committee 
At its 265th session of 25 September 1987, the Consulta-
tive Committee considered the Commission services' 
working document revising its report on the market for 
solid fuels in the Community in 1986 and the outlook for 
1987. 
The Committee expressed its concern about the develop-
ments shown in this report, indicating a further decrease 
in solid fuels deliveries within the Community. It urged 
the Commission and Member States to take appropriate 
measures to bring trends back into line with the agreed 
Community energy objectives for 1995. 
Information symposium on 
improving productivity through 
technology: modern 
management in the coal mines of 
the European Community 
The Commission of the European Communities or-
ganizes, regularly, symposia in order to present the re-
sults of ECSC research activities on mining engineering 
and product upgrading. The forthcoming symposium, 
which will be held in Luxembourg from 4 to 6 May 1988, 
aims to demonstrate the progress which has been made 
during recent years in the field of modern mine manage-
ment, with particular regard to remote monitoring and 
control, management information systems, colliery 
systems, planning and reliability. Specialized papers will 
be read and there will be more detailed discussion in the 
course of three round table meetings. Further informa-
tion may be obtained by writing to: P. P. Rotondo, 
Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII-
C-2, L-2929, Luxembourg; Tel. 4301 3166. 
Improving the efficiency of 
electricity use 
The Conunission continues to give a high priority to its 
work in the energy savings sector, in line with the agreed 
Community objective of achieving at least a 20% im-
provement in the efficiency of final energy demand by 
1995. In this context, the Commission has communicated 
to the Council (COM(87)496 of 27 October 1987) a re-
view of the case for a concerted programme of action 
throughout the Community to exploit the existing signifi-
cant potential for improved efficiency in the use of 
electricity. This communication was considered by the 
Energy Council at its meeting on 13 November 1987. 
In its communication the Commission points out the im-
portance of energy savings in electricity use. This sector 
accounts for an increasing proportion (currently some 
17%) of final energy use in the Community and electri-
city production accounts for over a third of total primary 
energy use. Electricity plays a key role in the economic 
and social life of the Community, contributing to better 
industrial performance and increased standards of living, 
and efficiency improvements in its use can bring signifi-
cant benefits in terms of reduced primary energy require-
ments, reduction in consumers' electricity bills and re-
duced need for costly investments in power plants. 
The Commission intends to draw up a concerted action 
programme in this area, in cooperation with Member 
State governments, electricity utilities, electrical equip-
ment manufacturers, representatives of electricity 
consumers and other interested parties. It is foreseen that 
the programme will be drawn up and presented to the 
Council for discussion by the second half of 1988. 
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Commissioner Mosar in high 
level talks with Norway 
Commissioner Nie Mosar, together with Mr Robert 
De Bauw, the Commission's Director for Hydrocarbons, 
and Mr Christian Waeterloos, member of Mr Mosar's 
personal staff, visited Oslo on 28 and 29 September for 
talks with Mr Arne Oien, Norway's Minister for Energy, 
and officials from his Ministry. The opportunity was 
also taken to meet Mrs K. Jesteby, the Norwegian For-
eign Secretary. 
Commissioner Mosar and Minister Oien had a wide-
ranging discussion on energy matters of mutual interest 
with particular emphasis on oil and gas. Mr Oien stated 
Norway's objective to increase gas production in the next 
few years whilst striving to maintain oil production levels 
as far as possible into the future. A principal concern of 
the Norwegian Government was to maintain hydro-
carbon development at reasonable levels to avoid over-
activity in the oil and gas sector and a too rapid exploita-
tion of resources. 
group also visited the existing Training Centres at 
Tianjin and Hangzhou, and took part in the opening 
ceremony of a joint energy conservation seminar in 
Shanghai. 
The purpose of the visit to India was to follow up the 
agreements made earlier in the year that the EC and In-
dia would cooperate in establishing a joint Energy Man-
agement Centre in India, and in an Energy Bus prog-
ramme to provide advice to Indian industry on energy 
saving. Meetings were held with the Indian Ministries of 
Energy and Industry, as well as other relevant public and 
private sector organizations. These resulted in a wide 
measure of agreement on the role and structure of the 
new India-EC Management Centre, and on the first 
phase of the Energy Bus programme. The Indian au-
thorities will now be considering the question of the Cen-
tre's location. In the meantime, work will continue on 
both sides to implement these agreements by establishing 
the Centre in the course of 1989 and by launching the 
first Energy Bus operation at the turn of that year. 
Mrs Jesteby drew attention to the need for international 
dialogue between oil producers and consumers and high-
lighted the role of Norway in this respect. Mr Mosar 
agreed on the necessity of such a dialogue and pointed to 
Commission efforts to promote exchanges of informa-
tion with producers, for example with OPEC and 
OAPEC. 
Commissioner Mosar and Minister Oien agreed on the 
usefulness of the talks and will meet again next year in 
Brussels. 
Energy planning cooperation: 
China and India 
A small group of DG XVII officials, led by Clive Jones 
(Deputy Director-General), visited China and India from 
26 October to 6 November. In China discussions were 
held with a wide range of agencies and agreement was 
reached with the State Science and Technology Commis-
sion on the 1988 EC-China Cooperation Programme. 
This Programme will include the continuation of training 
activities at five existing and three new China-EC 
Training Centres, support for energy policy studies, and 
technical assistance in certain specific energy sectors such 
as electricity, coal, nuclear safety and natural gas. The 
Seminar on the Community's 
energy planning activities in 
Europe and the developing 
countries — Marseilles, 
13 to 16 October 1987 
This seminar, which was organized jointly by the 
ARENE of the Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur Regional 
Council and the Commission of the European Com-
munities, brought together over 120 participants from 
Europe (local, regional and national representatives of 
the 12 EEC countries), and from the Third World 
(China, Indonesia, India, Thailand, Jordan, the Magh-
reb countries, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Senegal, etc.), 
policymakers, administrators, experts, and research 
workers and academics. 
The purpose of the seminar was to draw lessons from the 
experiments with energy planning which had been 
conducted for a number of years in numerous European 
regions and in certain Third World countries under the 
auspices of the Commission of the European Communi-
ties. 
Seminars on this subject have been held by the Commis-
sion since 1983 in Brussels, Berlin and Luxembourg. 
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Marseilles and the ARENE of the Regional Council were 
selected this year because the Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur energy planning project is an exemplary one in 
the context of the various regional energy planning ac-
tivities supported by the EEC, in terms both of organiza-
tion and of the results obtained. 
The European Commission has actively supported the ef-
forts of regions in the European Community and 
countries in the Third World to ensure better planning 
and control of energy systems for several years now at a 
time when Europe and many developing countries have 
felt the full force of the consequences of the energy crisis 
resulting from the tension (and more recently the volatil-
ity) of oil prices. In the first instance, these efforts have 
focused on a better understanding of energy flows (an 
understanding which was distinctly lacking in the wake 
of the various oil shocks), emphasis deliberately being 
placed on a better understanding of energy demand and 
the energy demand trend. 
Another objective was to help establish appropriate 
planning instruments so that both the regions of Europe 
and the countries of the Third World can implement en-
ergy-conservation programmes and programmes to use 
new and renewable energy resources (making the best 
possible use of local resources), and in so doing diversify 
their energy resources and increase their self-sufficiency. 
It also seemed worthwhile to bring together, under the 
auspices of the Commission of the European Communi-
ties, the various regional authorities in Europe, together 
with representatives from many of the Third World 
countries. 
These exchanges of experience have helped to bring 
about a wider dissemination, among the authorities con-
cerned, of planning techniques which have proved their 
worth in a particular European region or a particular 
country, and a better overall understanding of energy 
supply mechanisms at a time when energy still represents 
one of the major constraints on balanced economic de-
velopment both in Europe and in the developing 
countries. 
The challenges which our societies must meet between 
now and the end of the century are known: chronic 
underemployment in Europe due to an inability to com-
pete on international markets and dramatic tech-
nological changes, serious environmental pollution, un-
equal and unbalanced economic and social development, 
difficulties for the Third World to finance the invest-
ment needed in order to satisfy the needs of the popula-
tion. Energy plays a central role in all this: where pollu-
tion, the spread of deserts in the Third World, indebted-
ness and technological changes are concerned, energy is a 
fundamental constraint which must be taken into ac-
count in all cases. 
These topics were discussed by decision-makers, experts, 
academics and research workers in Marseilles. This year 
the emphasis was on the following highly topical sub-
jects: energy and regional development, energy and en-
vironment, energy and investment decisions. 
Third-party financing seminar — 
Luxembourg, 8 and 9 October 
1987 
The seminar was intended to introduce the concept of 
third-party financing to a wider European public. Third-
party financing is the mobilization of private capital to 
fund energy saving investments by an outside company, 
using the cost savings themselves to pay for that invest-
ment. 
One hundred and eighty participants drawn from the 
financial community, central and local government, en-
gineering consultancies and utilities were addressed by 
North American and European experts in third-party fi-
nancing. The model contracts and guidebooks drawn up 
by the Commission were presented at the seminar and 
were discussed during workshop sessions. 
Energy in industry conference — 
Berlin, 19 and 20 October 1987 
The programme of the Conference presented the 250 par-
ticipants with several essential aspects of the technologies 
associated with the rational use of energy in industry. 
Among the topics presented were: 
(i) energy audits; 
(ii) heat recovery at low temperatures; 
(iii) optimization of industrial processes; 
(iv) electricity use management. 
Each session consisted of an introduction to the techno-
logy followed by the presentation of several practical ap-
plications. A round table on the problems of financing 
energy efficiency investments closed the conference. 
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European gas conference in 
Madrid 
On 24 and 25 September, Unigas, the Spanish gas as-
sociation, in cooperation with the Commission of the 
European Communities, organized the Jornadas Eu-
ropeas del Gas in Madrid. From the EC, contributions 
were given by representatives of the Commission, the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the European Investment Bank. 
The purpose of the conference was to inform about the 
possibilities for the future development of the Spanish 
gas industry in Une with Community energy policy and in 
view of earlier developments elsewhere in Europe. The 
conference also dealt with the possibilities of organizing 
the financing of the required infrastructural investments 
with the help of Community institutions. 
The conference was opened by Mr Fernando Maravell, 
Secretary-General of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources, and closed by Mr Guillermo de la Dehesa, 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Mr R. De 
Bauw, Director of Oil and Natural Gas at DG XVII, de-
livered a speech on the Community's energy policy and 
the place of gas therein. 
Workshop on energy and 
employment — 
Brussels, 30 November to 
1 December 1987 
In the framework of its activities on regional energy 
planning in the EC, the Commission has financed several 
studies analysing the effects of energy-related activities 
on employment. Moreover, through our various contacts 
the Commission knows that important work is also being 
done on the same subject by organizations and institu-
tions in various regions, financed by other sources. 
The Commission therefore organized an informal meet-
ing where experiences in this field could be exchanged. 
The ultimate purpose of this meeting was to draw conclu-
sions which would assist in the orientation of future 
work. 
The presentations made at the Workshop will be pub-
lished. Further information concerning the outcome of 
the Workshop can be obtained by contacting Mrs Borg, 
Directorate-General for Energy, Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Brussels. 
Commission hosts meeting of 
energy forecasting and planning 
experts 
On 6 and 7 October 1987 the European Commission's 
Directorate-General for Energy hosted in Brussels a 
meeting of experts on energy forecasting and planning 
from a number of international organizations (Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, Economic Commission 
for Europe, International Energy Agency, Nuclear En-
ergy Agency, World Energy Conference and Economic 
and Social Committee for Western Asia). 
This was the sixth annual meeting of a group established 
under the auspices of the IAEA and which provides a 
regular forum for exchanges of information among the 
organizations concerned and for discussion of analytical 
topics of mutual interest. 
On this occasion much of the discussion focused on the 
fall in oil prices of 1986 and its possible implications for 
energy demand and supply in the medium and longer 
term. The energy outlook for the developing countries 
was widely considered to represent the greatest source of 
uncertainty for the future. This was felt to underline the 
importance of efforts to improve energy planning and 
management in these countries by means of the prog-
rammes undertaken by the European Commission, the 
IAEA and regional organizations in the developing world 
itself. 
The next meeting of the group is expected to take place in 
spring 1988, probably in Paris. That occasion should 
provide an opportunity for discussion of the first results 
of a large-scale forecasting exercise (looking to 2020) 
which is being undertaken by the staff of the World En-
ergy Conference with the help of the European Commis-
sion and many of the other organizations represented at 
the Brussels meeting. The final results of the study will be 
presented to the next World Energy Conference in Mon-
treal in 1989. 
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Two centrifugal slurry booster pumps in series transport 
the coal to the dewatering plant via a 2.5 km long, 
250 mm diameter pipeline. 
The dewatering plant (see diagram) combines a series of 
vibrating screens, centrifuges, cyclones, thickeners and 
continuous pressure filters. The water that is recovered 
by the dewatering process will be neutralized before 
being recirculated to the water storage pond as part of 
the closed loop system. 
The coarse coal dewatering plant has been designed for 
an operating capacity of 300 t/h dry coal and has a target 
percentage of coal recovery of 99.5 °7o, or better, based 
upon a maximum of 12 % total end moisture. 
The system has been designed to allow for coal from var-
ious origins in the United States, Australia, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Poland. 
Unloading unit, dumper/reclaimer and dewatering plant 
are each controlled by a PLC-type control system. The 
process is semi-automatic, whereby the operators still 
play a major role in the supervision and control of the 
different processes. The set-up of the control system is 
flexible in order to modify and further automate the 
process control. 
A supervisory system with operator interfaces at the 
three different plant locations will support the commu-
nication between these locations and will supply the plant 
management with relevant information on the system 
status. For automatic start, stop and emergency proce-
dures, this supervisory control system plays a crucial 
role. 
The supervisory system will also be used for data mon-
itoring and data acquisition during the test runs. 
Market survey and outlook 
As part of the project, a recent market survey has been 
carried out by Tebodin's Department of Economic 
Studies. The survey shows that new coal handling facili-
ties will be needed in southern Europe (Spain, Italy) and 
south-east Asia (Indonesia, India, Taiwan) and Japan. 
Furthermore, cost comparisons have been made between 
commercial-size conventional dry and wet slurry 
transhipment terminals. Based on actual data on five 
coal terminals under construction in Indonesia, the po-
tential use of slurry systems for newly-built terminals 
could be assessed. Two out of the five Indonesian cases 
show a commercial opportunity for slurry unloading. 
More in general, the project has led to the following 
conclusions as regards the commercial outlook for slurry 
unloading systems: 
(i) at locations with deep water access channels, with 
good port infrastructure and where the client is 
located fairly close to the coal handling site, dry coal 
transhipment is preferable to the slurry system; 
(ii) when major coal import infrastructure investments 
are required at locations that are less favourable for 
dry coal transhipment (mountains, swamps, etc.), 
there may be scope for initiating studies into coal 
slurry unloading. 
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Centralized management of 
heating systems in local 
authority buildings in Rennes 
Background — aim of the project 
For several years, the city of Rennes (population 
200 000) has been concerned to save energy, and projects 
have been conducted in several areas: household refuse, 
urban heating, transport, street lighting, municipal 
vehicles and local authority buildings. 
The local authority buildings (405 000 m2 of heated floor 
area, divided into 114 schools, 46 gymnasiums, four 
swimming pools, 12 crèches and other administrative 
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buildings and cultural, sporting and industrial faculties) 
have been the subject of a number of projects since 1973: 
renovation of heating systems, introduction of prog-
ramming and regulation, loft insulation, separation of 
circuits, heat pumps. It has thus been possible to obtain 
an energy saving of 50% under the heading of heating, 
which represents a yearly saving of more than FF 
12 million in 1985. In that year the energy consumption 
of local authority buildings represented 44% of total 
consumption for which the municipality was responsible. 
(iv) to obtain incidental indirect economies in materials, 
supervision, travelling expenses and labour costs. 
On 1 December 1980, the Municipal Council decided to 
implement the project for the 53 heating systems rated at 
more than 350 kW. The firm Sofrei was chosen to pilot 
the operation, with the assistance of CIT-Alcatel for the 
telephone, Missenard-Quint for the heating and Peri-
pheric for the data processing, and the completed work 
was accepted on 3 November 1982. 
Among the projects undertaken, an energy management 
system has been installed to enable energy consumption 
to be properly controlled and any drift to be checked. 
Analysis work carried out has thrown the difficulties en-
countered into relief : 
(i) the difficulty of recording the monthly and daily 
consumption of buildings; 
(ii) the impossibility of stopping the heating systems 
during short holidays or periods of warm weather. 
The total number of heating systems (130) and the 
fact that they are dispersed over the local authority 
area (5 000 ha) makes this difficult; 
(iii) long start-up and shut-down time for all equipment 
at the beginning and end of the season. 
The solution to these problems was found in installing a 
centralized management system for the heating systems 
(the subject of the demonstration project) in order: 
(i) to monitor and manage the installations in real time; 
(ii) while maintaining the same level of comfort, to re-
duce consumption: 
(a) by rapidly detecting breakdowns in heating com-
ponents either by means of alarms or by per-
forming calculations on measurements taken in 
the heating systems; 
(b) by centralized programming of exceptional days 
when no heating is required; 
(c) by individually shutting down heating systems in 
cases of mild outside temperatures at the change 
of season; 
(iii) to maintain the occupant's level of comfort by 
quickly dealing with defective equipment before the 
users feel any discomfort; 
The project was financed jointly by the city of Rennes, 
the Commission of the European Communities and the 
Agence française pour la maîtrise de l'énergie AFME — 
French Energy Saving Agency. 
Description of project 
Centralized management of heating systems, in its full 
sense, has to fulfil three functions: 
(i) the remote alarm function, which must enable 
operational faults to be detected and thus enable 
maintenance teams to intervene rapidly; however, 
this does not exclude supervisory visits; 
(ii) the remote control function, which must, princip-
ally, enable the heating system as a whole to be 
started up or shut down. The remote control must 
thus make it possible to take advantage of holidays 
or periods of mild weather to shut down the heating, 
which is important in Rennes at the change of 
seasons; 
(iii) the telemetry function, which must enable consump-
tion to be more precisely known and enable tem-
peratures in the installations to be monitored. The 
use of such measurements enables consumption 
trends to be followed and precise energy balance 
sheets to be drawn up by installing an 'energy 
gauge'. 
The system used complements the programming, regula-
tion and, where these are installed, heating optimization 
systems installed in the heating systems by centralizing 
the information (alarms, temperature measurements, en-
ergy counters, etc.) belonging to each installation and in 
no case does away with these. 
The system consists of: 
(a) transmitters installed in the heating system: their 
role, for which they use sensors, is to detect alarm 
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situations (operating faults) and take temperature 
measurements and energy talhes concerning the 
heating system and to transmit them to the central 
unit. Conversely, they also have the role of sending 
remote commands from the central unit to the cor­
responding components; 
(b) a central unit installed with the technical services: 
the role of this is to collect and process the informa­
tion received in accordance with the computer prog­
rammes developed for it, and to send automatically 
or manually generated remote commands to the 
heating systems; 
(c) a means of transmission: specialized telephone Unes 
which exist within the town and are connected to a 
private autoswitch. The original feature of the 
system is that the capacity of the existing Unes is 
doubled by transmitting the data on the high-fre­
quency band, which does not inconvenience tele­
phone users. 
Costs and results 
The total cost of the project (construction part) amounts 
to FF 4.26 million, tax included. From the follow-up, 
which was carried out during the 1984-85 season, there 
emerges an overall energy saving of some 160 toe/year, 
or 6.5% of previous consumption. 
The corresponding saving in money terms was of some 
FF 500 000. It should be noted that these results are only 
due to the remote control and telemetry. The balance 
sheet for the remote alarm system has not been drawn 
up. 
The initial objective (10% energy savings) has thus only 
partially been achieved. This is due to the fact that build­
ings had previously been subjected to very extensive im­
provements, involving both insulation and the optimiza­
tion of the operation of each unit. 
In addition, indirect savings, which it has not been pos­
sible to quantify, were obtained: 
(i) less travelling time for shutting down and starting up 
new units and responding to incidents (lack of 
water, faulty operation of burners, etc.); 
(ii) elimination of some routine inspection rounds; 
(iii) optimization of maintenance. 
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The future 
The actual remote management of the heating systems 
very soon turned out to be inadequate. 
Thus, on the initiative of the AFME and after a Eu-
ropean conference on remote management, organized at 
Rennes in June 1983 by the STCELA (Standing Tech-
nological Conference of European Local Authorities), 
an agreement to carry out a study of software was con-
cluded between the AFME, the city of Rennes, the 
Rennes INSA (Institut national des sciences appli-
quées — National Institute of Applied Sciences), the 
IRISA (Institut de recherches en informatique et 
systèmes aléatoires — Institute for Research into Data 
Processing and Random Systems) and the firm Sofrei. 
The main characteristics of the software developed are as 
follows: 
(i) they enable the operator to set and modify paramet-
ers; 
(ii) they make a true dialogue with the operator pos-
sible; 
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(iii) they make possible immediate interrogations, prog­
rammed either by the peripheral equipment or by 
the central unit; 
(iv) more wide­ranging management is possible; 
(v) operating tools are available (tables, graphs, 
diagrams, calculations). 
These tools make it possible to go a step further in de­
veloping more precise and flexible means for energy 
management. 
Document update 
Main Commission energy 
documents, proposals 
and directives 
COM/87/432 Proposal for a Council recommendation to the Mem­
ber States on developing the exploitation of renewable 
energy sources in the Community 
COM/87/401 Proposal for a Council directive on information on the 
energy efficiency of buildings 
COM/87/1404 Commission decision of 29 July 1987 on the granting 
of financial support for pilot industrial and dem­
onstration projects in the field of liquefaction and 
gasification of solid fuels 
COM/87/1400 Commission decision of 29 July 1987 on the granting 
of financial support for demonstration projects in the 
field of substitution of hydrocarbons by solid fuels 
COM/87/1399 Commission decision of 29 July 1987 on the granting 
of financial support to technological development pro­
jects in the hydrocarbons sector 
New energy publications 
Energy saving 
No 49 
No 50 
No 51 
No 52 
No 53 
No 54 
No 55 
No 56 
Inedible rendering by means of the wet pressing process 
Mechanical compression of organic vapours 
The Dutch 1 MW­wind turbine at Wieringermeer 
Use of solid refinery waste as fuel 
Continued electricity production by burning refinery gas 
Centralized management of heating systems in local authority 
buildings in Rennes 
Upgrading of biogas to raise its calorific value up to hydrogen 
gas quality standard in the central sewage plant at Suttgart­
Mtlhlhausen 
Drying under pressure 
Dumort, Α.; Lapillonne, B., Modèle de demande en énergie pour les 
pays du Sud, Office for Officiai Publications of the European Com­
munities, 1987 ­ ISBN 92­825­7395­8 
Daintith, Terence; Hancher, Leigh, La stratégie énergétique en 
Europe: son cadre juridique, Office for Official Publications of the Eu­
ropean Communities, 1987 ­ ISBN 92­825­6557­2 
Demuynck, Myriam; Nyns, Ε­J.; Palz, Wolfgang, Installations de 
biogaz en Europe - EUR 9096, PYC Edition, Paris, 1987 ­ ISBN 2­
85330­085­4 
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